

# THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

SEPTEMBER 1954

50¢

## Two Army Wives Talk About the Army Life





### Green Uniform Gets Green Light

The Army's proposed green uniform finally caught the approval of the Senate Appropriations Committee and orders for six million yards of cloth, enough for 1,400,000 uniforms, will be ordered soon. Enlisted men will probably be wearing the uniform late in 1955. Officers may be authorized to buy and wear it sooner. The Army promises a long wear-out period for the present uniform. Army recruiters may show up in it first in order to compete with the Air Force uniform.



### Training Problem for National Guard Medics

National Guard medical units on summer training get lots of experience in treating sunburn, poison ivy and related itches and miseries, but a major job of surgery seldom comes their way. It was different this year at the Delaware training camp of the District of Columbia National Guard. D. C. medics successfully performed two major emergency operations: one an appendectomy and the other for hernia. The patients feel fine now—and so do the medics who got a letter of commendation from the Surgeon General.


## The Month's Pictures

### Armor Trains at Camp Stewart

A sizeable segment of the 280,000-acre reservation at Camp Stewart, unused by the AAA Training Center, has been turned into a training area for Third Army tank outfits. The area is the only one east of the Mississippi River where 120mm guns can be fired at maximum range and it is probably the only post in the U.S. now used for tank training where combined arms (artillery, armor and infantry) can

engage in a river-crossing problem. Preparation of the area for tank training began in January when the 423d Engineer Battalion moved in to build tank trails and firing ranges. Since then a "tent city" has been erected 25 miles from the main cantonment area. The photograph shows ammunition being unloaded for the 194th Tank Battalion on one of the area's firing lines.





Army Engineer operating collapsible aluminum combat bridge.

## ON THE JOB... not "on the way"



This amazing bridge is of little value when the men who are trained to use it are delayed between assignments. That's why it's wise to get them "on the job" five times faster via the Scheduled Airlines.

It's sound economy, too. The Scheduled Airlines save the military millions of vital man-hours — which, in turn, saves millions in pay and per diem dollars. Compare the costs — the speed — the dependability of Scheduled flight with any other means of travel!

### NEW LOWER INSURANCE RATES AVAILABLE ONLY ON SCHEDULED CERTIFICATED AIRLINES

Due to the consistent safety record of these Airlines, insurance rates have been reduced as follows:

\$50,000 now costs only \$2.00  
\$37,500 now costs only \$1.50  
\$25,000 now costs only \$1.00  
\$12,500 now costs only \$ .50

Policies cover Stateside and much Foreign travel — personal or official.

### 10% DISCOUNT

for official travel on TR's . . . covers Full Service.

Saving the Military Millions of Vital Man Hours with Dependable, On-Time, Scheduled Service . . .



## THE *Scheduled Certificated Airlines* OF THE U.S.A.

ALASKA AIRLINES  
ALLEGHENY AIRLINES  
AMERICAN AIRLINES  
BOHAKA AIR LINES  
BRANIFF AIRWAYS  
CAPITAL AIRLINES  
CENTRAL AIRLINES  
COLONIAL AIRLINES  
CONTINENTAL AIR LINES

DELTA-C & S AIR LINES  
EASTERN AIR LINES  
FRONTIER AIRLINES  
LAKE CENTRAL AIRLINES  
MACKAY AIRLINES  
MOHAWK AIRLINES  
NATIONAL AIRLINES  
NEW YORK AIRWAYS

NORTH CENTRAL AIRLINES  
NORTHEAST AIRLINES  
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES  
OZARK AIR LINES  
PACIFIC NORTHERN AIRLINES  
PIEDMONT AIRLINES  
PIONEER AIR LINES  
RESORT AIRLINES

SOUTHERN AIRWAYS  
SOUTHWEST AIRWAYS  
TRANS-TEXAS AIRWAYS  
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES  
UNITED AIR LINES  
WEST COAST AIRLINES  
WESTERN AIR LINES  
WIEN ALASKA AIRLINES

# THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

Vol. 5, No. 2

September 1954

## EDITORIAL POLICY

The *Army Combat Forces Journal* is a professional military magazine devoted to the dissemination of information and ideas relating to the military art and science representing the interests of the entire Army.

The *Journal* strives to

- ¶ Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.
- ¶ Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.
- ¶ Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.
- ¶ Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.
- ¶ Advance the status of the soldier's profession.

(Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

## Journal's Journal

It was just about a year ago that our Editor reminded us that 1954 was the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of *Infantry Journal*, the older of this magazine's predecessors. He proposed a special issue devoted not to the glorious history of *Infantry Journal*, creditable though it is, but to an examination of the tremendous social changes that have affected the Army the *Infantry Journal* (and *The Field Artillery Journal*) served for so many years. As he said, the technological changes are all about us where we can see them, but the social changes, every bit as revolutionary, are less easily apprehended. In 1904 our nation was just beginning to sense that it was inseparable from the world beyond our shores. Today, three wars later, our Army is spread all over the world. What happened to it in the process? The explanation of this subject, written by Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy (retired), will appear next month. My advice is: Don't miss it.

THE PUBLISHER

PUBLISHER  
Col. Arthur Symons, Arty-USAR

EDITOR  
John B. Spore

BUSINESS MANAGER  
Col. Robert F. Cocklin, Arty-NGUS

CONSULTING EDITORS  
Brig. Gen. Donald Armstrong, USA-Ret (OrdC)

Maj. Orville C. Shirey, Inf-USAR

Assistants  
N. J. Anthony, Esther E. Bennett, Mary F. Grant, Martha J. O'Brien

Membership and Circulation  
D. A. Mulley, Manager

Doris Montgomery, Assistant

COVER: Map Reading For National Guardsmen. Photo by District of Columbia National Guard.

## THE CURRENT SCENE

The Legislative Record .....	8
The Army Family	
The Loyal Corps of Army Wives .....	Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway 11
The Army Yesterday .....	Genevieve Craig 12
The Army Today .....	Emilie Rigg 13
The Soldier and the Statesman .....	Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway 26
Echo in the Summer Doldrums: "Where Are the Men?" .....	28

## MEN AND METHODS

Soldiering Is a Way of Life .....	Lt. Col. Donovan Yeuell, Jr. 30
Peripheral Strategy ... Littoral Tactics ... Limited War ...	
Rear Adm. John D. Hayes	36
Career Management and Your Future. No. 13: What Can You Do	
About Your Career? .....	50

## TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Put Tac Air in Navy Blue .....	Col. George C. Reinhardt 21
Why Didn't They Shoot More? .....	Lt. Col. George Juskalian 35
Helicopter Patrol .....	Maj. George H. Reid 40

## DEPARTMENTS

The Month's Pictures .. Cover	2	Irons in the Fire .....	44
Front and Center .....	3	Cerebrations .....	45
The Month's Mail .....	4	The Word from the Schools ...	48
The Month's Reading .....	42	The Month's Books .....	51

The *Army Combat Forces Journal* is published monthly by the Association of the United States Army. Publication date: 25th of preceding month. Publication, Editorial and Executive Offices: 1529 Eighteenth Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Copyright, 1954, by Association of the United States Army. Entered as Second Class Matter at Washington, D. C., additional entry at Richmond, Va., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Articles appearing in *The Army Combat Forces Journal* do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Department of the Army, the officers and members of the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, or the editors.

Rates. One year \$5.00; two years \$9.00 when paid in advance; three years \$12.00 when paid in advance. Subscriptions for libraries, civilian groups or activities, and others not eligible for membership in the Association of the U. S. Army \$5.00 per year. Foreign subscriptions \$6.00 payable in advance. For other rates write Circulation Manager, 1529 18th Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

## ADVERTISING REPRESENTATIVES

San Francisco Office  
Duncan A. Scott Company  
Mills Building  
San Francisco, Calif.  
Garfield 1-7950

New York Office  
55 West 55th Street  
New York 19, New York  
Judson 6-4099

Los Angeles Office  
2978 Wilshire Boulevard  
Los Angeles, Calif.  
Dunkerque 8-4151

Advertising rates furnished upon request to any of the advertising offices.

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

# Front And Center

Recognition of the quiet but persuasive efforts of General Matthew B. Ridgway to change the trend of the "New Look's" de-emphasis of land power is beginning to pervade Washington. Recently Roscoe Drummond, the reliable Washington bureau chief of *The New York Herald Tribune* devoted his column to General Ridgway and his views. General Ridgway "is not waging any public controversy," he wrote. "That is not his way of doing military business. But within the Pentagon, within the Joint Chiefs of Staff and within the National Security Council, he is pressing his convictions with renewed vigor. The result is that the New Look is being looked at again."

*How persuasive the Army Chief of Staff is may appear when next year's budget is made public. A few months ago it was said that the reduction of Army strength in the present fiscal year (since slowed up) was only the beginning and further reductions would follow in the next several years. But now it appears that the budget for Fiscal 1956 will call for some increase in Army strength.*

The theory that the only purpose of marching drill is to move groups of men from one place to another in an orderly way is getting the lumps from the Marine Corps which is going back to the eight-man squad for drill purposes. Marines believe that the drill field is important in indoctrinating men in habits of obedience and instant response to orders and in developing command presence and voice in leaders. The advantage of the eight-man squad for this purpose is that it requires more complex maneuvers

than the simpler movements of the larger squads and thus gives leaders many more possible orders. The Marines will retain the 13-man squad for tactical purposes.

*The new I&E film, "This Is Your Army," is worth the substantial plugging and support the Army is giving it. While a bit long—the world-wide commitments and activities of the Army are breath-taking just in enumeration—the picture is well put together and altogether one of the finest military documentaries ever filmed. Every soldier is supposed to see it, so don't duck that detail when it is announced.*

One paragraph "declassified" from a National Security Council report by Dr. John A. Hannah during his final press conference (see page 28) had to do with the need by the services of men with skills that take a long time to learn and the consequent need for four-year enlistments. The paragraph reads in full: "Efficient and effective operation of the Active Forces requires a large core of professional career service personnel around which can be built in an emergency forces of the size and quality required to carry out the military assignments. Modern warfare requires large numbers of men possessing many skills that require long-time training. A reasonable return on the training cost requires the encouragement of four-year enlistments in all four services."

*Airborne soldiers who have been saying that the new green uniform doesn't have a garrison cap (overseas cap to you old-timers) are wrong. Headgear for the new uniform includes both the field cap*

*(formerly garrison) and garrison cap (formerly overseas). The troopers fear was that the new uniform might result in losing one of their most cherished symbols: the airborne cap patch. Actually their concern may be well placed. The new garrison cap will be made of green cloth without branch piping and special insignia may be prohibited. It will be recalled that a few years ago when the airborne cap patch was banned along with other such devices troopers made such a fuss that it was restored to them.*

A few months ago Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson, retired World War II commander of the Ninth Army, wrote an article for *This Week*, a Sunday magazine appearing in many newspapers. In the article Gen. Simpson observed that one of his minor irritations was that he and some other World War II army commanders had not been given post-retirement promotion to four stars, although it would not cost the Government additional retired pay and some army commanders had four-star rank. What effect this article may have had is unknown, but since then Congress has promoted Gen. Simpson and 10 other World War II lieutenant generals. As first proposed, the promotions would have gone to the late Lesley J. McNair, wartime commander of AGF; the late Simon B. Buckner, Tenth Army; the late Alexander M. Patch, Seventh Army; Ben Lear, who commanded AGF after Gen. McNair's death; Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., Fifth Army; Robert L. Eichelberger, Eighth Army; Leonard T. Gerow, Fifteenth Army; and Gen. Simpson. Added to the list later were the names of the late Robert C. Richardson, wartime commander of the Central Pacific areas; Albert C. Wedemeyer, commander in CBI after the recall of Gen. Stilwell; and John L. DeWitt, commander Western Defense Command. Other wartime army or army group commanders who retired or died while wearing four stars include the late Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., Third Army; Gen. Walter Krueger, Sixth Army; Gen. Courtney B. Hodges, First Army; Gen. Jacob L. Devers, 6th Army Group; and Gen. Mark W. Clark, 15th Army Group, also Gen. of the Army Omar Bradley, who commanded First Army before taking 12th Army Group.

**IN THIS  
ISSUE  
YOU'LL  
FIND**

- |  |         |
|--|---------|
| <b>Why the soldier and the statesman are partners</b>                | Page 26 |
| <b>Reasons why we must revitalize the spirit of the Regular Army</b> | Page 30 |
| <b>Three reasons why riflemen in Korea didn't shoot more</b>         | Page 35 |



### More Information

• It would seem that the articles "Time of Atomic Plenty" and "Design for Defeat of Red Armor" in the July issue are hardly in consonance.

"Design for Defeat of Red Armor" would have us descending on task assembly areas at night with men armed with 3.5-inch rocket launchers. I agree with "Time of Atomic Plenty". It is time that we started some discussion on use of atomic weapons for destruction of armor in assembly areas rather than men armed with 3.5 rocket launchers.

The principal handicap to a wide discussion on the tactical use of atomic weapons is the lack of information in the field.

Lt. COL. ROBERT M. HUSTON

Office of the Senior Army Advisor  
PO Box 1632  
Wilmington 99, Del.

### Mixed Nightmare

• Colonel Sloan's "Design for an Atomic Army" [June issue] invokes mixed emotions . . . like the henpecked husband who watched his mother-in-law back his new Floatmaster 89 over a 500-foot cliff. An army with sizable "in being" forces, wholly transportable, waging a daring campaign deep inside enemy territory would be a dream come true—but there are several items reminiscent of the lost Floatmaster.

The "small force rapidly extending its

control over all of the enemy country" has a nightmarish aspect. Some 200 million people (less, of course, those removed by Strategic Air's "preparation") spread over nine million square miles calls for at least the Texas Rangers' quota of "one riot, one Ranger."

Of course if that "small force" went in as liberators, that would be one thing—but after a thorough treatment with "thermonukes" they might smell like invaders. History says that the Mongols conquered Russia and occupied it 200 years without establishing anything approaching control over all of the country. Too much country, guerrillas, swamps, forests, and Russian stubbornness. Think of all the occupation ribbons the Mongol government awarded in those two centuries before they weakened and the "indigenous inhabitants" threw them out!

Then there is the matter of that vague pronoun in "if we accept the idea—as the Air Force and the Navy have—of fighting with forces in being . . ." The key word is "we."

Congress has always kept a tighter rein on the Army than on the other two steeds pulling the Defense chariot. Just how big a part does the horse have in deciding what road he shall take?

The United States has always placed the civil above the military power. Perhaps the "we" refers to the American people. That puts the biggest selling job in history

up to the Army . . . and more power to it. But let's not confuse the issue with suggestions that the Army itself can effectively "accept the idea" first put forth by George Washington as commander-in-chief, ably supported by Upton's classic tract, and not exactly unknown to George C. Marshall or his successors.

A combat-ready army doesn't have to be sold to military men. Colonel Sloan's irrefutable logic, like Gordon Dean's: "mass production lines don't function under a rain of atomic bombs" should be directed at the people who pay the taxes, whose votes spell out the doorplates on offices up on the Hill.

Before we spread the report on the record, however, it might be wise to review those logistic requirements: "200 tons per division/day" over an "average air distance of 1,200 miles." Without arguing the merits of the nebulous 560 tons/div/day from our well-thumbed copy of 101-10, the item of POL alone merits mention. Today's armored division needs 900 tons to move 100 miles! Tomorrow's will be smaller. It will also have to invent some means of radically reducing POL consumption if its Class III is to support it in the "fluid" warfare over the "spongy" battlefields Colonel Sloan logically conjures up for us.

Suppose magic does cut the requirement to 300 tons? The Air Transport Command, using C-124s (to become available)

## Association of the U. S. Army

U. S. Infantry Association, 1893-1950

U. S. Field Artillery Association, 1910-1950

### PRESIDENT

Lt. Gen. George H. Decker, USA (Inf)

### VICE PRESIDENT

Gen. Robert N. Young, USA (Inf)

### SECRETARY

Col. Arthur Symons, USAR (Arty)

### ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Col. Robert F. Cocklin, NGUS (Arty)

### TREASURER

Marguerite Mattison

### ASSISTANT TREASURER

N. J. Anthony

## EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

For the term ending June 1955

Maj. Gen. Earl S. Gruver, USA (OrdC)  
Maj. Gen. James C. Fry, USA (Inf)  
Col. Dennis M. Moore, USA (Inf)  
Col. John Lemp, USAR (Arty)  
Lt. Col. Barry Ryan, USAR (Inf)  
Lt. Col. Francis X. Bradley, USA (Arty)  
Capt. Barney G. Schneekloth, USA (Inf)

For the term ending June 1956

Lt. Gen. W. B. Palmer, USA (Arty)  
Maj. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, USA (Armor)  
Maj. Gen. Harry McK. Roper, USA (Arty)  
Brig. Gen. Kenner F. Hertford, USA (CE)  
Brig. Gen. Victor A. Conrad, USA (SigC)  
Capt. John H. Bolton, Jr., NGUS (CE)  
(Vacancy)

For the term ending June 1957

Maj. Gen. Wm. H. Abendroth, NGUS (Armor)  
Maj. Gen. Geo. C. Stewart, USA (Inf)  
Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, USA (Inf)  
Col. Wm. B. Bunker, USA (TC)  
Col. Charles W. McCarthy, USA (Inf)  
Col. Charles A. H. Thomson, USAR (Inf)  
Capt. Sam W. Sacra, USAR (Armor)

would burn up at least 1½ tons of fuel for every ton (POL or other) delivered from base to air head! Thus even Colonel Sloan's 200 tons/div/day—when handled this way—becomes 500 tons/div/day needed at base section.

Finally, my map of Russia, post World War II, embarrassingly locates in the vicinity of Moscow the "single base section providing direct support via air lanes to all of the varied task groups in the field." Nowhere else would my compass, set at 1,200 miles radius, cover even half of the nine million square miles to be occupied.

COL. GEORGE REINHARDT  
The Engineer School  
Fort Belvoir, Va.

### Colonel Sloan's Way

• Thank you and most especially thank Colonel George B. Sloan for "Design for an Atomic Army," [June].

If we ever have to send another army overseas to finish the job the other services stir up, Colonel Sloan's way is the only way. You will never get them over by ships, other than for another police action.

Sometimes I am shocked by apathy and unreality, then I read something like Colonel Sloan's stuff, and I have hope again. Sure hope that it gets into the right places.

MAJOR HARRY W. MORSE  
Staff Amphibious Group One  
FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

### We Are Worth Our Salt

• Your June issue was fine for the ideas it fostered on bringing *esprit de corps* back to the Army. We have been lacking so much for so long. "The British Regimental System" bore down on one aspect of low morale in our armed forces, the feeling of belonging.

Just as important though is that of being respected which is ably brought out in the "Long and Rocky Road" by M/Sgt Gordon. Give the NCOs the necessary backing and see what a big difference it will make. Nothing would be better than to see what is happening in the 33d Infantry spark plug a similar movement throughout the Army.

I would like to offer one suggestion. In Maj. Banigan's letter he states, "Back issues of the JOURNAL make the best reference library a military-minded officer or noncommissioned officer can possess." How right he is. Wouldn't it help us if the JOURNAL had an index at the end of each year? This would facilitate the finding of needed articles. Any magazine worth its salt has one. Couldn't you also do the same?

SGT ALBERT J. BERUBE, JR.  
USAR  
227 Clermont Ave.,  
Brooklyn, N. Y.

• We publish an index each year and members desiring a copy need only address a request to us. The index for Volume 4 (August 1953-July 1954) has just been delivered by our printers.

### Private Slovik

• Colonel Wiener, in "Lament for a Skulker" [July issue], poses some problems in military justice and military discipline which, I strongly suspect, are hardly capable of solution in the framework of our society. . . .

Would any useful purpose be served by making execution for desertion mandatory? I doubt it. As any combat soldier knows, there are more ways to desert a battle (though perhaps not in the legal sense) than simply to walk away from it, and most of them are safe from charges. A wave of executions for desertion in time of war might dissuade a few, but would probably only spur others to greater heights of ingenuity. The resulting outcry from the tender-hearted would probably do more harm to military justice and military discipline than any possible good that might come of carrying out the death sentences.

What, then, of the other alternative offered Private Slovik before his trial: to go back into the line and do his duty? This makes very little sense either. A man of Slovik's mental background is hardly capable of holding a concept of duty, much less doing it. Had I been his company commander, I would not have been happy at the prospect. A man who is not dependable is very often worse than no man at

all. I can, of course, speak only for myself, but I have no strong conviction that the Private Sloviks should be shot because they desert. I simply want them put somewhere where their derelictions will not endanger me or my outfit.

One cannot help but feel that the member of the firing squad who said "... his leaving could have caused a whole company of good men to have been slaughtered by Jerry patrols ..." was a man with a distasteful duty looking for something to justify it. I have never heard of a company of good men being slaughtered by German patrols or any other patrols. Furthermore, the company had a much better chance of not being slaughtered, by whatever force, with Slovik out of there. Presumably the rest of the men could be counted on to stay at their posts and fight, or at least warn of the presence of the enemy. Could Slovik have been depended upon to do that?

No, the solution for the Eddie Sloviks is not to shoot them or to send them back to the line—at least not to send them back without finding and correcting the condition that caused them to desert in the first place. . . . The real problem is to correct the conditions of society that breed our Eddie Sloviks. . . . But that is not the Army's problem. It is a problem for all of us. . . .



### AUTO INSURANCE

Now, for the first time, **GOVERNMENT SERVICES INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS** offer immediate savings to 33⅓% on complete coverage auto insurance from prevailing board rates in your state or territory. New low rates effective immediately. Join the thousands of policy holders enjoying protection against loss from bodily injury and property damage, liability, medical payments, accidental death, comprehensive personal liability, comprehensive fire and theft coverage, towing, and collision damage to your car. Why pay more when these new increased savings are passed on to you immediately? More than 600 claim representatives

are ready to serve you in case of accident. Available to officers on active, reserve, or retired status, and first 3-graders who are at least 25 and married.

### HOUSEHOLD & PERSONAL PROPERTY

#### NEW ALL-RISK COVERAGE

Make sure your valuable personal property is covered by insurance regardless of where you may be in the world. This new policy gives you maximum protection at savings up to 33⅓% and is written with you and your possessions in mind. Protects clothing, furniture, jewelry, household goods and other valuable personal effects. Act now! Mail coupon today!



### GOVERNMENT SERVICES INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS

NOT AFFILIATED WITH U.S. GOV'T.

**GOVERNMENT SERVICES INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS & CROCKETT AND PRESA STS.** SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

NAME .....  
ADDRESS .....  
AGE ..... RANK ..... MARRIED ..... SINGLE .....  
CAR DESCRIPTION ..... ANNUAL MILEAGE .....  
BUSINESS USE ..... AGES OF DRIVERS .....  
☐ AUTO IN U. S. ☐ AUTO OVERSEAS ☐ PERSONAL PROPERTY

## CHANGING STATION?

Don't forget to notify us of your change in address. Simply send your name, old address and new one to:

Circulation Manager  
The Army Journal  
1529 18th St., N.W.  
Washington 6, D. C.



## \*the Fatigue Cap that never shows Fatigue!

And No Wonder! It keeps you looking sharp on the toughest duty! Stands any abuse. Collapse it, step on it, sit on it—it springs right back into shape—no extra stiffeners required!

- WON'T WRINKLE
- WON'T SAG

Wind resistant. water repellent  
Can be dry cleaned.

INSIST ON THE NAME  
**\*Spring-Up**  
ON THE RED AND GREEN LABEL  
INSIDE YOUR CAP  
IT IS YOUR GUARANTEE

Ask for it at your P. X.

If not available, order by mail. Sent prepaid anywhere in the world.

**ONLY \$2.00** postpaid

Be Sure—Specify your size

#8590 with inside ear flap

#8593 without flap

Write for Quantity Prices

\*Patent applied for.

**Louisville**  
**CAP CORP.**

303 S. 30TH STREET  
LOUISVILLE 12, KENTUCKY

Speaking for myself, I would rather know that a deserter from my outfit was doing something to move the war along than to know that his usefulness was at an end. I do not say that a deserter should not be punished, but it might be that his imprisonment, if that is to be his punishment, could be served after the war without possibility of parole . . . it does seem wasteful to shoot him.

INFANTRYMAN

## "Attack Along a Ridgeline"

• I read "Attack Along a Ridgeline" [May issue] with mixed emotions, since I had the very dubious honor of being mentioned in the article. It is extremely interesting to read of the exploits of a unit with which you have been associated. This holds true, even when the action described is of a period of combat where we took it on the chin before attaining the strength to seize the initiative.

Confusion has always played a large part in any war. Perhaps this state of affairs was greatly assisted by the fact that the men directly involved in fighting the enemy were too busy to record all of the data which could serve as the basis for after action studies. This may account for numerous discrepancies and omissions in the article describing the action of Company A, 34th Infantry on 15 August 1950, which, unless my memory and medical records are at fault, occurred on 14 August 1950.

If the discussion by Lt. Canzona had been prefaced by remarks similar to those included in his original critique, my anger would not have been aroused, as it has been, by certain conclusions and inappropriate remarks. Granted, there were more mistakes made by those of us who participated in the action, than would have been made if the intelligence information and

academic solutions available to an analyst at a later date had been ours at the time of need.

An object like a burial mound or the infantry's well-known "lone pine tree" does not make a very safe observation post in troop leading procedure as a general rule. "My burial mound" was not quite as conspicuous as the article suggests. When my platoon was forced down by "relatively close range" machine-gun fire, I found it impossible to move my platoon over the crest of the knoll to our front and moved them slightly to the right to gain defilade from the machine gun fire believed to be coming from the left. As this was attempted, additional machine-gun fire was delivered from the right and, I believe, from the peak to our front. I immediately built up a base of fire and we tried to locate the machine guns so that we could neutralize them with fire and continue the attack. The North Koreans were very uncooperative in their camouflaged positions and wouldn't let me stick my head up to observe their locations. This made it necessary for me to move farther down to the right to gain defilade from the machine guns on the left. After removing my combat pack to present a lower silhouette, I crawled up to the left of a burial mound. This gave me some protection from the machine gun to the right front. While attempting to locate the enemy positions, I was struck by rifle fire, apparently from the peak which towered above us to the front, and not from the enemy machine guns, as was so critically stated in the article. Did this make me "reckless"?

Lt. Shea did not join me in the "narrow confines of the tempting target" but was about fifteen feet away, on the opposite side of the mound, from where he could also have some cover.

A close examination of the facts would have revealed that as a platoon leader I had no map, no radio, no telephone, no rocket launcher, and no light machine guns. I was fortunate (?) in having a wrist compass and one well-worn automatic rifle in my understrength platoon. The situation was little or no better in the other platoons. There were no 60mm mortars or recoilless rifles in the company with which to deliver "a devastating barrage of steel and fire," and our organic machine guns consisted of one light and one heavy caliber .30 machine gun, although I believe there was one, or possibly two, heavy machine guns under company control from the heavy-weapons company.

The artillery preparation before our attack was of very limited duration and was over before the jump-off. The forward observer was with the company commander and the platoon leaders had no method of communication except runners. The mortar observer who started up the ridge with me couldn't keep up and reportedly died of wounds from two rounds of HE which hit my platoon as we moved up the ridge. I could find no further sign of the observer or his radio and had to continue the attack.

California's  
**MONTEREY PENINSULA**  
COUNTRY CLUB offers  
**CHOICE HOME SITES**

**EASY TERMS.** As an officer, you qualify for special purchase privileges. Also, you can start payments while still on active duty, of reduced rates.

**A FULL LIFE.** Your site will be adjacent to the spacious Club, with its congenial facilities, golf course, bathing pool, and tennis courts. Many Club members are retired officers.

This beautiful, outdoor community is close to Fort Ord, Monterey Presidio, and the Naval Postgraduate School. There is no finer place to live. Investigate today.

**FREE BOOKLET**

Handsome illustrated booklet gives full particulars. For your copy, write:  
**DEL MONTE PROPERTIES COMPANY**  
Box M-2, Pebble Beach, California

Without any details in reference to the lack of organic transportation and the necessity for our evacuation through the hills into an adjacent regiment because of an enemy roadblock to our rear, the above circumstances are submitted for your consideration.

I have no need to give excuses for my men or myself because we did the best we could in spite of the adverse conditions. My sole purpose is to provide some important details of Company A's action on the Naktong . . .

CAPT. M. D. SCHILLER

Columbus, Ga.

### In Amplification

• Lieutenant Colonel H. A. De Weerd, in "Time of Atomic Plenty" [July issue], commented on certain deficiencies in the concepts set forth in *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat*. In particular, he suggested that the authors had not taken into account the increasing plenty of tactical atomic weapons and the organizational changes in the Army structure which reliance on tactical atomic weapons dictated. While this criticism is valid, it should be recognized that it took two years to obtain clearance for this book and that clearance requirements necessarily imposed upon the authors a conservative treatment of these problems.

The second revision of this book is now off the press. The authors believe it meets Colonel De Weerd's hope that "Colonels Reinhardt and Kintner will try their hands at writing a new book based on the assumption that atomic weapons will be plentiful enough in the future to fight through an entire ground campaign without relying in any important way on HE for fire and shock power." The new edition will stress the entirely new type of ground organization required in atomic warfare.

COL. G. C. REINHARDT

LT. COL. W. R. KINTNER

Washington, D. C.

### Error

• You had an error in the biographic sketch of Major General James M. Gavin in your June issue.

You state that he was recently in command of V Corps in Europe . . . he was in command of VII Corps with headquarters in Stuttgart.

LT. FRANK GRBINICH

APO 696 c/o PM

New York, N. Y.

• Lt. Grbinich is right. It was the VII Corps.

### Why Don't They

• The other day I was reading a column in some publications called "Why Don't They." This is a column to which readers submit various ideas for new inventions or new methods of doing a thing.

Some years of service give me a few "Why Don't They" for the Army.

• Why don't they make a second award of the American Defense Ribbon for all

Regulars who at the outbreak of the Korean War?—were serving.

• Why don't they issue or award an Honorable Service Ribbon? There could be an award for each 10, 20, and 30 years of honorable service. Make the thing hard to get and really something to work for.

• Why don't they award a Marksmanship Ribbon instead of the Marksmanship Badges? This would encourage more people to wear such awards. Might even make for some better scores on the range.

• Why don't they issue a Company Supply Records cabinet of some sort? This would be a good use for old trunk lockers. That's what we used in the 1st Cavalry.

• Why don't they have a company stock card instead of the company property book form? It would be faster to post, neater, and easy to handle.

• Why don't they have a general supply form instead of the issue slips, turn-in slips, ammo requests, and so forth? The Air Force shipping document and requisition form is a good example of what I mean.

• Why don't they issue OVM books with tanks and other vehicles that have a large number of OVM items? This way you could tell what you received with the vehicle, and what was turned in. It should always be with the vehicle.

• Why don't they have a special stock record card for unserviceable property accounts, one that would have columns to

show the accountable officer what is in the shop, what is in the laundry, and what is on hand at all times?

• Why don't they drop all mess personnel and equipment from line company T/O&Es and form such personnel and equipment as a Mess Platoon in the Headquarters and Service Company?

• Why don't they have a pin-on type rank insignia for enlisted men? Think of the sore thumbs and cussing this would save.

• Why don't they have a system where organizational clothing and equipment would be set up in sets and marked with the company letter and set number instead of the individual laundry marks? This type equipment passes hands several times during its service. And it's hard to re-mark some of it.

• Why don't they issue a Table of Allowances to show the number of tools authorized for so many vehicles instead of issuing tool sets? This would make for better accounting of tools.

• Why don't they do away with the hash marks and overseas bars? A guy who gets all that stuff sewed on looks like a walking mass of stripes.

• Why don't they let enlisted men use the ID card as identification while on pass in place of the Class "A" pass? Think of the typing, signatures, and paper this would save.

SFC RAYMOND R. BOWLES

APO 174, New York, N. Y.



## for GROUND FORCE OFFICERS

### United Services LIFE INSURANCE

gives you

### WORLD-WIDE PROTECTION WITH NO RESTRICTIONS

This is a specialized company which provides life insurance exclusively for commissioned and warrant officers, former officers and members of their families.

Write  
today  
for full  
information

UNITED SERVICES LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY  
1625 EYE ST., N.W., WASHINGTON 6, D. C. CFJ-1

I am interested in further details of this plan.

Name..... Rank.....

Organization.....

Military Address.....

Home Address.....

City..... State.....

Date of Birth..... ☐ Married ☐ On active duty  
☐ Single ☐ Not on active duty

# The Legislative Record

## What Congress did for and to you during the session just ended

**A**T the beginning of each session of Congress the Department of Defense and each of the services have neat lists of "must" legislation they hopefully send to Capitol Hill for enactment into law. At the end of the session the Legislative Liaison officers who have custody of these lists find that many of the items have been entombed by congressional committees and that other items on the lists have been so mutilated and patched that they are hardly recognizable. Experienced LL officers, always optimistic, will tell you that on balance Congress is more than decent to the services.

You can make your own judgment as you follow this run down of what happened to some legislation of interest to soldiers during the 2d session, 83d Congress. We should make it very clear here that this is not a complete list of either Army or Defense legislation, but just items selected for your presumed interest.

**Your pay** is of course, of more than presumed interest to you. But the less said about why you didn't get a pay raise this year the more joyous this report will seem to be. A bill to raise your full pay 10 per cent—basic pay, subsistence and rental allowances—had gotten exactly nowhere up to press time. And at that late stage Congress seemed undisposed to do anything about it.

**Fringes.** Soldiers and their families talk a lot about fringe benefits, but this Congress

didn't. Maybe you can add to your list of blessings the fact that commissaries and post exchanges were left alone. So was medical care for dependents, but in a different way. A bill was introduced that provided for medical care for dependents, but in truth it hardly got a decent diagnosis before it was laid to rest.

**Housing.** Congress approved the building of some family housing in the ZI, none overseas for the Army or Air Force. The Army's request for housing funds was cut drastically, especially funds for the construction of BOQs and barracks.

**The best news in housing** was the 1954 Housing Act which liberalized FHA loan policies for civilian home-buyers—and, glory be! added provisions that permit servicemen to buy homes on similar easy credit terms with the mortgage insurance being paid by the Department of Defense. You can now buy a home costing up to \$18,000 and the FHA will underwrite the mortgage up to \$17,100. The formula is that you pay five per cent down and the rest in easy monthly payments over the next 30 years (with interest, of course). To buy a house under this law you have to get the Department of Defense to certify that you are in dire need of a house and that you will remain on active duty for at least two more years. You have to live in the house or certify that your military assignment in Iraq or elsewhere doesn't make it feasible for you to commute back and forth. Incidentally, you don't lose your GI Bill home loan privileges when you buy a home this way. And you can do it more than once.

Now follows a brief description of some miscellaneous pieces of "defense" legislation passed by the 83d Congress.

**Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954.** Imposes limitations on the numbers of officers who may serve on active duty in grades of major and above. This law also repealed two provisions in last year's appropriation act that affected promotion and retirement.

**Warrant Officer Act of 1954.** Established a career pattern for warrant officers that is similar to the OPA of 1947.

**Collection of overpayments.** Made it possible for indebtedness resulting from erroneous payments to military and civilian personnel to be paid off in "reasonable" monthly deductions.

**Soldier deposits.** Gave statutory authority for the deposit of savings of enlisted persons. At least \$5 must be deposited each

time and four per cent interest is earned. Deposits cannot be used for indebtedness nor are they subject to forfeiture by sentence of court-martial.

**Uniformed Services Contingency Option Act of 1953.** Deadline extended to 1 November 1954.

**Colonels, Medical Service Corps.** Deleted proviso which limited the number of colonels on active duty in the MSC, Regular Army, to two per cent of the authorized RA officer strength of the corps.

**UMTS law** was amended to make it possible for physicians, dentists and allied specialists to be used in professional capacity as enlisted men if they fail to qualify for, or won't accept a commission.

**Veterinary Corps** officers may be able to get three years of constructive service credit under an amendment to OPA 1947.

**Missing persons.** Pay and allowances of missing, interned or captive persons will continue to be paid until 1 July 1955. Law also provides for initiation and discontinuance of allotments for dependents and insurance; movement of dependents and household effects; and authorizes presumptive findings of death and other determinations under appropriate circumstances.

**Commissioned officers** retired for certain types of disability are exempted from dual compensation laws.


**Foreign decorations.** Authorizes U. S. soldiers to accept and wear decorations, orders and emblems of foreign nations who had forces under the U.N. command in Korea.

**Appointment to Military, Naval and Air Force academies** authorized for sons of men killed in action or who die or shall die as a result of active service in both World Wars or in the period beginning 27 June 1950 and ending on date to be proclaimed by President or Congress.

**Homesteaders.** Veterans who want to file homestead entries may take credit for military or naval service earned during the Korean conflict.

**Armistice Day**—11 November—is now redesignated Veterans Day.

**\$28.8 billions.** The appropriation act for fiscal 1955 gave the Army \$7.5 billion as compared with \$11 billion for the Air Force and \$10 billion for the Navy. Fiscal 55's total was \$28.8 billion (including Department of Defense) as compared to \$34.6 billion last year. The Army took the biggest cut! The total figure was about \$1.2 billion less than the President asked in his budget message.



## HERE'S A REAL HOT "FLASH"



Slashing over enemy territory and thundering its way back with vitally needed intelligence data . . . Republic's **RF-84F THUNDERFLASH** is the latest addition to the long line of Thunder-craft. > > Fully equipped for any battle-front photo reconnaissance mission the RF-84F is capable of operations the clock around. More powerful than any of its battle-tested predecessors, the swept wing **THUNDERFLASH** is particularly well fitted . . . with protective armament, its tremendous speed and high maneuverability . . . to fight its way out of trouble, if and when necessary. > > Sturdy counterpart of the highly effective **THUNDERSTREAK**, this new plane, is being delivered in quantity to the U.S. Air Force. For more than a decade and a half Republic-designed aircraft have faithfully served our armed forces in the fight against tyranny.

**REPUBLIC**  **AVIATION**


FARMINGDALE LONG ISLAND, N. Y.

*Designers and Builders of the Incomparable* **THUNDER-CRAFT**



1922

1953  
227,380  
POLICIES



## IN *32 Years* WE'VE GROWN WITH THE AUTOMOBILE

Thanks to the confidence of the Armed Forces

- United Services Automobile Association was organized in 1922 to provide low-cost automobile and household-personal effects insurance for Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Armed Forces.

- USAA is under the direction and management of active and retired officers of the Armed Services.

- Because all funds are pooled for mutual protection, USAA can offer insurance at lowest possible cost, with large savings realized in generous annual dividends. (During 1953, 180,000 officers insured by USAA shared in dividends of \$4,300,000.)

- USAA operates in the United States, its possessions, territories; Canada, Cuba, Canal Zone, Japan; certain U. S. military bases in the Pacific, in the Philippines and in Western Continental Europe.

- Claims are settled promptly even in the most out-of-the-way places.

- No matter whether you're stateside, overseas or on orders, USAA is as close as your nearest mailbox, telephone or telegraph office. Your USAA insurance becomes effective as of postmarked time of application, unless a later date is specified.

Away back in 1922, the year United Services Automobile Association was founded, the Model "T" was popular. But you wouldn't be satisfied with one today.

There've been plenty of changes made since '22... in automobiles, the armed services and in insurance—all of them for the better.

As the oldest automobile insurance company exclusively serving officers in the U. S. Armed Services, United Services Automobile Association has enjoyed such amazing growth since its founding in 1922 that in 1954 it remains supreme in its field. Today there are nearly a quarter of a million USAA policies in force.

This is important to you because it enables you to stay ahead on automobile and household-personal effects insurance costs, and still enjoy the ultimate in protection.

So when it's time to insure, give yourself the best, and save too. Insure with USAA.

For additional information on how USAA can serve you as an officer or warrant officer... fill in coupon and mail it today.



# United Services

## AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION

Dept. G2 1400 E. Grayson Street • San Antonio 8, Texas

☐ Send information on Insurance covering household effects. ☐ Send information on automobile insurance based on following data:

Car Year	Make	Model	Body Type	Pass. Cop.	Serial Number	Motor No.	No. Cyls.
Factory Price	Cost	Purchase Date	New/Used	Current Car License Year	State	Name in which car legally registered	

Is the automobile customarily used in the occupational duties of any person except in going to and from the principal place of occupation?

Is the automobile customarily used in driving to or from work?

If the automobile is customarily used in driving to or from work, how many road miles is the car driven one way?

How many operators under age 25? \_\_\_\_\_

Age of each: \_\_\_\_\_

Are any of the operators under 25 owners or principal operators of the automobile?

If any of the operators under 25 are owners, or principal operators, of the automobile,

(a) are all such operators married? \_\_\_\_\_

(b) do all such operators have legal custody of a child resident in the household? \_\_\_\_\_

Name & Rank \_\_\_\_\_

Military Address \_\_\_\_\_

If car not at above address, give location of car \_\_\_\_\_

# The Loyal Corps of Army Wives

General  
Matthew B. Ridgway

**T**ODAY's Army is composed more largely of married men than ever before in our experience. Eighty per cent of our officers and thirty-two per cent of our enlisted men are married. The fact that so many of our soldiers have families depending upon them means that those soldiers must be concerned about the availability of acceptable housing, of medical care, of educational and religious facilities, of survivor benefits.

**A** RECENT study which was carried out showed that the average officer was having a so-called permanent change of station every eighteen months. If we extend that rate over the period of an entire career, it would mean that, normally, an officer would make twenty major moves in thirty years—and that is not making any allowances for the much more rapid changes in assignment which have to be expected in time of war. The situation is even more acute with respect to enlisted men. The same study showed that enlisted men were making permanent change of station moves on an average of every ten months.

While every effort is being made to make assignment tours as stable as possible, that old phrase which we all know so well—"the exigencies of the Service"—is still with us. The Army has a vital mission to accomplish, and while we carry it out with as much consideration for families as possible, the effectiveness of its accomplishment can never be subordinated to convenience.

*I would not want to be misunderstood. Far from being a liability, our Army families are distinct assets to the Army. The loyal support of Army wives is today, as it has always been, an invaluable source of spiritual strength for the men who wear the uniform.*

**I** KNOW that it is not easy for women to face and share the hardships and difficulties of a soldier's life. It never has been easy. But the dauntless courage and unselfish devotion of Army wives have given them the strength to brave the dangers and endure the hardships of military life in many climes and many lands, far from the comforts and amenities which their sisters can take for granted. Army wives today may not be called upon, as their grandmothers and great-grandmothers were, to have a loaded weapon on hand in case of Indian attack and to remember always, as a last resort, to save one shot for themselves. But they just stand as steadfastly beside their husbands. And the knowledge of that steadfastness is no less vitally important to soldiers today than it was to the soldiers who blazed the trail of civilization through the forests and across the plains and over the mountains.

Condensed from an address before the Army Relief Society

*The Chief of Staff and family when he was Supreme Commander in Tokyo*



---

On the following pages . . . what  
Army life means to the Army wife  
as two of them have lived it . . .

---

## The Army Yesterday

# When We and the Army Were Younger

*Genevieve Craig*

MY father graduated from West Point in 1871, but had been through the Civil War before he went there. His was an unusual case. He went into the War when he was sixteen, was wounded several times, and finally quite seriously in the leg at the Battle of Cold Harbor. He with a number of other wounded men was loaded into a springless wagon and driven over a rough road to the coast. Five hundred wounded men with only three doctors to care for them were put on a ship bound for New York. Unfortunately the weather was stormy, so instead of three days they were five in reaching their port. My father was sent at once to his home state, Vermont, where the surgeons prepared to amputate his leg because gangrene had set in and it was in serious condition. He was even placed on the operating table, but remonstrated so forcibly against losing his leg, that against their better judgment, the surgeons gave up the idea. He spent over a year in the hospital and almost every day his leg had to be scraped and dressed.

A year or two passed and he found himself longing to enter the Regular Army. He surrendered a pension, probably the first case on record, and was given an appointment to West Point, passed mentally but failed physically. However, the Secretary of War waived that on account of his war service—the age limit was raised for the same reason.

He graduated in 1871 and joined the 7th Infantry in Montana. He and my mother were married in 1874. Their first station was Fort Shaw, Montana, seven hundred miles from the railroad. There was a stage line running as far as Helena with stations, having most miserable accommodations in most cases, every thirty or forty miles. This was a day's trip, though sometimes one travelled day and night. In the former case the trip took about three weeks under favorable conditions. Once my parents made the trip in February,

*(Continued on Page 18)*



The Army Today

# Only Uncertainty Is Certain

*Emilie M. Rigg*



MILITARY wives have adventures just like their husbands. They also have problems, many of them "little ones"—a fact quite visible at any camp, post or station. But sometimes problems become adventures, which is one big difference between military wives and their civilian sisters. In 1947 Virginia Collins, five-ninths a mother, arrived in war-torn Changchun, Manchuria. She had hardly settled down when the China Civil War flared up and Changchun was isolated by the Chinese Communists. We could occasionally hear artillery fire in the distance at night. My husband and his assistant, Major John W. Collins III were on-the-spot U.S. observers.

Our husbands made a routine jeep trip to check Nationalist positions one morning and they were late for lunch—about eight weeks late. The jeep came back with four bullet holes in it. The horrified driver and interpreter tumbled out with their hair standing on end.

"Major Rigg and Captain Collins have been captured by Communists!" the interpreter gasped.

They had been ambushed by the Communists thirteen miles away from our house, and were last seen being led off with tommy guns at their backs.

The late General Robert H. Soule, the Military Attaché, sent General (then Colonel) Frederick Dau, his executive officer, in a plane to fly us to Peiping. Colonel Dau was persuasive and diplomatic. We said thank you just the same, but we'd rather stay here—besides, what would our husbands think if we skipped town before they got back . . . Finally, the insistence began to ring a bell and we realized he'd been sent to evacuate us. Ginny asked, "Colonel Dau, is this an order?" He said pleasantly, but definitely, "Yes!"

We thought our husbands would be released as soon as they reached a higher headquarters where their "diplomatic immunity" would be recognized. I even pictured the soldiers



EMILIE W. RIGG is the wife of Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Rigg, Armor, and the mother of three children: aged fifteen, six and three. Before her marriage she was a professional artist and had studied at the Art Institute of Chicago and graduated from the American Academy of Art. In the course of the Rigg's military peregrinations they have lived at several posts in the U.S.A., in Manchuria, China and Germany. They only recently returned from Germany and Colonel Rigg is now stationed in the Pentagon.

being reprimanded for their blunder, and apologies coming from the Red command. But days turned into weeks before it became apparent that there just isn't any Chinese Communist headquarters high enough to recognize diplomatic immunity.

Because of Ginny's expectant condition they got her out of Changchun fast. And, after a few weeks in Peiping she was further evacuated. The Army wasn't satisfied until she was safely situated in Nanking with General and Mrs. Soule and near the only U.S. Army hospital in China.

The question became: which Collins would arrive first, Jack or the baby? Jack eventually won that race, but he lost the final sprint to the hospital.

After two months of imprisonment (including 34 days of solitary) and being tried for espionage and other false charges, our husbands were released by the Reds. Jack joined his wife in Nanking.

In the small hours of one night, Ginny prepared to take her expectancy to the hospital for a leisurely production. Jack drove General Soule's Army sedan, the car most immediately available and already designated for the important trip. Due to back seat "reports on the situation" Jack careened down the dark streets. He overshot the hospital and had to whirl around when the first wail of a baby announced the arrival of Miss Judy Collins—right in General Soule's sedan!

### Courage and conviction

Many service wives have exhibited great courage and tenacity. There was Shirley Bender who never gave up. Her Marine sergeant husband was a prisoner of the Chinese Reds for three years in the period just before the war in Korea. She spent those years not just sitting and lamenting, but travelling the corridors of the Pentagon and the State Department as well as Capitol Hill in an effort to hasten the release of her husband. Her vigor and hope were not only a fine example, but they also inspired and spurred Government officials into more rapid action in obtaining his freedom.

Service wives and children in China during the civil war who remained on until 1949 were suddenly evacuated to rather dismal quarters in the Philippines. In 1950 another group of U.S. military dependents hastened before an onrush of Red armies in Korea. Somewhere between 1,500 and 2,500 American women underwent the hardships of sudden home breaking amid atmospheres of war and panic, and in circumstances far removed from comfort. Yet this group of service women endured these inconveniences with-

out resorting to despair, hysterics or despondency as key-noted by the tearful tone of an article about service people in the July 1954 issue of *Redbook* magazine. The article by Donald Robinson was called "The Divorce Scandal in Our Armed Forces."

Mr. Robinson decried the high divorce rate among service families. He listed four main causes for the marital breakdowns: (1) separation of husbands and wives; (2) the housing situation; (3) Money (lack thereof); and (4) difficulty of adjustment to military life. The divorce rate may be high, but if the self-pity that prevails in the case histories he mentioned is at all widespread, then it is probably amazing that the rate isn't higher.

Some of these four causes can be alleviated. The Army is gradually improving the overseas housing situation, and that will help the husband-wife separation problem. Congress could aid the money situation by voting appropriate pay increases to keep pace with the cost of living and by allowing us to keep our "fringe benefits." Certain civilian communities could help morale by giving the most rather than the least for our rent money.

But as for the fourth point, adjustment to military life, that lies within the flexibility of personality and strength of character of the persons involved.

### Complaint Department(?)

The *Redbook* article expresses crying sympathy for service wives who have the "dirty work of packing and shipping their belongings" after the husband has received orders to proceed immediately to a new post. It feels sorry because perhaps in the new house their furniture won't fit, or their electrical appliances will be AC instead of DC. And, it is even more sorry because the windows will probably be wrong for the curtains!

Why, I am moved to ask, should we of the present generation of service families be pitied for something that has been accepted as a part of military life all through the years?

*Redbook* laments: "From one day to another service families do not know how long they will remain in one spot. They are continually being transferred from one post to another . . . The Pentagon insists . . . transfers are essential to . . . efficiency . . . This may be so, but many experts believe that a large percentage of the transfers is merely the result of bad management and a lack of consideration for the feelings of military personnel."

There are false impressions in that lament. Families of any longevity or experience know, and often predict their

transfers. The Pentagon is right. Rotation gives military men broader experience, and prevents cliques and empires from forming out of the "homestead system." Mr. Robinson's "experts," whoever they are, will find it hard to prove "bad management," and if they are experts they should acknowledge that the military considers the *mission* first; the feelings of families second. That is hard on us but we learn to accept the hard necessity of it.

### The Old Army

Every new Army wife should read histories and tales of the "old army" so that she can appreciate the advantages she has today. The women of the old army had long separations from their husbands during which they were both in peril. They had long periods of waiting for news and letters. No airmail in those days. There was no radio to turn on in evenings "just to hear a man's voice in the room" as some lonely wife wailed (and got quoted in *Redbook*).

Those families of former years moved their children and possessions to distant posts in the wild west. It sometimes took three weeks to reach a railroad town. They traveled by stage coach, river boat, and sometimes by open sleigh. They were often in danger of Indian attacks and always threatened with epidemics. Medical service was almost non-existent.

Those women adjusted to military life the hard way. I doubt if they spent much time bewailing the fact that they had to "live such an unnatural life."

### Rotation and Separation

Army strength is one figure. The number of men who have been rotated through it since the end of the Second World War is much greater. Many of today's career soldiers were conditioned to family separation by World War II. They don't like it but they accept it as "being in the best interests of the service." However, since 1945 hundreds of thousands of married men who never experienced the 1941-45 separations have passed into and through the service. For these young families new to the service, separations are harder to take. It is not a pleasant interlude for anyone. But as we say about many things: even this will pass—and it does.

Privates and corporals cannot get their wives overseas at government expense. This is nothing to cry about. They represent the youngest and least married group. Under the present draft many will be out of the army soon. Those who stay simply must work up to a higher grade. It is a simple

case of logistics and *rank* (rank has its privileges). However, in Europe, medical care, *rx*, commissary and school privileges have recently been granted to the lowest ranks whose families can manage to join them.

Today in Germany new housing units are being built. In the Northern Area Command, General Thomas Herren, the NAC Commander, has made sweeping changes, thus cutting down the waiting period and in many cases permitting concurrent travel. The overall Army goal for next year is for concurrent travel to all overseas posts.

### Stay home, Yank wife

There are some who seem to think that we dependents shouldn't get there at all. Several magazine writers have said that overseas dependents are a liability, a logistical burden and that the services endanger families in potential war areas. These writers call for withdrawal of dependents, but they never seem able to quote any service family survey or opinion. The majority of families want to stay and will take their chances. As the commander's wife in two battalions, I have known more than a hundred Army families living within fifty miles of the Iron Curtain in Germany, and only four I know of showed momentary anxiety. The decision on dependents at overseas posts lies with the high commands which are after all the best able to judge the risks and factors.

Past casualties among military dependents are nil. In the cold war no American children have been casualties. If hot war comes, the families will be in more danger in big cities than on military posts. Furthermore, I have enough confidence in the U.S. Army to believe that evacuation plans for dependents are well worked out.

### Housing—Junction City to Mukden

Nearly every service family has enjoyed (?) extremes in housing. My personal experiences include an interval in a small, hot hotel room in Junction City, Kansas, and later, Emperor Pu Yi's former suite in the Yamato Hotel at Mukden, Manchuria. One thing about all housing situations, good and bad: we usually don't spend enough time *anywhere* to get spoiled by the better ones, or depressed by the lesser ones!

Many of us have known tours where housing was in great demand; where civilians were flinging up garage apartments in their backyards. These were built at the least possible cost. Wintry blasts of wind swept into the car area

*World travel is  
broadening especially  
when going through  
customs*





*OK, Soldier . . .  
Now up, up and  
down on one foot  
fifty times*

below and swooped up through the floor. The only object in building them was to make money at the service family's expense.

There have been areas near military posts where old buildings, shacks and shanties were rented to military families at a robbery level. In some places the post medical section was kept busy inspecting and placing these below standard dwellings off-limits.

The Wherry Housing Projects, such as they are, made it possible to avoid lining the pockets of those greedy civilian landlords who are unwilling to provide adequate housing facilities for service families.

By contrast there are towns where the citizens have done their utmost to make life pleasant for military families. One town, Paris, Texas, assumed the responsibility of providing a "home away from home" for soldier families of Camp Maxey during World War II. Their courteous hospitality created cordial relations. The military's appreciation resulted in friendly cooperation with the town's civil affairs to the extent that Paris citizens wanted the camp to become a permanent Army post.

The Department of Defense Housing Commission has concluded that the government can never build sufficient housing to take care of all military families, and that rental allowances must substitute in this gap. This commission was established to submit recommendations which "could remove, to the greatest extent feasible, the disadvantages suffered by military personnel with respect to facilities for the enjoyment of normal living conditions. These occupational disadvantages have existed ever since the original organization of the Armed Forces in this country . . ."

### **Money isn't everything, but . . .**

We have our so-called "fringe benefits" but these are under attack almost constantly in Washington. Service

wives, like their husbands, have always been reluctant about writing our Congressmen. We shouldn't be. After all, we have our hometowns and for some of us, it may be our next door neighbor who is now sitting in the House of Representatives.

Those "fringe benefits" you hear so much about have long been an established part of military life and they compensate in both money and convenience for some of the difficulties in our nomadic way of living. When the benefits are curtailed, it means that we take a pay cut and we can't be expected to like that very much in these days of steep prices.

We know that the Army's representatives in Washington are alert to these headaches and the newspapers tell of steady appeals to Congress from the White House on down to protect our benefits. But there is no reason we can't speak to our Congressmen, too.

Probably the question of medical care is foremost among the "fringes". While such care is almost always available, and the doctors do a wonderful job, they are often in short supply. This is a matter of closest interest to the Army wife and mother.

In Japan in 1949 the shortage of Army doctors was so acute that a medical services announcement in "Stars and Stripes" said in effect: do not bring your children to the dispensary with a fever or sickness until it has developed for several days. Give them aspirin and a rest in bed—wait for a change for better or worse. If it becomes serious or critical, then the dispensary will handle the case!

It is an accident when we see the same doctor twice. That is hard on the Army wife for every mother wants to have a meeting of the minds with her children's doctor. A civilian can select a family physician (and pay the bills). In the Army you pay few doctor bills. You take the advice of the available doctor, get free medicine, inoculations and labo-

ratory tests. In civil life these add up to dollars. Here is one fringe benefit that must not be slighted by shortsighted economy. Adequate free medical care can balance the scales when advantages and disadvantages of being in the Army are weighed.

"The only thing certain about the Army is the uncertainty." That is a favorite family cliché recited at irregular intervals when changes of scene and assignment occur. If accepted as normal routine the uncertainty is more fascinating than fearful.

This doesn't mean that we must never complain, register righteous indignation, or rave and rebel to a degree. We women have our rights! One is the right to blow off steam—if we stop in time to pack up and move! Let the shock wave pass—readjust your vision to new horizons, and then get busy.

Service wives early learn to be flexible. Adaptability is an imperative quality for us and our possessions. Each new setting is a challenge to our imagination and ingenuity. One example: our furniture has to be selected with more than one home in mind. Sectional furniture is fine.

An Army wife can be a burden or an asset to her husband and his career. By her attitude she can either inspire him or hang like an albatross around his neck. When civilian routine is temporarily shattered by a draft call a wife can make that period a more profitable and pleasant experience for her husband—if she possesses self-discipline and not self-pity.

Even in peacetime the military profession is not as safe as that of a doctor, lawyer, merchant, or Indian chief (1954 version). Any girl who plans to marry a man in uniform must face the fact that her husband has to take some risks in training. I stood my hospital vigil when an explosion in realistic training severely injured my husband. But I try never to forget that more Americans have been killed in automobile accidents than in all of our wars put together!

### Army Brats

There has been a fairly uniform level of schooling and course of study in Army schools. My eldest daughter, now fifteen, has experienced eighteen changes of schools. She has never spent two successive years in the same school. She

once attended four schools in one year. Scholastically she has not suffered.

Most children adjust to the military pattern of life quite well. Of course the grass is always greener. A civilian child wishes to see the world instead of reading about it, while my Army child at the age of nine had lived in twelve different places at home and abroad and stated that her one wish was to live on a ranch and never move again. My boy Billy loves tanks; he had his first ride in one when he was five.

After a few years and a few changes of station children experience the joy of reunions, and discover the reason why we never say goodbye to favorite friends. Paths cross again.

Children who are old enough to remember living in a foreign country look back on it later with interest and pleasure, even though they may not have appreciated it to its full extent at the time. The many experiences and memories of people and places are theirs forever.

### The World is our oyster

How many of us could afford to take a trip to the Orient or Europe—or both, in our lifetime if we were not in the service? How many civilians who do make a trip abroad stay two or three years? Army families have the opportunity to get acquainted with the countries they visit, and to know and understand the peoples of many lands. It is a rewarding experience.

In an Army community you do not have to seek friends—you are among friends. Social life is ready-made with many more activities available than you can possibly participate in. It is a tight little group and you are a "part of the family." You never realize how intensely loyal that family is until trouble strikes. Help comes in swarms. Both the official Army and the local Army community are beside you in an instant. It gives you courage to know that "the Army takes care of its own."

This paraphrase of a bit of World War I verse tells my story in four short lines:

Your husband's your allotment man  
Your kids your next of kin:  
But a mighty close relation  
Is the Army that takes you in!



Wherever they may be Army family quarters are a bit of transplanted Americana

# The Army Yesterday

(Continued from Page 12)

part of the time in an open sleigh and with the temperature often fifty and fifty-five below zero.

## Two rooms and a kitchen

Quarters were not plentiful in those days—the juniors had to double up. My father and mother had two rooms and a kitchen in one set while others had the rest of the house. There were a few fresh vegetables raised by the companies, but in the main they lived on what the commissary provided, and it was not an Army War College Commissary either. Fruit was prohibitive in price. The only water that was to be had was brought around each day and put in large barrels in the kitchen, this for bathing, drinking, washing the dishes, everything. Each summer for about six months the troops went out to round up the troublesome Indians, leaving a very small command in the Post. In 1876, just before they started, my mother and her baby girl and several of the ladies of the Post drove to the nearest point on the Missouri River, Fort Burton, the head of navigation, where they boarded a boat that took them down the river to Yankton, South Dakota. They were three weeks making this trip, much of the time spent on sand bars, from which the boat had to be dragged. From Yankton they went by train to Omaha. The boat was loaded with Army women and children and others fleeing from the peril of the Indians. There had been measles on the boat and three days after my mother reached home her baby was taken ill and died of the disease. That summer, while my mother was still grieving over the loss of her baby, news came that the 7th Infantry had been massacred. After several days it was corrected to read the 7th Cavalry, the Custer massacre. My father was adjutant to General [John] Gibbon and their command was the first on the field after the massacre, found all the officers and men stripped and mutilated—all but Custer. The Indians wanted him to be recognized.

## Goodbye message from Big Hole

The next summer most of the ladies remained at Fort Shaw when the troops went out, and in August came word of the battle of Big Hole. The command had encountered a large body of Indians and almost met the fate of Custer. They were completely surrounded by Indians, who finally set fire to the woods to burn them out—fortunately the wind changed. Every officer and many of the men of

the command were wounded and they all had their revolvers ready to kill themselves should the Indians get to them. The only meat they had was my father's horse—as adjutant of the expedition he was mounted. That night a courier slipped out to try to get reinforcements. My mother has a little note he carried, to be sent to her if he reached civilization, telling of their desperate circumstances and saying good-bye to her, for my father never expected to get out alive.

But help came and they were rescued. When Father's wounds healed sufficiently for him to travel, General Gibbon gave him a Dougherty wagon and a driver and he on crutches and my mother and my oldest brother, a baby of three months, started their long three-week trek to the railroad. Twice they had to pass wickiup villages of the Nez Percés Indians, the very ones who had fought at the Big Hole where father was wounded. But fortunately the Indians did not have the bitter feelings for the Army that they held against the settlers, who often were responsible for the loss of their lands and their being forced to move on. At first the stage stations refused them food and shelter, both being very scarce, but when they learned of the wounded officer, they could not do enough.

My father was so severely wounded that he had to take a year's sick leave and planned to retire and study law. But an appointment in the Subsistence Department, where he would not have hard, active duty, was obtained for him. He went to Leavenworth and later to Santa Fe, where I was born.

## Kansas to Arizona via San Francisco

My husband's father graduated in 1874, married on graduation leave and took his bride to Fort Laramie, Wyoming. The next year the regiment, the 6th Cavalry, was ordered overland to Arizona. Mrs. Craig returned to her home, Saint Joseph, Missouri, where my husband was born. When he was three weeks old she set out to join her husband, took the train to San Francisco, a ship around Lower California, and up the Gulf of California and then to old Fort Yuma, their first station in Arizona. Later they were in Forts Thomas, Grant, and Lowell in Arizona and Fort Wingate in New Mexico. In those days promotion was in the regiment and officers remained with the same regiment for many years. The Apaches were very bad at that time and caused constant trouble. Mrs. Craig has told me of one time when



GENEVIEVE CRAIG was the wife of the late General Malin Craig, Chief of Staff of the Army from 1935 to 1939, and the daughter of Brigadier General Charles Albert Woodruff (1845-1920). General Craig's father was Colonel Louis Aleck Craig. This article is drawn from a talk Mrs. Craig made to the Society of Daughters of the U. S. Army in Washington during the time her husband was Chief of Staff. Mrs. Craig died in 1941, four years before her husband.

*Wonderful things  
are found in books  
as First Graders,  
whether at Stuttgart  
(shown here) or at  
Sill well know*



they were changing station. The troops were out after the Indians so only one man could be spared to drive Mrs. Craig and her two children to the new post. He had orders to kill them, all three, at the approach of any Indians. Once they saw dust in the distance, and she thought the time had come, but fortunately it was caused by our own troops. My husband's sister was the first white child born in Fort Huachuca—in a condemned Government tent.

If you can picture all these experiences as vividly as I, who have motored over the Southwest when we met not a house nor a person for 170 miles in one stretch—in 1921, not in the 1870s—and through the Northwest country where today one can drive all day and hardly find a town in which to buy a sandwich, if, I say, you can picture what our old Army experienced then you will know why I hesitate about telling you the events of my early married life.

#### 'Days of Empire'

I was married in Manila, where my father was stationed, in 1901, the Days of the Empire, as we called them. Our story almost ended on our wedding trip, for we encountered a severe typhoon between Hong Kong and Manila. We were on a small liner, the *Diamante*, all the life boats were washed away, the steering gear broken, and as each wave struck us we thought it would be the end. This lasted from three in the afternoon until the next morning, when the sea calmed and we staggered into Manila. At that time my husband was an aide to General Thomas Barry. When we had been married four months, his troop of the 6th Cavalry was ordered to northern Cebu, where the natives were giving considerable trouble. He resigned as aide and went with the troops to this new station, Bogó, in the northern tip of Cebu, a most inaccessible place, letters very often a month on the way. Boats of any size could not land and the trail south to the city of Cebu was most hazardous, only a good-sized party was allowed to take it. I expected to join my husband, as it was a very lonely place for him, but my

doctors advised strongly against it. Four months later, the troop was ordered to Laizon, Biñan on the Laguna de Bay, only five or six hours from Manila. When my boy was five weeks old I boarded an old boat, went up the Pang River and across the lake to Biñan.

We lived in a small native house that we rented—slept on a native bed—just like the cane seat of a chair with a straw mat covering it. Over the latter we put the sheet. We always used mosquito bars—no screening in those days, bugs and gnats and beetles and flying cockroaches galore, especially when the lights were on. They were a great trial to me. I had not been there long when I discovered that the house was infested with the worst of all. We stood the bed legs in cans of kerosene oil, but the creatures would walk along the ceiling and drop onto the netting and try to get at us. After much labor, using much carbolic acid, as I remember, I cleared the house of the pests.

It was the custom in those days to have one general mess in the town, and all the officers and their families belonged to it. There were only five or six officers—three married—and mine was the only child. Three times a day we had to walk four or five blocks to this mess, managed by the wife of one of the officers. When I had been at Biñan about three weeks, cholera broke out. It had appeared in Manila just after my boy was born, and now it had reached Biñan. The government of this province was still under military control, so our officers had full charge. They had been on the lookout for cholera for several weeks, knowing that the natives would not observe the rules and regulations that would have kept it confined to Manila. One morning they noted an unusual crowd in a house and went to see what was going on—it was a wake. As they left the house they saw in a wood box under the house two objects that looked very strange and proved to be the bodies of two small children, plainly dead of cholera. Due to the party in progress, the disease, of course, spread in no time all over the town. It was a rather

small town, and yet the dead frequently numbered as many as fifty a day. They had to be buried under the supervision of the Army—laid out in trenches and covered with quicklime, as long as the lime lasted. A house-to-house inspection had to be made by our officers each day, because the people would not report cases and would bury their dead if not prevented under their houses in shallow graves.

#### Epidemics and baby food

In the first few days of the epidemic two enlisted men were stricken while the troops were on the target range. They were removed to a tent and died in four or five hours—strong, healthy men of about 175 pounds when stricken, they wasted away to about a hundred before they died. The shock to the men was so great that from that time they observed every rule and regulation. The germ of the cholera has to be taken through the mouth. We could eat only such meats as were cooked a considerable time, no fresh vegetables or fruits, canned food almost entirely, no crusts of bread, had to wash our hands in bichloride before eating and dip our silver in boiling water. The strain was considerable.

I had a funny old nurse for my baby. She had been

turned over to me by another Army woman. She could not speak English nor Spanish nor even Tagalog, of which my husband knew a little, but somehow I managed to get along with her—a sort of sign language, I suppose. We urged upon her not to buy anything from the market, but when we were packing to leave Biñan after eight months of this strain, we found fresh vegetables and fruit among her things.

Another great trial in Biñan was the feeding of my baby. After four or five months I had to find something for him and it finally had to be malted milk, which was not good but was better than any of the poor selection I had. The two doctors knew nothing of babies, neither one of the two Army women had ever had a child, and I knew practically nothing. The great wonder was that he ever lived, but he was a poor delicate little ten months old baby when we reached San Francisco.

\* \* \*

But we came through it all safely. We were young at that time, so nothing seemed so bad.

And now I hope that I have not tired you out but have told you enough for you to feel that in spite of the rising cost of living we are better off in our good old Army than we used to be.



*A scene enacted thousands of times since 1945: an Army family is reunited after months of separation*

Panther jets wing their way home to the USS *Princeton* after a successful strike on ground targets in Korea

Let the USAF pursue its predilections for strategic bombing and give the close support mission to an outfit that understands and wants to do it. The author says that the idea isn't as radical as it sounds, so he would have us



## Put Tac Air in Navy Blue

**COLONEL  
GEORGE C. REINHARDT**



Back from a strike at Korean ground targets, Navy pilots gather in the wardroom of the *Princeton* for coffee and conversation

**R**EALISTIC appraisal of a future global war accepts the fact that the United States and its allies cannot match aggression's hordes man for man, tank for tank. We strive for scientifically, technically, tactically superior unified land, sea, and air forces.

To be effective against superior numbers, small elite land forces must cherish their mobility and enjoy unequalled air and naval support. That support must encompass not only strategic bombing of enemy heartlands and naval control of the sea lanes; but effective action against

---

COLONEL GEORGE C. REINHARDT, Corps of Engineers, is the co-author with Lt. Col. William R. Kintner of *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat*, soon to appear in a new and up-dated edition. Col. Reinhardt is presently on duty at The Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Va.

enemy land forces, on and near the battlefield, by every weapon air/sea power can provide.

As a nation we rediscovered this forgotten truth in June 1950 when we initially opposed Red aggression in Korea with only sea and air elements. The realities of that combat quickly forced us to commit sizable ground forces and ground support aviation despite a national fixation that land armies were outdated.

It is clear that our present military establishment is not designed to extract the maximum value from our great air potential in the support of surface conflict. We are inherently weakest on land, the element where our worldwide commitments are greatest. How can we bolster our land arm with more effective—not necessarily greater—air support?

Evaluation of all factors suggests a solution, startling in its precedent-shaking simplicity: charge Navy/Marine air with all surface support, whether land or sea. This solution will permit the Air Force to concentrate on its two monumental responsibilities: strategic bombing and air defense of the U.S.

The advantages are apparent. They do no violence to total war strategies in that the Air Force, already divided into a Strategic Air Command and a Tactical Air Command, apparently believes that the two are entirely different and distinct, as the prophet of air power, Giulio Douhet, declared. It doesn't entail strange new responsibilities for sea power since Navy/Marine air already operate a highly efficient tac-air setup.

If you are shaken by this proposal, calm down and think it over; national security cannot pander to precedent or prejudice. American combat effectiveness, as atomic weapons intrude upon the battlefield, depends upon how much we strengthen outnumbered ground forces by unified combat participation of the other services.

**L**OGICALLY we should evaluate air support capabilities and performance before estimating the future. In Korea, a smaller United Nations army frustrated, but could not destroy, larger Communist ground forces despite the aid of absolute sea supremacy and very nearly complete air superiority. Korea was in fact a testing ground for the United Nations' optimum military combination: a relatively small, superbly equipped land element, whose combat effectiveness is multiplied by sea/air power. Unfortunately, results fell short of complete success.

Toward the end of the Korean struggle, Communist military forces, intended originally to defeat superior techniques by sheer weight of numbers, had almost equalled our technical attainments. Simultaneously, it became evident that our air power could not influence ground combat to anything like the promised extent. Indeed, unbiased evaluation reported a decreased effectiveness in air support compared to that demonstrated in World War II. Admittedly, the rugged terrain of Korea hampered close support air missions but the paucity of highway and rail networks presumably facilitated battlefield interdiction.

What actually happened? North Korean communications centers were battered into rubble. Sinanju's more than 50,000 inhabitants were mostly evacuated. When the Armistice was signed only a few hundred remained in that important railway junction. Sinuiju, a key "port of entry" on the Yalu, once a wealthy city of nearly 100,000, offered only a basic existence for a fraction of that number in its ruins.

Chongjin, center of the North Korean iron industry and a major seaport sixty miles south of the Chinese border, was almost entirely destroyed; barely 10 per cent of its quarter million former inhabitants are there today. Much the same could be said of Hungnam, on the east coast.

Throughout North Korea it was easy to drive right through town-sites without recognizing them as such. Factories, schools and essential services had been relocated in mountain caves.

These scenes impressed international armistice teams, viewing them first hand at the end of hostilities, as no Air Force "after action report," however conscientious, could. Over-all effects were reminiscent of Germany in the summer of 1945. There was one outstanding difference. Our armies did not march victoriously into North Korea as they had into Germany. Our Navy commanded the seas, our Air Force roared supreme, during both campaigns. But in Germany our armies outnumbered their foe. In Korea the reverse was true.

In the Korean campaign the enemy's formal transport system was smashed, his communication centers and seaports neutralized but his supplies never, after the spring of 1951, dwindled to critical shortages. Indeed, during the last months of hostilities the Communists matched us gun for gun; achieved remarkably high rates of ammunition expenditure in heavy, if limited objective, attacks all along the line.

The Navy's blockade, which hermetically sealed North Korean ports, was unable to close the inland border along the Yalu. Air power did not measure up to its potential to break the backbone of the enemy's logistic system. Nor did it tip the combat balance in any landlocked sector along the 150-mile front.

**T**AC-AIR interdiction turned out to be ineffective against little men with A-frames carrying supplies on their backs. But the quantities of artillery ammunition fired by the Communists in their 1953 attacks, as much as 15,000 rounds per day (including mortars) into a single battalion position, do not jibe with any theory that all supplies were hand-carried from the Yalu. Communist trucks could, and did, operate freely at night in small convoys—even with headlights blazing. Such movements, beyond effective artillery range, were often visible from outposts.


Experiences of Korean combat veterans soured them on the "curtain off the battlefield" theory. Interdiction did not interdict.

Neither coolies nor vehicles offered targets for aircraft unless the pilot was willing to fly down against the anti-aircraft and take his chances. As a rule the Air Force did not bomb below 5,000 feet. Marines and Navy flyers, operating under a different policy, flew low enough to get hits. The net result was only partial interdiction of enemy supplies. Longer-range air interdiction did prevent full-scale Chinese offensive operations.

A scrutiny of close air support in combat discloses mistakes. Prisoner of war interrogations confirmed what UN troops suspected; front-line tac-air strikes were stereotyped. Set routines, with only minor variations, warned the foe to take cover in the underground shelter he was certain to have nearby. Colored smoke markers, spotter planes, or "flak suppression" missions signalled every air punch which, consequently, attained slight success.

Effective use of the good earth in position warfare plus plentiful manpower was the Chinese rebuttal to our battlefield air power. Caves were dug as jump-off points for assaults right in front of UN outposts. It takes a big explosion, precisely placed, to blast troops out of a cave.

We should not forget that the whole Korean conflict was not position warfare. "Fluid" was frequently and aptly used during the first nine months—right up to the start of truce talks. Statistics on tac-air effectiveness in that period are



A Navy fighter pilot shot this photograph as he dived to bomb Chinese forces that were holding up U.S. infantry and tanks. Our infantry were pinned down behind the irrigation ditch (upper right) and tanks were on the road on the right. Enemy mortars hidden in buildings in the center had been holding up the U.S. push. Navy bombs hit these positions in the area where the smoke is rising. The Communist troops were forced to drop back after the attack of the Navy fighters.

scarce. Air Force General O'Donnell's comment after heavy bombing of the North Korean attempt to cross the Nak-tong was less than optimistic: "We stopped 'em today but they'll come again tomorrow."

That, insofar as it has been revealed, is the record. Not proof of sea/air power failure to offset enemy manpower but evidence it was not fully achieved in Korea. In search of flaws, doctrinal or procedural, let us delve into "surface-air" concept and operation.

**A**IR doctrine tries to liken interdiction to naval blockade. Lt. Gen. Anderson, commanding Fifth Air Force, asserted when the fighting stopped that "with the air force available it was impossible to stop the flow of supplies from Manchuria to the battlefield." He argued, reasonably, that the Air Force aided by Army ground activity prevented a Communist supply buildup adequate to launch an all-out offensive. Less validly, in relation to the tactical air mission, he asserted: "Once the stuff gets started, some will get to the front lines. You've got to get 'em at the source."

Just as the Navy, forbidden to blockade China, could not strangle Communist armies by closing North Korean ports, so, claimed air exponents, they should not be expected to bar reinforcements and supplies from the Korean battlefield, since they could not bomb the Manchurian "sanctuary."

The analogy is not valid. Blockades slowly strangle the "source" of contraband. It may take years to starve out a foe. Air interdiction can work faster. The farther from the source enemy material and supplies are destroyed, the greater the loss to the enemy. At the factory only the material is lost. Near the battle end of a long line of communications, destruction wastes the tremendous effort expended in getting supplies and equipment to that distant point. The blockaded army can fight while national stockpiles last. The army interdicted by air is immediately emaciated.

**T**WENTIETH century warfare has proved the inseparable bond between efficient joint operations and victory. Neither land, sea nor air power alone nor, except under the rarest circumstance, any two of those three, can win decisively against serious opposition. Least of all can a portion of but one of them—strategic bombing—do the whole job.

Airpower is essential to victory—just like surface (land and sea) power. As the latter requires two distinct (but co-operating) phases, i.e., armies and navies, air power too, as Douhet originally insisted, must have its tactical as well as its strategic forces. Omit any one of these and we lose the essential "balance" that brings victory.

Devotees of Douhet forget that prophet's own assertion: surface-support air

is necessary in addition to strategic air; both are entirely different and distinct. Douhet was farsighted in an age of TNT rather than KT bombing. He realized that destruction (or capture) of hostile air bases, not aerial combat, won air supremacy. Today, scores of bombing planes are no longer required to flatten an enemy air base. One plane, reaching the site with nuclear bombs, can complete the job. The types of aircraft most appropriate to execute these missions are rapidly losing all resemblance to types desired for close support of ground forces, those needed by a surface-air force.

Tac-air requires equipment, training and doctrine different from airpower designed to contest air supremacy and conduct deep bomber operations.

**C**LOSE air support pays off only when it hits, and hurts, the enemy. This kind of effective air support can be provided. Procedures essential for success are no mystery. They approximate Navy/Marine operations closer than those of the Air Force.

The first fundamental is acceptance of the idea that support of surface forces has top priority. Targets ranging from rearward supply dumps to the line of contact are those whose destruction best advances the ground battle. Crucial ones are often fleeting—to be hit swiftly, aggressively.

Surface commanders' judgment re-

garding target selection, both close support and interdiction, must govern. Not only on, but immediately beyond, the battlefield he is most concerned with the tactical impact of every air strike upon enemy capabilities. He wants especially to take full advantage of tac-air's heavier punch.

Tac-air is flexible. There are things that it alone can do: hitting a target on a steep reverse slope, strafing the enemy ahead of our advancing troops, smashing a bridge beyond artillery range, pounding reserves concentrated in defile. Able ground commanders will not waste air strikes, where artillery or mortars can accomplish the mission, any more than they would squander their other resources.

**T**HE priority system now in effect for interdiction targets is generally sound. Enemy transportation approaching the front and within the battle zone comes first. Enemy stockpiles of POL, ammunition, equipment and food at and immediately behind the battle front come next. Massed effort at specific points or sometimes a coordinated series of small strikes, both imposing heavy demands upon tac-air, will constitute interdiction efforts.

Unlike interdiction's systematic operation, close support may often be most effective in "penny packets." Two or three planes instantly available can squelch almost any target reported from the front lines. A single plane dropping an egg in a cave can often do what massed artillery battalions cannot achieve.

The Navy method of having planes armed and circling at initial points, ready to go, fits beautifully into ideal tac-air specifications. Critics complain that airplanes used a few at a time in pinpoint bombing on call are being wasted. But the fleeting nature of battle zone targets generally requires this use. A limited number paired off with particular divisions would not go to waste. Air-ground teamwork improves when ground fighters work constantly with the same group of pilots upstairs.

The technological complexities of combat flying render highly improbable development in any pilot of equal ability for close-support and long-range bombing assignments. Behind a well executed surface mission lie hundreds of hours of training, not only in flying but also in acquiring intimate knowledge of the surface force supported. Unit recognition, map reading, trajectories of mortars and howitzers, instant identification

by smoke puffs of different explosions, tactical significance of ground phenomena, all enter into a successful tac-air strike. Such technical training is important, but more vital is the will to move in on the target. This last requires an understanding of ground combat and ingrained belief in the importance of unified effort.

**T**HE last word has by no means been written in the field of surface air-support techniques. There are many ways which can and should be explored for moving a pilot and his plane close enough to the target to hit it and get out again in the face of murderous flak. Unless the men responsible for air-support training concentrate on these problems our hardware will continue to improve faster than our skills.

Improved air reconnaissance for surface warfare is another essential if air support is to achieve maximum results. There is little question that some of the skill achieved in photographic intelligence in World War II has slipped away since. Then, too, the Chinese competence in digging and camouflage severely taxed air reconnaissance. Cameras, recon planes and their techniques for surface warfare can all be improved if the necessity is recognized and acted upon by sympathetic agencies. We need a better means of analyzing an enemy's communication system. Although primitive systems move underground more readily than technically complicated ones, even the little men with the A-frames must have assembly areas and pass through defiles. Better analysis may reveal these weak points in the enemy's communications system.

Effective coordination between land forces and support aviation with its split-second timing comes readily only to forces that know each other's limitations and capabilities. A key reason for Navy air's effectiveness is the fact that Navy aviators serve sufficient time on surface ships to know naval operations. Likewise Marine pilots are Marines first, pilots second.

Tomorrow, if not today, we will have atomic weapons which hugely increase tac-air's combat potential. That potential constitutes a primary reason for concern over close support and interdiction performance levels. Tac-air, either directly or as the eyes of other agencies, delivers atomic missiles on and near the battlefield. Understanding its impact on a future war requires an appreciation of three neglected facts: (1) the enormous tactical prowess of atomic weapons; (2)

their optimum employment by the United States would be in conjunction with small elite forces opposing massed manpower; (3) such use would strike an aggressor's military establishment only, not civilian populations.

**H**IGHLY effective tac-air will be essential to enable relatively small land forces successfully to counter the manpower an aggressor may throw at us in any of the world's half dozen remote "hot spots." Experience in Korea illustrates how comparatively ill-equipped military forces—designed to fight against superior technique—are approaching equality with us in every field except air and atomic weapons. Our lead here must certainly be maintained and preferably lengthened, to overcome our permanent deficiency in manpower.

The presence of 280mm atomic artillery on the battlefield will not eliminate the need for tac-air. Limited gun range is the most obvious reason. Planes must deliver atomic blasts required for interdiction missions.

Tac-air will still furnish reconnaissance to spot, report and track targets for atomic missiles whether delivery is by artillery or plane. The Army's "light aviation" is too fragile and slow for such sweeps behind hostile lines. Essential post-explosion surveys also require swift, powerful planes. Last, and by no means least, the majority of targets assigned to tac-air must still be hit with conventional weapons, tac-air delivered. Few will justify expending an atomic bomb, even a "small" one.

Nor will addition to land combat of not yet available guided missiles involve major alteration in the outlook. Tactical atomic warfare, whatever its agencies, accentuates, not diminishes, the role of surface air support.

We need the means to make peripheral wars as unattractive to an aggressor as our fission/fusion power spoils (we hope) his appetite for global war. We can meet another Korea with smashing atomic blows against the invader's field army on and near the battlefield if we possess a "surface air force" with atomic capabilities wedded to some top-notch mobile divisions. Unfortunately that "if" seems insurmountable without some adjustments in our military establishment. This means relatively small, overwhelmingly effective, atomic weapon-equipped, integrated air-surface force.

**A** SINGLE major alteration of Army-Navy-Air Force doctrine would create the surface air force we need with-

out weakening our structure for all-out war. This change would charge Navy/Marine air with all surface support over land and sea; place in the custody of the Air Force the dual mission of strategic air offense and air defense of the United States.

The proposal is less radical than it appears at first glance. Divorcing "tac-air" from the Air Force may be a blow to pride, but the move might be secretly welcome, particularly if accompanied by little or no reduction in combat wings.

Rising clamor for continental air defense consumes more and more Air Force effort. Public discontent over "protection," postulated mainly upon the deterrent effect of a retaliatory striking force, deserves and receives increasing attention. Interceptor squadrons appear in greater number—and cost—as plan succeeds plan. Losing the contentious headache of "ground support" might secretly appeal to many a high-ranking airman.

No violence is done to the current status of our inter-Service balance by the suggested shift. Detailed specifications for a "surface air force" remain a highly classified subject, whoever provides it. However, the principles involved are readily discernible. It must possess enough wings to balance the Army's divisions plus Marine divisions. It must train realistically with ground forces in maneuvers; exchanging knowledge and experience, getting intimately acquainted.

To provide the Army with its own combat air force would be an untenable proposition for all that it has been requested by some ground commanders. There are already enough "air forces" in the United States military establishment.

Naval, and Marine, air outlook is already beamed toward surface support, albeit much of that "surface" is water instead of land. A highly organized, superbly motivated, equipped and skilled force is in being. Whether expanded by transfer or other means it could absorb its new role without disrupting shock.

The Air Force predilection for strategic bombing orients that Service almost wholly toward total war. The Navy, from long experience, must prepare in addition for sudden, small peripheral wars. As American policy moves perceptibly toward the elite striking force backed by air/sea power, naval resources are more and more committed to traditional tasks with consequent lessened interest in sharing the strategic bombing pie.



A flight deck officer signals "Go" to the pilot taking off for a mission over Korea

**N**OT only does Navy and Marine air offer a going concern capable of handling surface support missions; they offer one better designed, with respect to military characteristics of the job to be done. The military effectiveness of a fighting force can be determined by analyzing its doctrines, organization, concept of command, and participation in joint operations. Gauged by all these keys, the Fleet Air arm and its companion, Marine Air, are well suited to execute the surface support mission.

If the Navy/Marine combination were given the entire air support mission they would stress familiarity between pilots and the forces they support. Marine air wings and carrier groups already set the example.

In the realm of equipment, the rapid strides of air technology approach a point where that designed for strategic air missions may be unsatisfactory for surface support; where planes developed to wrest air superiority no longer fit the air support harness. Naval air has been accustomed to developing planes for specific tasks. Near misses won't sink ships or knock out bunkers. The Navy has never gone overboard in the search for a single aircraft which incorporates air

support, interceptor, and air escort qualities. It can be counted upon to foster the types support missions require, much as it already operates mobile (floating) airfields to serve until fighter strips can be built.

But phenomenal technical progress in every military field cannot overshadow the human element in war. We cannot bank on machines alone. Tactics and pilot skill provided by training are equally important. As previously noted, it is in the realm of training that the advantages of the Naval/Marine air support combination become most evident.

**A**N old rule for anyone providing service is: give the customer what he needs. Charging Navy/Marine aviation with all air support of ground operations would be endorsed by most Army men. Navy/Army cooperation in amphibious operations has never given rise to the intensity of disagreement instanced by Navy/Air Force or Army-Air Force disputes. The two older services have, after all, fought side by side for generations, leaving their bitterest rivalries to the football field, their most acrimonious disputations to guest night at Army-Navy Clubs around the world.

# The Soldier and The Statesman

Military planning must conform to political goals . . .  
political determination must fit military capabilities

**GENERAL MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY**

**E**XCEPT, perhaps among certain barbarians, war is never an end in itself. No one in his right mind can want war. But it occurs when a nation comes to believe that the only alternatives are even worse. These alternatives may be the continued acceptance of an adverse economic, political, or strategic situation; or the loss of an economic, political, or strategic advantage. In other words, war is simply a device for achieving national objectives by force, usually resorted to only when other methods fail.

As a result, in the execution of national policy, the soldier is the statesman's junior partner. This relationship is emphasized by the fact that the apparent ability to make war successfully adds to and strengthens the capability of a nation in the peaceful intercourse with other nations which we call diplomacy. The absence of a reasonable capability to support diplomacy militarily in case of need can weaken foreign policy to the point of ineffectiveness. On the other hand, the excessive and deliberate use of military capability as a diplomatic device is both immoral and dangerous. History provides examples in which "saber-rattling" precipitated rather than prevented war.

The purpose of war, when it occurs, is for one contestant to impose its will, by force, upon the other. . . . The method by which this end is achieved has remained fundamentally the same throughout history. That method is the defeat of the enemy's armed forces.

**F**OR centuries, mankind has been seeking some simpler formula to achieve this goal. There is the eternal idea that in the enemy's total capability there must be some key element by whose destruction or injury his will to resist can be paralyzed.

This search has affected not only strategic but even, for a time, tactical thinking. Tactics, however, vary with weapons capabilities, so that they are constantly changing. Since strategy is more fundamental it is to strategy that

most of the effort to discover a single deterministic formula has been devoted.

As a matter of fact, through this search a great deal has been done over the years to increase knowledge and understanding of war. Mahan codified and explained a strategic philosophy in terms of sea power. Mackinder paralleled this contribution in terms of political geography. Douhet and Mitchell made a beginning in interpreting the role of air power.

While each of these thinkers contributed much, the thesis which each propounded contained the flaw of being applicable not in general terms, not absolutely, but only in terms of specific circumstances. Beyond that, the exposition of any single one of these theses alone was and is based upon a fallacy—the same fallacy which exists when an attempt is made to explain history in terms of any single deterministic influence, be it economics or ideology or wars or even sun spots. While each such influence may be significant at a given time under specific conditions, none is ever the sole determinant of the course of history.

**N**EVERTHELESS, the search for the simple solution goes on. Today, it is given impetus by the fact that mankind has in the past decade developed a capability for tremendous destruction, on a scale never even dreamed of before. Such a completely new potential must, it is assumed, put a completely new face upon the conduct of war.

Since the consequences of such destruction are so dreadful to contemplate, there are those who say that the mere possession of this destructive capability by one nation constitutes so great an implied danger to its enemies that they would never provoke its employment. We must realize, however, that when rival nations both possess this capability, its effectiveness as a power giving weight to diplomatic action tends to be balanced.

Be that as it may, in studying warfare as in studying

CONDENSED FROM AN ADDRESS BEFORE THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, HARRIMAN, N. Y. 30 JULY

any other human activity, the only guide which we have for the future is the record of the past. I am unable to recall any example in history of a nation at war losing its will to resist until its armed forces had been defeated.

\* \* \*

Actually the fact that a nation will continue to resist until its armed forces are rendered impotent is testimony to the indomitable courage of the human spirit, regardless of race or nationality. If a people has faith in its cause, it will not lose its will to resist the opponents of that cause until the last reasonable hope of success is destroyed—until its formal means of resistance, its armed forces are broken.

On purely pragmatic grounds, therefore, if on no other, it would be an error of the greatest magnitude for any nation to become over-committed to a strategy which, while designed to destroy or damage life and industry in its enemy's home territory, left that enemy's combat forces relatively unhampered.

**T**HE fact is that the weapons properly suited to one of these objectives are not necessarily suited to the other. I have already mentioned the situation in which rival nations' destructive capacity is equivalent and thereby is balanced out as an influence supporting their foreign policy aims. Consider further a situation for such nations if war actually occurred and in which mutual fear of retaliation in kind might prevent both opponents from resorting to the use of their most destructive weapons. Or consider a situation in which such weapons were used but the materials and facilities required for the production of those weapons were, respectively, expended or destroyed, and no decision was reached. In any of these eventualities, the military element which would necessarily determine the outcome—the only element capable of tipping the balance one way or another—would be the superiority of one side or the other in the more accustomed means, the more conventional forces.

I do not by any means minimize the vital importance of the portion of strategy which is primarily aimed at destruction of an enemy's war-making potential in his own homeland. I merely warn against undue reliance upon that one aspect of strategy at the expense of the other equally essential aspects. In other words, a sound strategy must stand firmly on all of its legs.

I do, however, believe that it is vitally important to remember that wars are won by the achievement of domination over human beings, and the territory they inhabit, and that only land forces can achieve and maintain such domination. To do so, they require strong support from the air and from the sea; but in the final analysis it must be the land forces which assert control and thereby determine the victory. There is a direct analogy from football—air and naval forces run vitally important interference, but land forces carry the ball over the goal line of military victory. If your ball advances you win, if it is pushed back you lose.

In all of this, a primary conditioning factor in any democratic nation, and certainly in the United States, is that the soldier is an adviser and an executor, not a formu-

lator, with regard to the policy determined by the civilian authorities of the government. This is the only proper allocation of responsibilities. Bearing in mind that war is a device for achieving national objectives by force, it is therefore fought to achieve political goals. It is a means to an end. In determining which of several means to follow to achieve a military end, the one offering the greatest political gain is accordingly the one which should be chosen unless it entails such military risk or cost as to outweigh the possible political gain. Such a consideration must be carefully weighed in the determination of strategy as a whole. And if utter annihilation of the enemy is the means chosen to win victory, that victory would be empty indeed.

By the same token, foreign policy has a military aspect as well as a peaceful aspect, and military considerations must enter into its formulation. Thus, while military planning must be carried out in the light of political goals, policy determination should be carried out in the light of military capabilities. A policy which depends for effect upon military capability becomes nothing but bluff—and obvious bluff—when the military capability for backing it up is patently inadequate.

**T**HE soldier and the statesman must work together in close coordination. It is the statesman's function to formulate the policy to be followed. Upon him rests the authority of decision. But among the many factors he must weigh and assess in reaching his decision, the military factor must be given appropriate consideration.

The soldier's responsibility lies in the professional military field. His over-riding responsibility is to give his honest, objective, professional military advice to the civilian authorities over him. If what he is given to work with is less than the minimum he regards as essential to accomplish the military task assigned him, he must give his superiors an honest, fearless, objective opinion of the consequences, as he sees them from the military viewpoint, of this shortage. Finally, whatever the final decision may be, he has the duty to do the utmost with whatever he is furnished.

The soldier is dependent upon the statesman not only for allocations of men and materials, but for the climate of international agreement in which he can successfully carry out his tasks.

\* \* \*

Such organizations as NATO are based on international military agreements, and international military agreements can stem only from international political agreements. Thus, the statesman is the trail blazer who makes it possible for the soldier to build the organizational machinery with which, if need be, he carries out the policy determined by the statesman.

The statesman and the soldier both necessarily depend for their effectiveness upon each other. The military man, within his specialized field, must keep in mind that he is called in only when other methods have failed. The statesman should remember always that the soldier's effectiveness in supporting any national policy is only as great as his capability.

## Echo in the Summer Doldrums:

### "Where Are the Men?"

THE endless Washington debate over military means was in its mid-summer doldrums during July, despite the splitting of Indochina and other evidences of Communist advance. The Alsops tried to stir things up with gloomy forebodings of Russian progress in the development of hydrogen bombs and intercontinental carriers. Senator Stuart Symington, the former Air Force Secretary, debated the same issue in a lively and knowing manner on 21 July, but raised few objections from his colleagues except that they were reluctant to admit any need for the U. S. to engage in an all-out crash effort to keep ahead of the Soviets in the production of hydrogen bombs and IBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles).

Neither the Alsops nor the persistent Senator from Missouri were able to make much headway against the record-breaking heat wave and public apathy. Such excitement on military problems as Washington could muster had to wait until the last week end of the month. On Friday the 30th, a brisk breeze was stirred up at a press conference called by the retiring Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower & Personnel), Dr. John A. Hannah, who was going back to his old job as President of Michigan State College, revealed to the newspapermen some aspects of the Administration's thinking about what should be done about the military reserves, meaning principally the Army and Air Force Reserve and National Guard. The breeze Dr. Hannah kicked up was to blow open a door of the White House out of which the Press Secretary would emerge with some comment. It also was to stir a headline from Mr. Wilson.

Much could be written about what Dr. Hannah had to say, but briefly stated his program has three points:

- ▶ Continue the draft; it is now scheduled to expire in June 1955 and Congress will have to extend it.
- ▶ Make service in the reserves compulsory by recalling to active duty any man who failed to fulfill his required obligation.
- ▶ Abolish the Army and Air Force reserve organizations and put all civilian components into the National Guard which would become a "National Guard of the United States."

Up to now most such programs have called for a relatively short period of active duty before men were embarked on their reserve obligation. But, as Dr. Hannah described the new program, most men will serve a period beyond that required for basic training. Indeed, he said that men who voluntarily join a reserve organization before they are inducted may still be required to serve for a minimum period of active duty. This would remove one of the best recruiting gimmicks the National Guard has had for 17- and 18-year olds: "Join us and you won't

be drafted and you won't go on active duty except in case of emergency or war—when you would be drafted anyway."

DR. HANNAH'S idea about how to compel a man to perform his legal reserve obligation was hardly original. This magazine has mentioned it before; the last time in August 1953. The difficulty is not in finding a way to make service compulsory but in getting Congress to pass a law that will actually compel, and in getting the people to accept it.

As to the third part of the Hannah plan—the National Guard of the United States idea—it can only be said that both Reservists and National Guardsmen were so astonished as to be rendered speechless temporarily. This was most unusual, and before they fully recovered their normal facilities that White House door blew open and Mr. Hagerty was heard to say that Dr. Hannah's plan did "not reflect fully the attitude of the National Security Council."

A day later Mr. Wilson backed up his ex-subordinate. The National Security Council had approved the compulsory feature "in a broad sense," he said, but admitted that political considerations might make the Administration settle for "90 per cent instead of a full 100 per cent of the plan." He also said that the condition of the reserves "would be a scandal very disturbing to the American people" if the nation had to go to war.

The latter was really rather old-hat, although the daily press made quite a bit of it. Surprising because it suggests that Mr. Wilson (and the press for that matter) didn't have much faith in the memories of the American public. It has been told more than once in the past few months that the reserve situation wasn't a rip-roaring success. Among those who had said so were President Eisenhower, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, and General Matthew B. Ridgway.

THE President has mentioned it more than once. The last time was on 27 July. In a letter to Sen. Saltonstall, Mr. Eisenhower wrote that "deficiencies and irritations and half-measures . . . for more than 30 years have characterized that part of our defense program which involves the training and administration of the civilian components of the armed forces." A plan "for reconstructing, revitalizing and reinforcing the Reserve and Guard structure" will be "a top priority item in January," he wrote. The President's earlier comment was in his State of the Union message last January. "Evident weaknesses exist in the state of readiness and organization of our reserve forces," was the way he put it then.

Admiral Radford's comment, made last March in a press interview: "It is my opinion that we have to make our reserve programs more realistic and more responsive to current and future needs."

General Ridgway, testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee: "... the strength and proficiency of the Army Reserve components must be increased in order that the Army may be prepared to execute its responsibilities for the defense of the nation."

The history of attempts to get legislation that would create a vigorous and effective reserve force is depressing to read and certainly frustrating to any man who believes very strongly that reserves are needed. This includes many thousands of patriotic, hard-working Reserve and National Guard officers who contribute more time and energy to the security of the nation than their fellow tax-payers will ever know.

The most recent history is typical. In his State of the Union message in January of this year, the President said that "measures to correct these weaknesses [in the reserves] will be later submitted to the Congress." Nine months have passed and now the hope is that it will be submitted in January 1955. What happened in those nine months? The story begins even earlier.

**M**ONTHS before January the President had received a recommendation from the National Security Training Commission and had sent it to the Office of Defense Mobilization to find out if the nation had enough men of the right ages to put the program into effect.

The program recommended by NSTC would require that every young man be given six months of training and then be transferred to "compulsory reserve activity" for a remaining three and one-half years or more (depending upon how active he was) and finally moved to a standby status for the remaining period of his eight years of obligation. Men could volunteer for active duty after their six months of training and men who refused to participate in reserve training would be ordered to active duty (this was the punitive feature that would make the compulsory feature effective). In addition to these men the active forces would be kept up to strength by the drawing of lots by all of the men in the NSTS pool.

When Arthur S. Flemming, Director of ODM, got the NSTS recommendation he appointed a civilian committee headed by Lawrence A. Appley, President of the American Management Association. The Appley committee attempted to reconcile the manpower needs of industry and the civilian economy with the requirements of the military in the event of mobilization. The committee concluded that a program could be effected. Mr. Flemming then recommended that the President direct the Department of Defense to establish its needs for an "immediately callable reserve" and a "selectively callable reserve" and that the National Security Council then determine the size and composition of the military reserve forces.

The President accepted the Flemming recommendation early in January and directed the Department of Defense to make its report by 1 April. The Department

missed that deadline but sometime later it did report to the President who sent the whole thing to the National Security Council. Obviously some progress had been made there for it was an NSC paper that Dr. Hannah quoted during his swan song press conference.

If Congress should pass a law similar to the plan outlined here, more problems will immediately face the Regular Army. It might reduce the number of men volunteering (enlisting) in the Army for the simple reason that a youth, weighing his choices, might doubt if a four-year hitch, plus two in the inactive reserve would be better for him than two years of active duty (and a chance of escaping even that) and four years of active reserve duty, plus two years of inactive. Furthermore men sent to active duty because they didn't fulfill their reserve obligation would hardly be the highest type of citizen-soldier. Finally men who were "drawn by lot" for active service would feel imposed upon. The feeling of equality of sacrifice is all important in selective service and these plans simply cannot provide for it. A tip off is the not uncommon query of the worried mother of 1950-53 who wanted to know why her Johnny was in Korea while the neighbor's boy on one side was in Germany and the boy on the other side was in college.

Despite these reservations it is quite probable that the compulsory features in Dr. Hannah's plan are as good as any that could be devised. So the catch is not in the instrument, nor can there be any question of the need for a workable reserve system. The big question is whether any compulsory system will ever be enacted into law. We cannot escape the feeling that Mr. Wilson's ninety per cent is too optimistic. We feel that reserve component commanders will be saying a year from now as they have said so often in the past: "Where are the men?"

We concede that we are not visibly moved. We are inclined to believe that Mr. Wilson was completely accurate in an unintended way. The American people show every indication of refusing to be scandalized over the military reserve situation until war comes.

**I**T is not nearly so depressing and much more fun to speculate as to why the hard-working Dr. Hannah chose to comment on such an explosive subject as the reserve situation before the Administration's plans had hardened into specific legislative proposals. This was quite unusual. Details of National Security Council projects aren't ordinarily bruited about at a press conference—even a Presidential press conference. The answer may have been made by a service newspaper several weeks before the Sage of East Lansing departed from Washington. In its "gossip" column it commented that Dr. Hannah "was counting on National Security Council endorsement of the new plan for Reserve Forces as [his] last major achievement. . . ." It is not uncommon for public figures who are bursting with pride of parenthood to suffer premature birth pains. It is one of the sources of news leaks in Washington and so it is surprising that the reporters at the conference seemed not to have noted this, even though the retiring Secretary failed to pass around the cigars.

Now, in an unparalleled period fraught with uncertainties of grave import to us and our institutions, some shadows have seemed to fall across our Army, some doubts too have arisen in some minds as to its integrity.

GENERAL MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY



# Soldiering Is a Way of Life

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DONOVAN YEUELL, JR.

It is not belittling the many serious problems in the fields of strategy, tactics, organization and weapons to say that the foremost problem of the Army today is the lack of one-ness, the solidarity that is the mark of a spirited, vigorous fighting force. Soldiers of all grades and ranks in the Regular Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve, yearn for a re-birth of faith in the military profession.

The outward manifestations of the taint on the Army's soul are numerous. The "evidence" includes these obvious facts:

- The reenlistment rate is lower than it should be, not only among draftees but among noncommissioned Regulars of several years of service.
- The number of officers who have resigned, many of them of field grade.
- The difficulty Army Reserve and Na-

tional Guard units have in maintaining authorized strength.

- The lack of interest in a military career by young men who possess qualities of leadership; this is shown by the number of men who apply for West Point and Officer Candidate Schools, and in the small number of ROTC graduates who express an interest in a Regular commission.

- The fact that many soldiers believe that inspired and dedicated leadership, while not dormant, is not nearly so prevalent as it ought to be.

- Finally, the deplorable fact that many officers and noncommissioned officers deliberately evade troop duty, especially command assignments.

The Army is certainly not shot to hell, but there are enough danger signals to call for some soul-searching by all of us. General Ridgway has addressed him-

self vigorously to the situation by command action and by stirring statements directed at strengthening the Army's belief in itself. Secretary Stevens has gallantly supported the Army's good name. But the Secretary and the Chief of Staff cannot themselves restore the Army's spirit. All of us, at every echelon, ought now to be following their lead. Here are my thoughts on what can be done to make soldiering a life free of shadows and doubts.

The creation of an effective fighting force depends upon factors both within and without the Army's control. Being soldiers, we must concentrate on the internal, or Army, side of the problem.

The surest way to meet difficult days is to stick by the clear-cut standards of proper soldiering. An honest, professional attitude is the one hope of an army in unsettled times. But great danger lurks when professional standards are lowered for reasons of expediency. Any compromise of personal integrity and honor in the performance of duty soon debases a military force. Selfless, courageous and honest conduct must be upheld. If it is it will become the rallying point for the re-birth of high standards of professionalism.

It is the Regular Army that must set the tempo for this re-birth. This is not to say that the Regulars are the only

Lieutenant Colonel Donovan Yeuell, Jr., Artillery, is presently working for an advanced degree in foreign affairs at Georgetown University under the Army's civilian school program. He is a graduate of the Military Academy, Class of 1940. Before entering Georgetown he was on duty in Germany where he commanded the 32d Field Artillery Battalion and also served on higher staffs.



"professionals." Many non-Regulars are highly professional and some Regulars fall short of the mark. However, as it is the Regular Army that determines the soldierly life and sets the standards, the full-time Regular must lead the way in instilling in all components a professional outlook that is derived from those beliefs and practices that have always distinguished soldiering.

A professional army has a solid basis of fundamentals held together by what we may call "frills." Both are essential. Over a period of nearly two centuries the United States Army has developed a body of fundamentals and frills that comprise a set of operating rules. Typically American, this set of "rules" has proven itself adaptable to the changes in means of warfare, military thinking, and domestic and foreign affairs. Applied with common sense, the rules are flexible enough to meet a wide variety of circumstances.

It is safe to say that many of the Army's difficulties, past and present, can be traced to violations of these "rules."

**A**N Army cannot enjoy the self-assurance that is so vital to its being unless it is confident that its highest leaders are competent professionals who will act as courageously in the face of public opinion as they do on the battlefield. The high command will not be blamed if Congress refuses to raise pay, or if no way can be found to get dependents overseas more rapidly; but there will be no forgiveness unless the rank and file are confident that their chiefs have done all within their power to alleviate such conditions. Downward loyalty begets upward devotion. So also much is expected of the senior leadership in furthering the role of the Army in modern war, and the Army's place in the sun. Men know when great principles appear to be compromised without a fight. Any suspicion that the Army lacked the courage of its convictions would be depressing to the rank and file.

**W**HATEVER the reasons for the reluctance of many leaders—commissioned and noncommissioned—to lead, the trend must be reversed. Strong and confident leadership at every level is absolutely indispensable to an army.

A leader should be able to feel that he is more or less a prince in his own right and that, so long as he produces, he may "run his show" within the set bounds of his responsibility. It is in the nature of good soldiering that command duty should produce deep personal satisfac-

tion. If it doesn't something vital is missing.

One of the great virtues of our Army has been that it gave a man a job to do and let him do it; conversely, failure to perform at a high level of excellence traditionally has been rewarded with firm and immediate disciplinary action. Within reasonable bounds, the criterion of leadership is *results*. Responsibility is supposed to carry commensurate authority. The "hard but fair" attitude remains sound. Such principles are the only basis for inspired and reasonable leadership. Yet these obviously sound principles often have given way to overcentralized control whereby mediocrity thrives and good men wonder whether strong leadership is really desired.

**A**NOTHER distressing influence on leadership has been a tendency to try to prevent trouble before it happens. An officer requisitioning supplies may find himself making as many as three or four certifications of his honesty, and half a dozen clerks up and down the line may "check" his veracity. Numerous restrictions have been placed by higher headquarters upon troop units, to keep down the rates of AWOL, to reduce minor disciplinary infractions, to "insure" obedience and for other purposes that should be the personal business of commanders. Preventive measures designed to make mistakes almost impossible can have the effect of making leaders

Spit and polish is part of the soldier's trade and its complete absence is as debilitating as too much of it.



mere relay stations. The way to reduce failures in leadership is to strengthen the leadership and not to cut out its guts with excessive "command by prevention." Proper performance is achieved when commanders demand high standards and deal summarily with failures.

Poor leadership can be blamed for almost everything that ails an army. But the truth is that the U. S. Army is rich in leaders with a wide variety of experience. The problem is to get the most from these proven leaders, to develop leaders who show promise, and to weed out the incompetents. Nothing should ever deter the removal of poor leaders; quality of leadership counts far more than quantity.

It may well be that we have too few Regular officers and that this affects the leadership. Something less than one-fourth of the officers on active duty are Regulars. The recent decision to seek authority next year to add 4,000 Regulars is a good start.

**S**OMETHING must be said about the corroding tendencies that came to a head in the Doolittle Board Report in 1946. Whatever merits it may have had, that report developed inhibitions against leadership. Officers and noncoms got the idea that the old tenets of leadership were improper. It didn't intend to, but the Doolittle Board did untold damage to the Army's self-confidence by discouraging good leadership. Furthermore, it blackened the Army's reputation.

Inevitably, there were some abuses of rank and privilege during World War II, but they were far from widespread. The abuses were not the fault of the system, but of slackness in enforcing it. Such gaps and distinctions as may exist officially and socially between officers and enlisted men are there for practical, proven purposes.

The officer idea has honorable precedent in the record of every great people. It works as nothing else will. The notion that it is "Prussian" and undemocratic is a product of ignorance and misunderstanding, certainly as regards the U. S. Army. The few fools and villains who abuse military rank give credence to the ignorant critics. The only solution is ruthlessly to eliminate them. The status of a military leader is quickly accepted by the vast majority of soldiers.

There have been attempts to transform leadership into a scientific technique using the methods of big business. Certainly scientific research and development and business methods and industrial production have military application and should be used. It goes

without saying that the scientific, industrial, and business resources of the nation are invaluable assets to the Army. However, they are *adjuncts* only; the Army must not assume their character but should fit their contributions to the Army's needs. *Military leadership is an art.* It may use science and technical know-how but it cannot be governed by them. My objection is not to the civilians who have made indispensable contributions to the military profession and national security or to civilian control of the military establishment. I object to the growing tendency to seek *civilian* solutions to problems that can more effectively be solved by *military* methods.

Enormous administrative burdens have been allowed to fall upon the Army's shoulders in the name of more efficient personnel and business management. The mania for "business methods" is all too familiar to any officer or senior noncom who has served with troops in recent years; a visit with a company supply sergeant will send one reeling with IBM reports and stock records. Undoubtedly the administrative load has developed from well-meaning efforts to improve the Army's functioning, but the pay-off has not been greater efficiency and it has led to a diversion of effort from the main purpose of the Army. My skepticism on this score is shared by so many that I gladly risk the charge of "reactionary."

When activities not germane to military effectiveness get too much attention, professional excellence becomes incidental. If too many things are given top priority, the old principle of first things first goes by the board. A dangerous condition arises when a commander is ordered to do more than reasonably can be expected of him, when he is told over and over how to do it, and is in a constant turmoil over many matters that contribute little to the mission of his command. One gets the impression that non-essentials and essentials are lumped together indiscriminately. In such circumstances, even the best leader can become hopelessly frustrated and find that in trying to do all that is directed, his unit is doing few things well.

**W**E are over-enthusiastic about putting "how to do it" in writing. Every directive and order issued at every echelon should be withheld unless it can pass the test of military necessity. There has never been a more complete and sound literature on every phase of Army activity. It is safe to say that some adequate publication is available to meet nearly all the needs of training, administering and maintaining the Army. In

general, if more is needed, the troops will ask for it. Present doctrine is largely sound and sufficient. Commanders do not thirst for guidance; what they need is breathing space.

The Army is tough and resilient but it cannot work at peak pressure indefinitely. Jack the Soldier becomes a dull boy if he works without letup. Without the stimulus of battle, overlong periods of field training tend to exceed the point of good returns. Without lulls between the storms, the Army may one day find itself too worn out to last through really heavy weather—this especially menaces our leadership. For more than a decade the Army has been working at full steam. Good soldiers do not resent honest work, but they expect to get a break occasionally. A life of grim tedium is not necessary to produce a good army.

A high peak of soldiering ought to be attainable with considerably less time and effort than we now expend. We need a deliberate reduction or elimination of activities that are not essential to the legitimate functions of the Army.

With the leaders allowed to lead, and the tasks directed toward the main business of soldiering, a proper military way of life will come into better focus.

**T**HE binding force of discipline is a fundamental of prime importance. In the better units a high state of discipline obtains today. Where lack of ability is the cause of poor discipline, the leaders, regardless of rank, should be removed. Where knowledge is at fault, leaders should be set straight by their superiors.

There is no excuse for poor discipline. The policy of the Department of the Army is to insist as strongly as ever that firm discipline is the cohesive force of the Army. Coddling will not make soldiers. In his war memoirs President Eisenhower quotes the late Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair on this subject, "Our troops are capable of the best of discipline. If they lack it, leadership is faulty."

Based on firmness, fairness, understanding, and obedience, the time-tested American version of military discipline can achieve wonders. Contrary to popular fancy, Americans are amenable to discipline. The standards will be just as high as the leaders make them. With proper discipline, a well-trained and well-led soldier is inevitable.

I have concentrated upon intangibles because the Army can do something about them. We depend upon others for weapons, supplies and creature comforts and the Army usually has the finest material support. I am stressing the intan-

gibles because they, more than anything else, are what make a military force out of arms and men.

The appeal of soldiering and the worth of an army come out of the human spirit. The French *esprit de corps*, the British *sense of otherness*, and the American *unit pride* all have a common source. An army in which spirits flag does not enjoy self-confidence, public support, or success in battle.

When the Chief of Staff takes public cognizance of shadows across the Army, it is fitting to raise the question of whether *esprit* has suffered neglect. *Esprit* is nourished by the hard work of leaders; it appears when men believe they are doing a difficult job that others could not do as well; it shines out when a group of men go through a dangerous or trying ordeal together; it cannot be given to men—they must earn it through performance of duty, courage, self-denial, perseverance, honor, and integrity.

*Esprit* cannot be turned on and off. It is more a reflection of soundness than a description of a condition. It is steeped in professional excellence and sound leadership. The attainment of high *esprit*, based on a careful blend of fundamentals and frills, is the certain sign that a military force is fit for its role.

*Esprit* is not easy to define, but every good soldier knows when his outfit has it. When a soldier believes that *he* is somehow different from other men, and *his* outfit is better than other outfits, and *his* army has no peer, then *esprit* exists. And the chances are you will have a superior military force.

**G**OOD *esprit* appeals to the heart and mind. In recent years there has been much concern over answering the soldier's "why?" Soldiers have always asked what they are fighting for. Once in a while the answer to "why" is pretty obvious, but more often it is complicated. General Ridgway's revival of the Eighth Army in late 1950 and early 1951 is a striking example of how leadership can furnish the "why" that soldiers will respond to.

Competent commanders have always recognized the need of furnishing troops with truthful and convincing answers to their "why." The current troop information program is probably the best the Army has had and within bounds worthwhile. However, most soldiers are satisfied that their country has a job for them to do. B. H. Liddell Hart has rightly observed: "In most professional armies national spirit has been a factor second-

ary to the soldierly spirit."


Military men *are* something special, for no other group has taken the same oath of allegiance, shares the rugged training and high standards, or faces such hazards and discomforts. A commander's responsibility and authority over life and death have no parallel in civilian pursuits. It is right and proper for every member of the Army to live in a belief that he and his outfit are doing a job that the Army and the country cannot do without. Vainglory is to be despised but pride is to be cherished, and a good leader knows the difference. Pride is the life blood of an army and of every man in it.

**S**OME armies have built *esprit* and the sense of otherness around the regiment. The British Army, for instance, has resisted having a corps of infantry

The regimental spirit is one of the more powerful aspects of real soldiering. If the U. S. Army's planned unit rotation system develops into battalion and regimental rotation, a historic step will have been taken towards sustaining unit pride.

It is important to understand that while tradition is important, it is not indispensable. Many a new unit, wholly lacking roots or history, has performed superbly well. The point is that while a revival of tradition is all to the good, as in the series of posters on Army battles, tradition by itself serves no useful purpose; a good soldier does not rest on laurels won by others.

Another distinctive feature of Army life is the personal integrity expected of each member of the service. Soldiers must be truthful, honest and decent. Many soldiers find that association with



Traditional customs help create "one-ness." This is the awards ceremony held by the 32d Field Artillery Battalion on its Organization Day in 1951.

in preference to retaining the traditional regiments. There was an excellent article on this subject by British Major Julian Paget in the June issue of this magazine. Although the regimental system has organizational and administrative drawbacks, it does foster high unit pride and a strong individual sense of otherness. The system is too involved to discuss here, but the gist of it is that men look upon their original regiment as "home," and may serve several tours in it. The regiment's very name instills a strong sense of otherness. Perhaps some such plan could be evolved in the United States Army by relating Regular units with corresponding units in the National Guard and Army Reserve.

men of high integrity is one of the Army's finest attractions. It is a pleasure to live among men of honor and decency.

There is also the high premium the Army places on courage. Soldiers are subject to tests of moral and physical courage that are not present in other walks of life. It takes a man to be a soldier. The ability to take it as well as to dish it out sets a soldier apart. It is not medals or outer trappings, or cockiness, that measure a soldier's courage. It is his belief in a code that says, "You are expected to master your fears and do what must be done."

These are some of the fundamentals that breathe life into an army, and can

give to military men their distinctive sense of "otherness." When a soldier senses an "otherness" about himself; about his uniform, tradition, and customs; about his outfit and his Army, he can withstand the trials of service and the shock of battle. An Army composed of such soldiers has untold strength. This is the only kind of army worth having.

There are frills that need to be attached to the fundamentals. These are certain customs that have proved their military worth when applied wisely. While the fundamentals must be sound to hold men to a life of soldiering, it takes frills to draw men to the colors.

**A**MONG the more important frills or props of the military profession, the uniform is first. In recent years the Army's uniform has undergone so many changes that a soldier is unlikely to look upon it as a very strong symbol of his profession. It is unfortunate that both the current and projected semi-dress uniforms have little connection with tradition, except for shoulder patches and unit insignia. American military lore is rich with ideas upon which to base a handsome and meaningful uniform, rather than "just another suit."

The Army has long practiced false economy in respect to the full-dress uniform. Officers and enlisted men should be required to have and frequently to wear dress uniforms. Some version of a blue uniform would do very well. It is a basic part of soldiering to "dress up."

The armored and airborne forces have developed a few minor peculiarities of dress that set them apart. If such practices as a different hat or special buttons were to become Army-wide, the effect would far exceed any inconvenience to the Quartermaster.

Unfortunately we have fallen into the habit of not wearing all our ribbons and qualification badges. Regardless of inequities that may have occurred in the granting of awards and decorations, every soldier should wear those he has earned. And on formal occasions he should wear the full medals and decorations. It is a slur on the Army and the nation for a man to spurn the recognition, however great or small, that has been bestowed upon him.

When in uniform, a soldier should be immaculate, correct, and of proud bearing. All ranks should be required to wear the uniform correctly and respect it. A soldier's uniform is his trade mark; it is worth many times whatever it may cost in money. Distinctive, handsome,

and significant articles of uniform can go far in holding high the Army's appeal and pride.

Not long ago the salute was not required off-post or in metropolitan areas of the U.S. This letdown in one of the more binding frills of Army life came at a time when military customs should have been getting an uplift. Except in the heat of battle the salute is a recognized part of soldiering. Even when in civilian clothes, military men should register recognition by a polite greeting and a gesture like tipping the hat or nodding the head. The salute should never be discouraged. It is good that it has been restored.

Although the "old days" should not be allowed to retard progress in fields like strategy, tactics, organization, and administration, many of the traditional customs have great value in developing unity and *esprit*. There seems to be no particular reason, for instance, why regiments and battalions should not be known by their names as well as their numbers. The 3d Infantry is a respected title, but perhaps "The Old Guard" is more stimulating.

Hanson Baldwin recently offered "more brass bands" as one cure for the Army's troubles. Undoubtedly he meant to suggest a return to more of the customs that typified garrison life. Spit and polish is part of the trade. The bases of discipline can best be established in garrison. Extended field service takes a heavy physical and moral toll on troops and so periodic return to garrison duty can do much to restore discipline and integrity. I do not suggest that the Army should adopt a sterile life of morning drill, guard duty, and whitewashing rocks. But I do say that it is in garrison that basic and technical training and officers' and noncommissioned officers' schools are best conducted.

**G**ARRISON life used to be one of the attractions of the Army, and an up-to-date version should be revived. This involves a restoration of some of the customs that gave zest to Army life. Ceremonies should be colorful and exciting events, not perfunctory formations. Premium should be placed on perfection of drill and appearance. Competition among units should be encouraged.

Social life should be made more formal and obligatory. Clubs should be more than bingo halls. Enlisted clubs should be pleasant social centers to which a soldier can proudly escort his mother, sister or girl friend.

Service clubs, soldier shows, and hobby shops serve a splendid purpose. But if such attractions savor too strongly of civilian life, they can create a false impression of soldiering. Soldiers will seek their own civilian-type interests. Surely it is not unwholesome for the Army's recreational facilities to be distinctively military.

Consideration should be given to reviving separate messes for officers and noncommissioned officers in addition to clubs. Mess life has definite value in welding units together.

Such old customs as the departing commander's presentation of a trophy or a piece of silver would provide continuity to *esprit* and set a distinctive tone for the unit.

Admittedly, these ideas are subject to existing conditions. For instance, so long as housing shortages require some married men to live at considerable distances from their duty stations, a full return to garrison life is impossible. (All the more reason for the Army to press with increasing vigor for a solution to the housing shortages at home and abroad!) Meanwhile, a modified version of the old customs and garrison life should be adopted whenever possible.

A host of other thoughts comes to mind, but it is enough to say that a distinctive Army way of doing things is essential to developing unit *esprit* and an individual sense of *otherness*.

**I**N this article I have considered some of the things that can be done to strengthen the Army's confidence and appeal. I have tried to show the relationship of fundamentals and frills in a great military institution. I have stressed that the Army is different and must capitalize on the differences to gain appeal. This is not a staff study but an attempt to stimulate thought among soldiers who look upon the Army as more than just a job. In the process, many searching questions have had to be by-passed, and serious problems have gotten the once-over lightly.

The idea that the old ways are not suited to the "new" Army is nonsense. Over the years the Army has developed proven methods of doing things and owes no apology for them. They are effective and they give the soldier pride of service and self-confidence. These are qualities the Army must have in these days of tension and crisis. So let us pursue them relentlessly and in the knowledge that if we are honest with ourselves we will be faithful to the trust placed in us by the American people.

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL



# Why Didn't They Shoot More?

- Too much artillery
- Bunkeritis
- Failure to include riflemen in coordinated fire plans

## LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE JUSKALIAN

**D**URING the latter stages of the fighting in Korea when the front was stabilized, more than one position was lost because infantry weapons, particularly the close-range, flat-trajectory weapons, were not used to their full effectiveness. While artillery fire was being brought down in torrents, infantry weapons were silent. As a result, once the enemy penetrated our barrages, he frequently faced only random resistance from infantry weapons.

Why wasn't our infantryman in Korea doing more—and better—shooting? Was it a lack of proper basic training? In isolated instances, perhaps, but as a general rule unlikely.

The principal reason why our infantryman didn't fire enough was his over-dependence on artillery. At times this over-dependence reached ridiculous extremes. It was not uncommon for friendly ambush patrols, already in position, to call for artillery fires upon an unsuspecting enemy patrol of equal or smaller size instead of waiting until the enemy moved into effective small-arms range. Such action invariably alerted the enemy, caused him negligible casualties, and, in effect, helped him out of the trap. And commanders who honored such calls for artillery fires instead of insisting that patrols use their own infantry weapons to advantage, were abetting the attractive but false idea that the artilleryman can fight the infantryman's battle for him.

**S**OLDIERS in the trenches are susceptible to a strange malady—Bunkeritis. It sometimes proved fatal. Generally speaking, fighting bunkers in Korea were misused. There were too many of

them. Not only were automatic weapons emplaced in fighting bunkers, but also riflemen—riflemen who would have been far more effective from fire positions (known variously as fighting positions, fighting bays and fighting steps). Fire positions afforded better fields of fire and observation, greater freedom of movement, and easier means of communication. These advantages were sacrificed for the edge in protection afforded by bunkers, an edge largely offset by the more prominent targets which bunkers presented to the enemy.

Despite these drawbacks, fighting bunkers had an understandable appeal to the infantryman. They gave him relative comfort and a false sense of security. As a consequence, when the crucial moment for close combat with the enemy arrived, the infantryman all too often found that his bunker, far from being the bulwark he naively believed it to be, had turned into a trap in which he was caught.

Their was still a third reason why the infantryman in Korea did not use his weapons to the fullest possible extent. Thorough as it usually was with regard to artillery, mortars and machine guns, the coordinated fire plan often failed to reach down to the level of the individual rifleman and BAR man and fix specific sectors of fire for them. Consequently front-line soldiers did not know the part they had in the firing pattern for the defense of their own and adjacent sectors.

What can and should be done about these weaknesses so that they will not bedevil us in the future?

**F**IRST of all the infantryman—from regimental commander down to the last rifleman—must be ready, willing and eager to engage the enemy in close combat. Know-how isn't enough; to it you must add the will to win. Certainly the infantryman must exploit the sup-

port rendered by the other arms, but he must do this together with maximum use of his own weapons. In short, the infantryman must fight his battle to the fullest.

Then, the commander must carefully evaluate the use of fighting bunkers in his organization for defense. Bunkers tend to generate a passive attitude on the part of the defender; hence, bunkers should be used moderately. They should be used for crew-served, flat-trajectory weapons (except the BAR) and should be properly constructed and camouflaged. Riflemen and BAR men must not be cooped up in bunkers. Instead, they should use fire positions. For it is by use of fire positions—or positions similar to them—that the front-line soldier can retain the freedom of action and the fighting spirit needed to close unhesitatingly with the enemy should the latter threaten the defensive position.

Finally, the coordinated fire plan must encompass all weapons—including the individual rifleman. All likely enemy avenues of approach and objectives must be covered by the fire of the greatest possible number of weapons. Sectors of fire for small arms should not be restricted to the immediate front of the sectors in which those weapons are located but should include adjacent terrain features wherever feasible. Too many a front-line soldier in Korea slipped into the role of curious spectator when an adjacent friendly position was being attacked instead of taking part in the fight as he should have. Had prior coordinated fire planning given him a specific job to do in such an eventuality, he'd have been a helpful participant instead of a helpless onlooker.

The mistakes brought out in this article are not new. Neither are the remedies. They are recounted here in the hope that the remedies will be remembered and the mistakes not repeated.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE JUSKALIAN, Infantry, recently completed a year of study at the Armed Forces Staff College and is now on duty in the Pentagon.

# Peripheral Strategy . . .

## Littoral Tactics . . .

### Limited War

REAR ADMIRAL JOHN D. HAYES

IN 1615 Francis Bacon, the English philosopher and father of the scientific method, wrote, "He that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will, whereas those that be strongest by land are many times nevertheless in great straits." This reasoning from the history of the ancients was made at the beginning of the geographic age. Mahan proved the validity of the first part of this statement by illustrations from later British history. Two Twentieth Century wars proved that the second part was also valid.

Today the military profession of the United States must determine whether

Bacon's thesis still holds in this air-and-atomic age. If war is to be used to settle man's issues and forward his progress, it must be at a price less than weapons are now able to exact. Can the American people today take as much or as little of a war as they will?

Before a military man can attempt such an investigation, he must accept two premises that his countrymen impose on him. The first is that war is a means of fulfilling the dictates of a political will and only enough warfare to achieve political ends is justifiable.

The second is that the methods of employing the armed power of the United States must be consistent with the philosophy of our national life. In essence this philosophy is that individuals and nations are to be allowed to work out their own destiny within certain minimum rules and that, above all, the United States must preserve itself as it is.

So much for American idealism. What about the reality of the modern world? There seem to be three stark facts in today's world that transcend all others.

The first is that our knowledge of the physical world is increasing at a rate far in excess of our ability to use this knowledge for our own good.

The second is the Communist ideology coupled with Russia's historic imperialism and that country's inherent strength has caused the world to become bi-polar as it has not been since the rise of Mohammedanism challenged the Christian world.


The third is that the Twentieth Century wars, total both in emotion and extent, stalled the dynamic forces that dominated Western Europe for four centuries. This last is perhaps the most significant of the three, for it does not merely mean that changes have taken place but that the world as we have known it is no more.

THE nature of these two great Twentieth Century wars convinced Americans that in this industrial and scientific age war could only be total. Once war is undertaken it should be neither limited nor stopped until the enemy sur-

---

REAR ADMIRAL JOHN D. HAYES, U.S.N., retired, was on the faculty of the Industrial College of the Armed Services for several years before retiring a few months ago. He is a regular contributor to various service journals and has reviewed several books for us in the past. He has retired to Annapolis, Maryland, which, as we understand it, is the East Coast's Fort Sam Houston for old salts.

Task Force 77 executes a high-speed turn while on patrol duty in the Sea of Japan. Four attack carriers, a battleship and several destroyers are in the force.





renders unconditionally. Only complete victory would bring total peace. But it has not worked out that way. Total peace remains an illusion while the scars of total war are grim reminders that such wars destroy but do not settle.

The awful reality of the absolute weapon was imposed upon this disillusionment. In the hands of opposing powers this weapon can extend destruction to incomprehensible proportions. If anything could be settled it would be only at unacceptable costs. This dilemma has resulted in the continuance of the *de facto* state of hazardous armistice between atomic camps while adjustments of international differences are accomplished by some other means. Several

have been used with success. One of these, power politics in a cold war, has already been demonstrated by such examples as our aid to Greece and Turkey, by the Berlin air lift and by the Communist success in China. Another is warfare for limited aims and in limited form.

We call the condition of continued and recognized antagonism short of war that has existed since 1945 a "cold war." War is used here in its widest connotation, to denote the continued struggle between Communist expansion and U.S. containment. The adjective *cold* suggests operations lying between diplomacy and armed combat. However, there was something unreal about this concept, for how could *cold war* be waged without

risking *hot war* which would become total in extent? Korea furnished the answer.

THE cold war over Korea did produce actual war but it remained limited because neither side chose to extend it. This fact brought into focus the fundamental truth that international relations, like all other human matters, have many causes. Attitudes between nations cannot be kept in the easy categories of peace and war. There are various conditions of peace and there are types of warfare such as "cold war," war of limited aims, general war and total war. More important than these designations is the continuity that exists between

them. A nation cannot be sure of peace if it is unwilling to be ready for war. A cold war cannot be effective unless there is a willingness to use armed force to back it up. A nation cannot keep a war limited unless it is in a position to fight a general war. This the Japanese learned.

Relations between the Communist's and non-Communist's worlds have passed through three of these stages—peace, cold war and limited war—all under the shadow of atomic weapons. The thinking consensus of the world still is that a general or total war could not be fought in this bi-polar world without using the absolute weapon. Therefore, if war is to be what Clausewitz said it should be, an extension of national policy, if it is not to become just a synonym for destruction, it must be kept limited.

**A**N acceptance of limited warfare as an instrument in international relations will require some radical changes in American thinking. Limited wars are usually agonizing, drawn-out affairs and Americans are impatient about war. Limited wars never seem to get settled or settle anything. But man's affairs never get settled anyway. Life is a process of living with problems, not of settling them; of resolving contradictions, not of removing them. If limited wars cannot settle, we must be ready to accept a corollary: negotiated settlements. Negotiated peace seems all that military people can achieve in the present state of the world. The permanent stopping of a dynamic Communist ideology has to be done by some other profession.

The specific assumptions in this hypothesis can now be restated:

- ☐ Limited warfare can accomplish the purpose of war in its traditional sense as an extension of national policy.
- ☐ Limited warfare can be conducted within the atomic threat without extension to general or total war.
- ☐ Negotiated peace is the only arrangement we can expect to make with Communism.

The general assumption is that the realities of both Communism and the absolute weapon have initiated an era of limited warfare and of negotiated peace. If this assumption is valid, the military man must have a plan to fulfill his role in such a future. I propose in the next few pages to show that a strategy and a system of tactics applicable for limited warfare are available to the United States in this atomic age.

Within recorded history, nations have conducted warfare in two general fashions, dictated by their geographic con-

ditions. These manners of warfare, or strategies, have been termed continental and maritime. In this air age with the United States in indisputable control of the oceans, the maritime can appropriately be called peripheral. Continental strategy is one in which military strength is projected direct at the enemy, either by driving in or sweeping over and crushing him. Peripheral strategy probes the enemy's outside points for weaknesses, and seeks to make him diffuse his strength in extended efforts. Continental strategy has been exemplified by Napoleon and codified by Clausewitz, while maritime or peripheral strategy has been exemplified by Great Britain and codified by Mahan.

**S**OME nations have subscribed to, or have had powerful advocates for, both strategies. Japan was one once. The United States is another, and this is understandable. The U.S. Army has fought three continental wars within a century, and the efforts of the U.S. Air Force have been concentrated on strategic bombing. It is natural for these services to advocate a continental strategy. On the other hand, the maritime strategy of the U.S. Navy was used to defeat Japan. The fact that few sailors read Clausewitz and few soldiers and airmen read Mahan emphasizes these separate military viewpoints which have so confused their worried countrymen in the last few years.

This confusion is now aggravated by the question of whether strategic air warfare is a new strategy or is continental strategy in a new form. My own contention is that it is essentially continental strategy. It is directed toward the heart of a land mass; it drives for the enemy capital to stifle the functioning of government; it prostrates a nation by destroying its industrial complexes instead of by occupying its territory. It also has the continental warfare characteristics of all-out effort, commitment, and lack of freedom of action. Above all, it is Clausewitz's war of annihilation, not his war of exhaustion.

Contemporary history has indicated clearly that modern continental strategy and limited warfare are not compatible. Continental strategy can be used only with general war, and deciding on a continental strategy means choosing general war. In World War I the commitment of a limited military effort in France cost Great Britain a generation of her manhood. The limited aims of our low order continental strategy in Korea produced an insoluble stalemate with opposing forces poised on each side of a line that

had neither military nor political significance.

**B**EFORE the air age peripheral strategy could validly be called maritime. Its major characteristic is that it allows freedom of action, both geographically and in the context in which Francis Bacon defined it. Limited warfare can be prosecuted by means of maritime strategy provided the aims are kept limited and do not include "liberating" large geographical areas, subjugation of peoples or unconditional surrender.

Peripheral strategy on external lines is made possible by the mobility of sea transport. A peripheral strategy of interior lines, which the Soviet has used with success in the political area, is feasible militarily only with an immense road net. Such a net exists nowhere in the world except in the United States and Western Europe. Air transport may well change this and we can neglect such a probability only at our peril. But it is not the case yet. Sea, rail and road transport are still the bases on which present warfare rests.

The great advantage of peripheral strategy for us is that it can use all the military specialties of land, sea and air. Strategic bombing uses only one of these specialties, air. Continental warfare requires only two, land and air (sea played a supporting role). The island-based, maritime strategy of the United States in the Pacific also used only two, sea and air (ground forces had a bloody, but minor, role).

Despite much lip service, the armed services of the United States have never used military power in an integrated pattern. Experience has taught some integration at the theater level and in logistics. But an integrated strategy, No! All three services shy away from that. The Navy wants an offensive role. The Army wants a zone of communications between its fighting forces and its ports. The Air Force wants intercontinental bombing.

**T**O effect a sound integrated strategy there must be a system of tactics which will fully employ all military specialties. Such a system of tactics for peripheral strategy is one that uses the littoral of the world as the new borders of the United States. The littoral becomes the line from which operations are projected in offense, the line on which defense is conducted. The striking power of air forces, the mobility of sea forces and the holding power of land forces can all be used on this line. It is the line that contains a continental enemy.

Since the enemy can be kept behind this line without too much difficulty, it does not have to be held at all points as does a line in land tactics. Our strength need only be concentrated at selected points chosen for their political and military significance. Ground forces will face a continental land mass with its continued support insured by naval forces. The striking power of air forces will be the main weapon of offense, and airborne operations from the littoral will be used when feasible and suitable.

All military specialties integrate themselves quickly when defending on a littoral. Such was the case at Dunkirk which was evacuated and at Guadalcanal which was held. The air forces maintain local control. The navy keeps the convoys coming despite an enemy air force that can be continuously reinforced from inside the large land mass. Above all, the ground forces must stay as a functioning entity. The U.S. Army, accustomed to plenty of maneuver room, may have to emulate in peripheral strategy such classics as the defense of Gibraltar from 1780 to 1782 and of Malta in the last war. It may find itself in positions like that of the British force under General De Burgh, who refused to leave Elba in 1796 when Nelson on orders from the Admiralty withdrew from the Mediterranean with his naval forces. If a situation does become unacceptable, it is the Navy's duty to withdraw the ground forces under any circumstances. This has been the tacit understanding between British admirals and generals for centuries. It was done at Dunkirk and again at terrible naval costs at Greece and Crete. American independence was achieved because it could not be done at Yorktown.

**A**BILITY to occupy is a necessary function in warfare and it is a function which only land forces can perform. Man is a land animal and there is a reality, a decisiveness about land warfare that warfare in the other two media has not been able to achieve. Ground forces must possess and hold the bases from which the other arms can strike. On a littoral where ground forces can be either reinforced or evacuated by sea, a minimum force should be able to perform this holding function. In a cold war situation, even small occupation forces have a political significance such that any action against them means accepting real war.

The function of a naval task force in peripheral strategy and littoral tactics should be exactly the same as that of the Sixth and Seventh Fleets on the inter-

national scene today. These fleets, as mobile military forces containing their own bases, cruise about the frontiers of the world, available anywhere either for political purposes in a cold war or for littoral offenses and defenses.

**A**IR transport is the great fact of modern power. It most likely will be the great fact of future warfare. When a philosophy of air warfare finally is derived, it probably will be built around the transport aircraft rather than the bomber. Atomic energy in the engine of an airplane will mean replacing peripheral strategy by an enveloping strategy, for then large, bulk-carrying airships will bypass oceans as small German transport aircraft once bypassed the narrow waters of the Mediterranean between Greece and Crete. An enveloping strategy will mean that the airplane will be able to position and maintain military force anywhere in the world, as ships do now. The great challenge to air-warfare thinkers is that this capability must also be granted to our enemy. With no sea transport and the prospects for land transport always poor by reason of soil conditions, the Russians are forced to develop air transport and with their economy of priority may get far in the lead of us.

But that day of reckoning can be put off until air transport is able to provide quantity as well as quality support to military forces; until it can carry bulk as well as critical cargoes. In the meantime there will be plenty of tactical and special functions for transport aircraft in peripheral strategy. The most apparent could be the use of paratroops to replace assault waves in over-the-water landings. However, with the freedom of action that littoral tactics permit, it is not likely that there will be much need for assault waves in future amphibian operations.

Air transport properly supported can be used to make incursions into enemy territory to cut transportation lines, to destroy vital installations for keeps, even to hold some "islands" in the heart of a land mass.

The function of the atomic bomb in peripheral strategy will be that proper to its weapon status; that is, to create a favorable tactical situation of the highest order. Against our peripheral strategy an enemy will find few opportunities to use the atomic bomb commensurate with its tactical potentialities, whereas it will give us the same freedom of action that is inherent in the strategy itself.

Victory in World War II and the increased international commitments

that came with it changed the position of the United States in world affairs. Our foreign policy became that of open and continued opposition to imperialistic communism while reviving the military and economic strengths of the free world. Control of the seas, peripheral strategy and limited warfare offer the military means of sustaining such a foreign policy and the role of the armed services should have been changed accordingly. But during the five crucial years after 1945, Americans, out of their past experiences, continued to think militarily only in terms of continental strategy and total war. As a result China was allowed to go by default because the American people refused to take the chance of another total war, this time on the land mass of China. They could conceive of no other way of saving it.

**T**HERE was another way. We might have stayed on the coast of China instead of retreating behind a water bastion. Whether or not the Communists could have driven the forces of the free world from the littoral of China is an academic question. The fact is that neither the Americans nor the Nationalist Chinese are there now while the British are still in Hong Kong. American naval officers for a century had known China as a country of a long coast line and great rivers but they failed to remind their countrymen of this geographic fact. Instead the American people had to get their ideas of China from small-scale maps that emphasized its similarity and proximity to Russia.

Had we supported the Chinese Nationalists in their defense of the major rivers or of the ports of China, Chiang Kai-shek might now be the head of a considerable sea state ranging from Shanghai to Canton with Formosa as his capital and economic heartland. Had our forces remained in Tsingtao there probably would have been no Korean incident. Had we refused to allow the seas to be free in a cold or limited war, the routes from the Russian Maritime Province and along the coasts of China could not have been used for supporting the Communist effort in Korea.

Ancient Greeks, mediaeval Byzantines or eighteenth century Englishmen would have recognized the advantages that the sea gave us for the struggle in Asia. But continental-minded Americans could not be expected to know this instinctively and it was not explained to them. As a result China went into the Communist orbit. We cannot make many more mistakes of that order.

# Helicopter Patrol

Give the I&R Platoon helicopters and it can collect more information faster

**MAJOR GEORGE H. REID**

**T**HE mission of the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon during combat is simply stated and broad in nature: the securing of information of the enemy. The mission in itself is no problem; it is its performance that is so vastly different in different units, and under different S2s and regimental commanders. But irrespective of these, who can doubt the correctness of the statement that "the dominating factor . . . insofar as it affects the . . . Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, is the terrain"?

This means that the ability of the I&R Platoon to perform its mission is affected by the geography of the local area. What will work in Korea may not work in North Africa; what may work in Northern Italy may not work in Northern Germany.

If the I&R Platoon could overcome the limitations imposed by terrain it could increase its ability to perform one of its most important functions, namely, that of patrolling.

Ground patrols have definite limitations, particularly against an aggressive and callous enemy who has little regard for his own casualties. However, if the I&R Platoon could patrol by air, then immediately certain of these restrictions are eliminated or reduced. The Platoon is not equipped to fight to gain information and if, on a road reconnaissance mission, it runs into enemy roadblock it

is usually compelled to report that it has been stopped and can proceed no further. But, if that same patrol took to the air, the effectiveness of that same roadblock in preventing continued reconnaissance by friendly forces would be reduced materially. The I&R Platoon could pick up the roadblock, report it by radio, and continue.

Similarly there were many situations in Europe during World War II where reconnaissance patrols were forced to turn back because of blown bridges or other similar obstacles. If the I&R Platoon were equipped with helicopters, blown bridges or unfordable rivers could hardly be considered barriers.

In a 1945 report on the activities of regimental reconnaissance agencies, the Sixth Army stated: "Daylight patrolling has been found feasible only in very fluid or fast moving situations and even then are liable to ambush or well-aimed fire of all types." Again the helicopter could help overcome this obstacle.

**C**ERTAINLY the use of the helicopter by the I&R Platoon in combat would not eliminate the need for some ground patrol activity. Obviously there are certain installations the regimental commander might desire more detailed information about than could be achieved from observation from the air. But the helicopter is potentially a very useful additional or supplementary means. It does have limitations of its own. Weather is one serious problem. Enemy air superiority is another. Maintenance of the aircraft is a third. Qualified pilots and observers are a fourth.

The addition of the helicopter to the I&R platoon really is only an extension of the latter's present mission of manning observation posts. The importance of our own observation posts and location

of those of the enemy, like the need for patrolling of all types, cannot be underestimated.

Ground OPs could be supplemented with air observation posts. The value of the latter in Korea is a matter of record. General J. Lawton Collins, former Army Chief of Staff, has repeatedly said that the present use of the helicopter to supplement ground observation has only begun.

The effective use of aerial observation posts is not new, of course. The Sixth Army, during World War II, had considerable success with them in terrain which severely limited other types of reconnaissance. A typical report said: "Battalions, regiments, divisions and corps are unanimous in their acclaim of the outstanding accomplishments of the air OPs. Undoubtedly the observers in these planes have made one of the major contributions in the field of combat intelligence . . . Many have stated that the Cub planes provided more enemy information of direct value to the troops than all the U. S. Air Forces combined. Their great success justifies full development."

In the helicopter we have an even better method of employing an air observation post than we had in the liaison plane. It is able to hover, fly at very low speeds and land and take off in confined spaces.



**MAJOR GEORGE H. REID**, Infantry, enlisted in the Army in 1943 after graduation from Lehigh University and was commissioned the same year. He served overseas in Europe and later in the Philippines. In 1944 he was commissioned in the Regular Army and in 1949 attended Syracuse University where he earned a Master's Degree in Political Science. After a tour of duty in the Pentagon he attended the Army Language School.



**T**HE helicopter could have its effectiveness as an aerial observer further increased by the addition of camera equipment capable of accurate pictures and speedy film development. A XIX Corps report states, "The equipping of air OPs with cameras, developing and printing equipment would greatly reduce three failures now current—the failure to get photos to a using unit in time during fluid warfare, the failure of the regular photo planes to exploit brief breaks in bad weather and the failure of regular photo planes to pinpoint specific areas of immediate importance."

The failures mentioned above are inherent in any system where the servicing element is not an organic part of the served unit. The helicopter would be at the beck and call of the infantry regimental commander and could fly the mission at a moment's notice. No communication difficulties could arise, because the pilot in all probability would be in or adjacent to the command post.

The development and application of atomic weapons, tactically on the battlefield, is an additional reason for making the helicopter an organic part of the I&R Platoon. It is anticipated that both offensive and defensive operations will be conducted on wider fronts than heretofore experienced. Reconnaissance of all types, forward of the battle position, will, of necessity, be over greater dis-

tances. Speedy transmission of accurate information will be, more than ever before, of inestimable value to the receiving unit. Experience in Korea, with helicopters almost in their infancy, has proven that they can cover a much greater area of ground than any foot or motorized patrol.

**H**ELICOPTERS can help in situations that require close ground observation. Let's assume that the I&R Platoon is given a mission of securing information concerning a suspected guided missile installation, well forward of the regimental front lines. The desired information must be obtained as quickly as possible and the terrain over which the mission is to be accomplished is extremely rough. In this instance we combine the air capability with the ground requirement. By prior reconnaissance a suitable landing location can be picked out for the helicopter. The helicopter then flies a small patrol to the location, unloads and returns to the comparative safety of its own lines. Later, at a predetermined time and place, the helicopter returns and picks up the patrol which has had ample opportunity to accomplish its mission.

Use of the helicopter in this manner provides two qualities to the ground patrol which it might otherwise not be afforded. In the first place, through its


ability to move rapidly and easily over terrain extremely difficult to foot troops, it puts the ground patrol close to its objective while the patrol still has not expended any of its energy solely in the traverse of terrain.

Secondly, the "air lift" given to the I&R Platoon ground patrol by the helicopter enables the overall mission to be accomplished much faster. Speed of reporting intelligence information is of course a primary consideration. Information of the enemy is like eggs—better when fresh. General Patton said that.

Use of the helicopter in the air patrol role may well prove to be more economical in the use of men. If the achievement of a three-jeep, twelve-man motorized patrol, for example, can be exceeded by a two-man helicopter, manpower is saved.

The modification of the T/O&E to include helicopters in the I&R Platoon must be accompanied by the assignment of trained aerial observers. There is a vast difference between observation from the ground and observation from the air. Until we have trained aerial intelligence observers, the full value of the helicopter as an aerial OP will not be possible.

In the final analysis the use of helicopters by the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon would be limited only by the degree of ingenuity possessed by those responsible for its operations.



## Armor and Atomics

MAJOR GENERAL H. E. PYMAN  
*Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*  
 May 1954

I would now like to give you my ideas about defensive operations because they are particularly encouraging. It seems that not only have armor and air forces a special affinity, but also armor and atomics [atomic weapons]. Consider a normal defensive battle front with some form of obstacle in front of it, perhaps a river, or a mountain range, or a swamp, or a forest. Assume, and be safe in assuming, that you will not have enough soldiers to defend the whole area in strength. There will be strong points and there will be areas that are only screened by light mobile forces. Perhaps we might consider an army composed of three armored and four infantry divisions, in such a situation. Let us have the infantry divisions in firm localities with plenty of anti-tank weapons and ammunition. Behind the infantry, who will have local armored support, let us put three armored divisions out of range of the bulk of the enemy artillery. Two of them will be deployed each behind two infantry divisions. I mean deployed, so that they will avoid becoming atomic targets before the enemy assault begins. Further back and again deployed will be the third armored division.

Eventually the enemy will attack and, for the purposes of my argument, eventually he will obtain a penetration. The breadth of his penetration will be restricted by the frontage he can attack, and by his inability to dislodge elements of our static defence. Immediately his penetration begins to show its direction getting through the depth of the static defence, it must be brought to a halt. One of the two armored divisions deployed at the back must counter the penetration, and must seal the enemy spearhead in, wherever he goes. Armored divisions are well designed for such a role. They have mobility and tremendous fire power, and both of these they must use to the utmost. Once the enemy is thwarted in this manner, he will have to bring up reserves. He will probably have to move a proportion of his guns and other heavy equipment over the original obstacle in front of the defence. He will, unless I am mistaken, be greatly tempted to concentrate in space to obtain success. As the opposing army commander that would be my precise aim—to make the enemy concentrate in space. When he does, I shall ask for atomic assistance. Provided that my armored division, which no doubt will be stretched almost to the point of limit, can hold the enemy thrust with the assistance of parts of the infantry divisions which are still firm on their ground, then the battle must turn to my advantage. I have

produced an atomic target and, moreover, I have remaining one and possibly two armored divisions to exploit the situation which the atomics will create, by destroying completely what remains of the attacking force. It is interesting to consider how close Alem El Halfa was to this technique: though Montgomery did not go in to kill at the end for reasons we know.

## Battle Proves the Allies

BRIGADIER A. L. PEMBERTON, M.C.  
*The Journal of the Royal Artillery*  
 July 1954

[Aristides] was a typical aristocrat of the old school; a strict disciplinarian, abstemious in his own habits, highly respected by all who knew him, and chiefly admired by his contemporaries for his sense of justice and his personal integrity. He had a great veneration for Lycurgus and in both his private and public life he was a pattern of the Spartan virtues, which he carried to the point of glorying in his own poverty. As a general, though brave and aggressive enough in battle, his leadership appears to have been of the cautious, unimaginative kind that is characteristic of the institutional. As a diplomat he was correct and reliable rather than sympathetic or subtle; as when, during the preparations for the battle of Plataea, he settled a dispute between the Athenians and the Tegetae for the honour of fighting on the left wing. "The post" he said "neither gives valour nor takes it away . . . We are not come hither to quarrel with our allies, but to fight our enemies . . . and the battle will soon show what value our country should set on every state, every general, and every private man."

## Air Power at Dien Bien Phu

AN COSANTOIR  
*The Irish Defence Journal*  
 June 1954

French domination of the air over Indochina was all promise but no achievement. A reader of the reports might be excused if, generalising, he condemned the efficacy of air support as a whole and for all operations.

Air power cannot be represented by aircraft which are few in number and inadequate in quality for the role thrust upon them. Tactical air support, in the modern sense, was absent at Dien Bien Phu; there were too few aircraft and even these were of a poor vintage.

If it is conceded that air power did not exist in Indochina

then the plain inference is that such power is an expression of military strength so demanding as to be incapable of attainment by any but the few major powers.

Of course, the idea of placing on aircraft the onus of breaking a stranglehold, such as was maintained by the Viet Minh, was a misconception of the capability of tactical air power operating with conventional armament.

Means certainly exist, in the form of atomic weapons, to neutralise, if not to destroy, such concentrations as were made by the Viet Minh, but even so the task would have been no simple matter of a few hours bombing. The fact remains that with the means available—some 200 combat aircraft—the desired end could not be achieved.

There are some valuable lessons to be learned from the use of aircraft at Dien Bien Phu. Until we read what the acknowledged commentators on air matters have to say, the average infantryman can see in the story only the failure of air power.

## Measuring Human Beings

VANNEVAR BUSH

Quarterly Report, Carnegie Corporation  
July 1954

The real difference between these two great branches of science [material and social] lies in the fact that the social sciences deal with the performance of human beings. It is far more difficult to "measure" human behavior and to reduce all arguments about it to numbers than it is to do the same thing with molecules. But it is worth noting that even the physicists, when dealing with interactions inside the nucleus, have abandoned all of the usual mathematical formulations and are proceeding in terms of arguments which at times border on the mystical.

One cannot specify a human being in the same way that he can specify a chemical compound. But again be it noted that the chemists, in dealing with proteins, are in much the same situation for they can neither specify the atomic arrangements involved nor can they predict what characteristics one of their chemical modifications may produce. The difference is hence a matter of degree as far as the use of measurement is concerned. Also one should note that there has been enormous progress in the last decade or two in reducing to measurement many matters in the field of the social sciences which were formerly thought to be beyond reach from this standpoint. And one cannot disregard the fact that there has been great science which involved very little in the way of measurement and mathematical formulation. Science does not always lean on the deflection of a needle or the dip of a balance.

## German Rearmament

KARL JASPERS  
Foreign Affairs  
July 1954

The main question which will decide our [German] democratic future and our freedom, both at home and abroad, is that of the new German army. In view of the total loss of freedom which threatens us from outside, rearmament is a

hard necessity. In contrast to former days, German youth now has no inclination toward military service. Nobody wants a war. Yet there are strong pressures to rearm. The regular officers of the Hitler era push forward into public life, anxious to rehabilitate themselves while building a new army. America wants German rearmament because without it no secure dam for the protection of Europe can be created. The European countries favor it for the same reason, despite misgivings about reviving an army which has proved once before that it can achieve the inconceivable. Among the German people themselves additional confusion has been caused by what they have been told from abroad. In 1945 they heard that every military activity must cease altogether, once and forever, and that it was wrong even to have a future military aim in view. Now they hear that military activity should be revived, indeed that it is a necessity, and that it would be morally wrong to try to evade [it] . . .

Rearmament cannot be discussed parenthetically. Yet a few of the possible dangers which it represents for the democratic system of thought should be called to mind. Would not the spirit of the Hitler army, through its many regular officers who are still available today, kill at the start all chance for the creation of a German political spirit? Would it not be disastrous for German freedom and indeed for world freedom if the new German army were not built up in radical denunciation of the spirit of the Hitler army and after a conscious break with that tradition? Must not the new army discard that tradition in favor of the soldierly spirit of Gneisenau and Scharnhorst and the old Moltke? In this connection it should be realized that the German military spirit lost its dignity under Hitler. Nobody who owed his position to Hitler and had served him could save his honor except by sacrificing his life as did General von Treskow and others. . . .

At one time in the eighteenth century Prussian army instructors helped the Americans to build up their army. Would it not be possible for American and Swiss instructors to train the new German soldiers and officers now? That would take too long, I am told, the matter is too urgent. Doubt is also expressed whether the spirit of an army in the old sense can be revived at all. Instructors for the mechanized modern army are totally different from the officers of the past; Hitler's officers were efficient technicians, and so would be useful.

At this point I am overcome by terrible pessimism. Whoever wishes to save the possibility that there will be democracy and liberalism in Germany should find a way to free those people and forces who would start at the beginning and build up, in a technical age, a spirit that is soldierly and yet humane. They would not build on the immediate past—except as something to push away from—but on centuries-old memories of German and Western honor, finding new forms to suit the new conditions. When I imagine how, in the framework of a European Army, German contingents might be trained in France and French contingents in Germany, what possibilities for mutual sympathy and esteem might flourish as a result of direct contacts on a basis of equality, how the spirit of democracy would develop naturally—this dream seems to me the most natural thing, and still a dream.

# Irons in the Fire

## Big Camera



The special 100-inch telephoto lens in this new long-range camera makes it possible for the Signal Corps, using infrared lens, to record images up to 30 miles away and more, depending upon the weather. At six miles it can pick out in detail a jeep or comparable vehicle across the one-third of a mile it takes in. At 500 yards the coverage is 105 feet and at 20,000 yards it covers 3,000 feet. The camera was built under Signal Corps sponsorship and the lens was manufactured by Eastman. The shutter has 10 speeds, the fastest 1/200 second. The camera takes a 5x7 inch still picture with cut film or plates, and can also handle 30-exposure roll film. A second type of 100-inch telephoto lens takes pictures with ordinary "visible" light. It is being tested for still and 35mm motion picture use.

## Mobile Crane



A crane that can convert any standard truck into a dual-purpose hauling and handling unit has been developed by Truck-Crane, Inc., of Chicago. The crane will lift up to 5,000 pounds, swing it onto the truck, lift it off, and spot it anywhere within a 16-foot, 280-degree radius of the truck. The unit takes up only 18 inches of space behind the cab. The mechanism is hydraulic with controls on both sides of the truck. Two models are available. Model HB-50 (pictured above) is the one described here while the EB-50 has a telescoping elevating boom with extensions up to 22 feet.

## Big Wheels



R. G. LeTourneau, Inc., the builders, calls this the Sno-Buggy, a vehicle for use in heavy snow, boggy swamplands and shifting desert sands. The tires are 10 feet high, 4 feet wide and carry only five pounds of air pressure. The four dual wheels are each driven by a separate electric motor.

## Multi-Channel Radio Relay



This new multi-channel communication relay can link points 25 or 30 miles apart by radio transmission. It was developed by Bell Telephone Laboratories for the Signal Corps and was manufactured by Western Electric Company. The military designation is Radio Set AN/TRC-24. It consists of transmitter and receiver components, from power source to antenna and provides frequency modulated radio transmitting and receiving facilities in the range of 100 megacycles to 400 megacycles for relaying a broad band signal of 250 to 68,000 cycles per second over a line of sight path of transmission. For field use the equipment is packaged in transit cases with the 45-foot antenna mast divided into nine sections.

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

# CEREBRATIONS

## Ties with a Purpose

THE British habit of wearing a distinctive tie to show membership in some exclusive institution is far from being confined to the "old school tie." Colleges, universities, athletic clubs and even the armed forces all have their special neckwear.

The practice of wearing ties as "identification tags" began in the British Army after World War I, chiefly as a means of keeping touch among veterans. It soon reached the stage where almost every regiment (in the British sense) had its own tie, so that it became possible to identify a man in mufti as belonging to, say, the Gloucestershire Regiment.

The privilege of wearing a regimental tie is very jealously guarded, and in Britain itself, no one would dare to be seen wearing a tie to which he was not entitled. However, such rules are unwritten and many regimental ties have been exported just because the colors were attractive. One of the many surprises I had on my first day in the United States was finding that the porter shifting my baggage was wearing a "Guards tie," one of the most sacred of all regimental ties.

The pattern of these ties is fairly standard, usually being either diagonal stripes of varying size and color or a plain background with some symbol on it. That of the Airborne Forces, for example, has small silver parachutes embroidered on a maroon background, maroon being their color. In the same way, the Light Infantry Regiments, whose symbol is a silver bugle, have a tie with silver bugles on a dark green setting.

The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force each have one tie for the whole Service, but the Army never felt the need for that, since it had so many regimental ties. Within the last year, however, they have adopted an "Army tie" which will soon be in use. The design will be the Army badge of two crossed swords over a crown, and it will be embroidered in gold on a maroon background. The Territorial Army (National Guard) will have a tie of the same design, but with the badge in silver on a dark green background.

The Army tie will be for wear by all ranks equally (and voluntarily) when in plain clothes, whether they are serving

This department is designed to accommodate the short, pithy and good humored expression of ideas—radical and reactionary, new and old. We pay for all contributions published but you deserve to be on notice that the rate of payment depends upon the originality of the subject and the quality of writing rather than length. This department is hungry for contributions, so shoot that good idea in . . . today.

soldiers or in the reserve. It is thought unlikely that this tie will be worn by anyone who is not entitled to it, since he will be laying himself open to the risk of being arrested by the Military Police!

In addition to the Army and regimental ties, there are also ties for most branches of the service and for Army colleges and schools. The British School of Infantry, for example, has a bayonet as its symbol, as does Fort Benning, and they have a tie with the bayonet on it. That is worn only by the staff of the School, but any officer who passes successfully through the Staff College course can wear the Staff College tie (and has usually earned it!).

The privilege of wearing the tie of his regiment is not only useful as an identity tag. It is one more way of adding to a soldier's *esprit de corps*, and that gives it real value.

MAJ. JULIAN PAGET  
British Army

## Counting Combat Noses

THE enemy has landed in North America. The Nth Division, Michigan National Guard, after engaging the enemy, has returned, badly battered, to Fort Brady near Sault Ste. Marie for rest and rehabilitation.

The Commanding General, Fifth Army, informed that the enemy had dropped paratroops with the purpose of capturing the Sault locks, grabs the phone and calls his G1.

"How many troops do we have at Brady?" he asks.

"Well, Nth Division is there. It reports 12,000 effectives, but . . ."

But! Nth Division had left 8,000 casualties, mostly from the infantry, on

those beaches. What about replacements? Can the division still put up a good fight?

The division commander rates the morale and efficiency of his men as "excellent." Excellent in comparison to what? Two weeks ago the army commander presented a Distinguished Unit Citation to the division and pinned on four DSCs at a review. It was a gallant crew, but do the old men trust the new? Do the replacements have confidence in themselves and their units?

The army commander will decide whether Nth Division attacks enemy drop zones or mans a perimeter defense around the locks. But behind his decision there will be more art than science.

Can't something be done to help commanders dispose their troops more scientifically in fluid situations? Where can we look for guidance? What about the experience of other armies?

Back during World War II, when the Germans began suffering reverses in Russia, they faced such problems daily. Harassed commanders trying to organize defensive positions and delaying actions had difficulty assessing actual strength. Reports which included convalescents, soldiers on furlough, personnel away on detached service, members of a tremendous supply organization and hordes of functionaries were no help. The commanders needed to know how many men were ready and able to fight.

By spring 1944 the German high command had licked this headache. Ignoring assigned or rations strength, it called for reports of *effective combat strength, combat efficiency, and critical armament.*

The German staff defined *effective combat strength* as that portion of a combat unit which engaged directly in the fighting. It omitted personnel on leave, convalescence, or detached service; those who were back with division trains; cooks and bottle washers, oil jockeys and tinkers, company clerks and supply sergeants; and all drivers except those of serviceable combat vehicles. The effective combat personnel were those up front who got shot at, including messengers and battalion medics. Some persons farther back who managed to get counted, like the communications men whose radios were a lucrative target and whose job was repairing shot-up wire, were the personnel

at infantry or cavalry regiment CPs.

The main body of combat effectives were those comprising the infantry rifle companies, reconnaissance, heavy weapons, and antitank companies as well as the staff members of infantry and cavalry battalions. Artillery personnel in observation posts and at gun positions, staffs of artillery battalions, and soldiers who carried ammunition forward to the firing positions were also counted. Those manning operational tanks and staffing tank battalions were also included. Of the engineers, however, only men assigned to companies made the list; in tank destroyer units, only the ones in firing positions or observation posts.

Division CP, division artillery, and engineer headquarters and the trains were left out. These men could be used in an emergency. When a division neared exhaustion, overhead personnel became surplus; rounded up into alert companies they, too, became combat effectives.

From week to week reports informed commanders at all echelons of the actual fighting strength in the field.

Reports and more reports. How were commanders of divisions in combat to count noses?

They didn't have to. Weekly reports were only approximate. The basic unit of report was the battalion. Any battalion commander could tell within a hundred men how many combat effectives he had. That was close enough. A "strong" battalion was code for one with over 400 combat effectives; a "medium strong" battalion had more than 300; over 200 combat effectives made it "average"; more than 100 made it "weak"; and, if a battalion had less than 100, it was listed as "exhausted." Adding up median figures from ten or fifteen battalions in his division gave the commander a pretty good estimate of his effective combat strength.

A large margin of error? Certainly. Perhaps as much as twenty or thirty percent. But how significant is this margin? The attacker needs a superiority of at least two or three to one; that's two or three hundred percent. An error of twenty or thirty percent is insignificant.

The advantage of this system over other strength reports is that it does not add much to the work load of already overburdened staffs. As a matter of fact it may knock out some time-consuming work. A good division commander can very likely shake this estimate out of his sleeve; he won't even have to trouble his staff at all.

So far so good. But how efficient will

these men be in combat? A good division commander loves his men. If asked whether they're good or not, he'll give them the best rating he can. What a commander needs is an objective scale that won't tempt his loyalty or leave room for misunderstanding. German division commanders rated their organizations according to four categories of *combat efficiency*: (1) divisions capable of launching difficult attacks; (2) divisions capable of making limited assaults; (3) divisions capable of defense; and (4) divisions which could be called on only in extreme emergency. Though ambitious for the glory of his outfit, a responsible commander would hesitate to report his division "category one" if he knew that the men needed another month's training before taking to the field. The subjective hazard was diminished.

Fine, but you can't throw dead cats at the enemy. What about *critical armament*? Will the infantry have adequate artillery support? Can the division stop the enemy's tanks? Can it mount an armored assault itself?

The commanders of corps and armies don't care about the deadlined vehicles for which there just are no parts. They want to know what sort of a punch their troops can throw. Where does that punch come from? From operational tanks and guns. More reports? No more than already outlined. An artillery commander knows offhand how many of his pieces can shoot. A tank company commander knows how many of his tanks can roll. If the division commander tells corps and army how many light, medium, and heavy tanks, assault guns, artillery pieces and antitank guns he has ready for action, higher headquarters will know what to expect of him.

*Effective combat strength, combat efficiency, and critical armament* are three unknowns every commander wants filled in. How can he obey the principle of economy of force unless he really knows his own strength? Back to our hypothetical situation. Had the German system of reporting been instituted, the Commanding General, Fifth Army, would have received the following report from his G1:

"Nth Division reported as of last Saturday a total of 6,000 combat effectives; six strong and five weak battalions; combat efficiency "two"; ten light and three medium artillery pieces; ten medium antitank guns; ten medium tanks; twelve medium assault guns."

On the basis of this report CG, Fifth

Army, could make wise decisions about tactics, reinforcements, and supply. Sure of his own strength or weakness, he could concentrate on worrying about the strength of the enemy. *Effective combat strength* extends the idea of the "division slice" to the tactical sphere.

On our home ground we have never been hard pressed like Germany. We have never needed this reporting system as badly. Perhaps we never shall. But why wait, as did the Germans, until five minutes before midnight to adopt a sound practice?

JAMES HODGSON

### Artillery-Infantry Intelligence

THE division commander is denied current artillery intelligence because of a few hundred yards—the distance normally separating the division CP and the division artillery FSCC.

When the division is heavily engaged, either offensively or defensively, the division commander could use the artillery intelligence to better plan the employment of his reserves or to better allot his fire support. This becomes apparent when we consider the difference in the information on the G2 situation map and the information on the division artillery S2's situation map.

The artillery situation map will show targets that have been originated by the artillery FO and their locations corrected from firing data. Because of the nature of the communication channels, this information gets to the division artillery S2 with maximum speed, so we find speed and detailed locations.

We find on the division situation map that the same target information has come through an operational channel in which each intermediate headquarters has taken action on the information before relaying it. Since these steps are taken, the information reaching division arrives later and is usually more general in nature and less specific as to locations. Although, fundamentally, both present the same information, the time delay in infantry channels and the generalization of information is unavoidable.

We could give the division commander, or those members of his staff concerned with current operations, the picture presented by the artillery situation map as well as the present picture presented by the G2 operations map. All that is necessary is a means of transmitting this information those few hundred yards that separate the division CP and the division artillery FSCC.

Perhaps the artillery liaison party at division would be the agency to perform

this relay. However, this would put the responsibility with the G3 rather than with the intelligence section.

The G2 air, whose place of business is normally at the FSCC, could be used. G2 air could be the relay—phoning the information to division.

Still another solution is to equip G2 operations section with a radio receiver to monitor the division artillery fire control net. In this way the fire request could be received and plotted as a matter of routine on a separate situation map. If we present the division commander with two sets of information concerning the same action, the overall picture should be clearer and more accurate and be reflected in the division commander's decision. The promptness of the artillery information also would give the division commander the benefit of the time saved by the use of the faster artillery fire control net.

The division commander can influence the action by committing his reserves, by use of his support fire, and personally. We can assist him in all three of these functions by keeping him properly and promptly informed.

MAJ. RALPH H. COWAN

### Mission Duty

ONE evening not long ago in a bar of the Ankara Palas Hotel at Ankara, Turkey, I and a friend were sampling some of the local fermented grape. This friend had spent more than eight months and driven many thousands of miles on field training team duty as an infantry advisor to Turkish Army units. I asked him what he would tell any hypothetical successor in the way of advice on how to perform his job. "Bone up on how to maintain a pickup," was the answer I got. Not much advice, is it?

More and more of us are in foreign lands serving as advisors on all sorts of things to all kinds of people. Mission duty has become a big thing, but there is still little in the way of a guide to this type of work. Direction (and restriction) by higher authority are, for the military service, amazingly scanty. Therefore what follows may be of help to some of my fellow soldiers. It is based upon my experiences in Turkey and my observations elsewhere, and emphasizes field duty.

Most of the countries to which you will be assigned are to a greater or lesser degree "backward" areas, so the first problem is one of personal adjustment. The plumbing is bad, rooms are ill-heated, trains get snowbound for ex-

tended periods during the winter. The best answer to that sort of thing is the philosophy of the Chinese maiden: "... relax and enjoy it."

The hunting and fishing in these places are always really wonderful. There will be many spots of historical interest that you can visit. Life generally is varied and interesting. You will be extended every possible courtesy; in Turkey, for the year I was in the field, I was the "guest" wherever I went. And, of course, the minimum tours of duty out here are shorter than the normal. So keep loose.

Adjustment to your job is another large problem. Since we do not have command authority in any of the missions, your effectiveness is measured almost wholly by the extent to which you are able to "sell" yourself to the people whom you must advise. You must "sell" yourself both professionally and personally; your hosts *must* both respect and like you, or you will not succeed.

Respect comes fairly easy—we have a good reputation—but is easily lost. Top performance and prime leadership are required here.

Liking is another matter—it comes fairly hard, but once acquired is not easily lost. The American temperament does not always go very well with that of foreigners; history and race have made many of these people value "face" and the outward façade much more than we do. A rather rigid social system has been necessary to enable them just to get along. Exact consideration for the customs of others is the answer to this one.

Technique is simple, but must be followed carefully. The units with which you work will have plenty of things wrong with them (by our standards), or else you wouldn't be there. By the numbers:

(1) Stick to the mission to which you are assigned. Especially, don't meddle in local customs or methods of discipline.

(2) Don't try to "make corporal" on your first enlistment—take your time. Be absolutely sure of what you are doing before you do it.

(3) Don't criticize anything for which you do not have a feasible completely-staffed solution.

(4) Don't criticize too much all at once—this tends to discourage the people we are trying to help.

(5) Don't fight any battles your good sense tells you you will certainly lose. Tilting at windmills just uses up the available good will (and patience) with which you need to work.

(6) Don't waste any time protesting the things which may have to be done inefficiently because of local politics. In these cases the longest way around is the shortest (and for you, the required) way home.

(7) Take the easiest things first.

If at all possible, learn some of the language of the people with whom you work. Start with the most common courtesy phrases—Good morning, Thank you, Please, Good-bye. Once you start, learning becomes progressively more easy. This is, among other things, an indication to your opposite numbers that you personally are willing to meet them more than halfway. Anyway, quite often just when you need an interpreter, you haven't got one.

The last thing is perhaps one of the hardest for many of us to get used to. In the type of area to which you will most likely be sent, there is a terrific curiosity about America and Americans. There are also no secrets—the natives know absolutely everything about their neighbors. You will have almost no private life. You are Mr. America. You will therefore have to live up to the highest standards of personal and professional conduct every minute of the time. You are continually on stage, and it is *your job* to come through.

On a mission you are freer than you have been in a long time—professionally and personally. An assignment to a field training team is one of the greatest challenges and one of the finest opportunities you will ever have. It is also potentially one of the pleasantest and most satisfying assignments you will ever have. If you are really fit to wear the uniform—if you can live the traditions of the service—you will succeed. If not, you will be found out. This sounds trite, but it is the absolute down-to-earth truth. You are strictly on your own and the job involves more than just keeping your vehicle on the road.

CAPT. CHARLES W. KOBURGER

**WHERE ARE YOU?**  
That's what our Circulation Department is asking about those of you who haven't sent in a change of address. We suggest that you do it now. Address:  
**CIRCULATION MANAGER**  
**1529 Eighteenth St., N.W.**  
**Washington 6, D. C.**

# The Word from the Schools

## THE ENGINEER SCHOOL

### Atomic Thunderbolt

In a lightning blitz that swept 200 miles in 24 hours, Battle Group Thunderbolt, 10,000 men strong, consisting of nine "Battle Teams", decisively defeated an enemy army group armed with atomic weapons. This victory in Operation ANNIHILATION was won by the 8th Engineer Officer Advanced Class.

The key to its success was the organization of a unit, designed and equipped for atomic warfare, by student committees. In developing the TO&E full use was made of available or reasonably developable equipment: light amphibian armored carriers of all types capable of almost unrestricted cross-country mobility; communications of automatic encoding and decoding (lighter, smaller, and of longer range than current standard radios); compact multi-purpose rapid-firing rockets; light rifles of greater firepower; surface-to-surface guided missiles with atomic warheads; and atomic artillery and rockets.

Departures from traditional practical exercises included presenting the tactical solution as well as the situation and mission. The student committees organized and equipped their numerically inferior unit in such a way that it could accomplish the assigned mission. The accepted, but nebulous concept of a small, highly trained unit was then developed into a detailed TO&E.

### Leadership a la Harvard

The case study method, pioneered by the law school of Harvard University, has been used by the Department of Military Art, The Engineer School, to fill an awkward gap in the curriculum. Students are required to submit solutions to leadership problems developed for each class level from sergeant to lieutenant colonel. This provides a much improved instructional vehicle which is a radical departure from the usual "Catalogue of an Ideal Leader's Characteristics" type of leadership instruction.

An advanced class case study might include the following principal steps:

**Situation:** A number of substandard engineer units are to be regrouped into a larger unit (details are given). You are assigned as CO of the new unit.

**Requirements:** What measures do you take to start the new unit off on a sound basis?

**Class Discussion:** Student committees present their solutions; the solution is critically analyzed by the other committees. It is from this "attack and justification" discussion that the student learns to solve any problem in leadership. There is, of course, no "school solution" but always heated argument—hence learning.

### Third of Atomic Employment

TES has devised an aid more simple and certainly easier to use, than its proverbial "slide rule." A current TES publication, "Atomic Weapons Reference Data," provides easy-to-read charts and tables giving the effects of bursts of various energies, elevations and distances. Simple formulas and illustrative problems present all the calculations normally required of a field commander or his staff.

This unclassified pamphlet was compiled initially for instructional purposes. But it might well serve as a ready reference for the practical solution of problems connected with atomic warfare in the field.

Use of this practical but unclassified text also enables Allied students to participate in the numerous exercises which involve atomic weapons.

Another special text, also prepared by the school staff, is ST 5-7-1, "Engineers in Atomic Warfare," now in its revised second edition. This text gives each new student a searching review (or preview) of his profession as it may evolve in the light of current and foreseeable super weapons.

### Night Sight for AFPE

To offset the disadvantage of night combat, the U.S. forces in Korea turned night into day with artificial moonlight and fireflies (reflected searchlight beams and flare planes). In addition, TES teams recently supplemented UN night fighting potential in the Far East by conducting instruction in the use of a new model Sniperscope. Designated the Sniperscope, Infrared Set No. 1, 20,000 volts, the weapon is greatly improved over the models used in WW II and Korea. In absolute darkness, the average marksman can obtain daylight accuracy at a range of 125 yards.

Two instruction teams of one electronics officer and three special electronic device repairmen each were sent by TES to introduce this new model Sniperscope to AFPE. These teams presented a thirty-six-hour course to nearly all regimental units in the Far East. Training included operation, maintenance, characteristics, circuit familiarization, disassembly, and assembly, trouble-shooting, zeroing and night firing.

## THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

### Service-of-the-Piece Charts

Commencing with the publication of FM 6-75, "105mm Howitzer M2," pull-out charts of by-the-numbers operations have been inserted in each manual of the new service-of-the-piece series. Covering sequential activities such as "duties in preparing for action" and "inspection duties and maintenance after operation," these columnar displays are on a single sheet and show all individual duties within the section. They are intended to facilitate reading and instruction.

Examples may be found between pages 22-23, FM 6-75; pages 24-25, FM 6-81; and pages 26-27, FM 6-87.

Comments and suggestions on this particular feature in these manuals are requested by The Artillery School. Get them in not later than 1 September 1954.

Do pull-outs meet the purpose for which intended? Can they be improved? If so, how? Should they be accompanied by photos? Do you use them in any special way? Are they adaptable as training aids? Do you desire additional copies? Should such copies be enlarged? If so, to what size? Address your comments to: Commandant, TAS, Fort Sill, Oklahoma (Attn: Director, Department of P&NRT).

### Change in Initial Fire Request

The sequence of elements in the initial fire request has been changed. The new sequence places the OT azimuth as the fourth element in the observer's request when the target location is given by coordinates or by shift from a known point. However, when target location is by polar coordinates, the sequence remains as formerly; that is, the azimuth follows the warning order. The change provides FDC with fire request information

in the order which provides the most expeditious production of firing data.

ELEMENT	EXAMPLE
(1) Identification of Observer	(1) This is Keel 28
(2) Warning Order	(2) Fire Mission
(3) Reference Point (or Coordinates)	(3) From Base Point (or Coordinates 42833145)
(4) Azimuth	(4) Azimuth 230
(5) Location of target—shift (Omitted if coordinates given in (3) above)	(5) Left 450, Up 20, Add 800
(6) Remaining elements of fire request: No change.	

Change 4 to FM 6-40, soon to be published, reflects this minor change in the initial fire request.

### Howitzer Blast and Noise Investigated

Reports from artillery units in Korea indicated certain types of powder fired from the 8-inch howitzer subjected cannoneers to excessive blast and noise level; occasionally, blast even destroyed camouflage nets and ripped clothing. In conjunction with current Ordnance investigation of these reports, TAS recently conducted test firings here for Ordnance.

Both 8-inch and 155mm howitzers were used in the test. Positions were so selected and dug in as to approximate closely those found in Korea. Firing was conducted during rain, fog, and clear weather. Blast was measured in pounds per square inch by "blast meters;" while an audiometer measured noise level in decibels.

From test firing with white bag propellant (zones 5, 6, and 7), it was determined that excessive blast and high noise level occurred only when there was a flash. Charge 5 always gave a muzzle flash accompanied by blast and excessive noise. In the higher charges (i.e., 6 and 7), frequency of flashing rounds was considerably less; but when charge 6 or 7 rounds flashed, blast was much greater than that obtained with charge 5. It was also found that flash reducers (M2 for 155mm howitzer; M3 for 8-inch howitzer) eliminated flash and reduced the accompanying blast for all charges.

The Ordnance Corps is now considering redesign of white bag propellants for both the 155mm and 8-inch howitzers. Until these characteristics of excessive blast and noise are greatly diminished or eliminated by other means, flash reducers may be used; but it must be noted that their use produces smoke in such quantities that position disclosure may result during daylight firing.

### Uniform Powder Temperatures Pay Off

Effects of non-uniform powder temperatures on muzzle velocities of weapons in a battery have been strikingly illustrated by chronograph at the TAS.

Item: On a typical hot day, two 105mm howitzers fired at range 6000 with charge 5. From previous chronographing, the two pieces were known to have about the same shooting strength; yet OP reports indicated the left piece was shooting about 100 yards beyond its companion. Boreighting and piece settings were checked and proved correct. The chronograph indicated that the left piece was shooting about 10 f/s faster than the right piece. The answer to the apparent discrepancy was read on the dial of the powder thermometer. Ammunition for the piece on the right was protected and the powder temperature averaged 90 degrees; ammunition for the piece on the left was exposed and the powder temperature averaged 115 degrees. This 25-degree temperature differential produced the equivalent of a 7-mil error in elevation. Firing was continued with an

"appropriate" special correction applied to the site of the right piece.

Item: The left piece was subsequently designated to fire a check point registration. The chief of section allowed his supply of ready ammunition (temperature 115 degrees) to be exhausted with the result that the last three rounds in fire for effect (temperature 80 degrees) were fired fresh from the packing case. The variation on the ground was so apparent that the registration was invalidated, and the adjustment phase resumed.

Item: A 25-degree temperature differential (75 to 100 degrees) would thus have produced these effects in various weapons:

Weapon	Charge	Range	f/s variation	Yard Effect	Mil Effect
155 How	5	8000	8.5	62.9	4.5
155 Gun	Super	21000	11.5	98.9	5.0
8" How	5	9000	7.5	53.3	3.1
240 How	4	20000	17.5	201.3	8.8

Conclusions and Recommendations: No new principle is implied in the foregoing examples, but they do emphasize the need to practice established rules. Ready ammunition should be kept off the ground and protected from wind, moisture, and the direct rays of the sun. It should be opened sufficiently in advance of firing to allow all rounds to reach approximately the same temperature. Proper care of ammunition to insure uniformity of powder temperature is essential to avoid the distortion of normal range dispersion and to improve results.

### Errata Sheets for TM 20-350

Errata sheets for TM 20-350, "Army Ephemeris for 1954"—containing corrections to tables 7, 8 and 13 thereof—are now available by writing: Commandant, TAS, Fort Sill, Oklahoma (Attn: Director, Department of Observation).

Other discrepancies existing in the manual are corrected in an additional errata sheet, to be published and distributed by The Adjutant General.

## THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

### New Training Films

Fire and Maneuver, Part I (Squad) TF 7-1868, 24 minutes in length. This film combines actual combat scenes accompanied by a chalk talk. It shows how a squad advances, and stresses the need for accurate fire.

Fire and Maneuver, Part II (Platoon) TF 7-1899, 22 minutes in length. This motion picture illustrates the basic concept of maneuvering all three rifle squads under protection of supporting fires. "Leaning into fires" is demonstrated.

### Changes to Field Manuals

Change 1 to FM 23-80, "57mm Rifle M18A1," has been printed and distributed. It is devoted to describing, illustrating and explaining the operation of the new 57mm rifle, M18A1, which has replaced the M18.

Change 2 to FM 21-18, "Foot Marches," has been printed and distributed. This change adds more information about march hygiene, march safety and march sanitation.

Change 4 to FM 23-30, "Hand and Rifle Grenades," has been printed and distributed. This change supersedes all previous changes. Additions include a discussion of the new M26 hand grenade and a new hand and rifle grenade qualification course.

Change 4 to FM 23-92, "4.2 inch Mortar, M2 and M30," has been printed and distributed. It contains new information on the use of smoke and the new subcaliber assembly for the M30 mortar.

# CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE

## No. 13 | *What Can You Do About Your Career?*

**N**EVER volunteer for anything!" Thus the old-timer to the recruit since time began. There is some sound advice in it but not all of the time or under all circumstances.

Each soldier must establish his own professional goal, and there are few who do not aspire to reach the top. Several years ago, the Department of the Army published a manual which laid down guides or career patterns for professional development. This manual, TM 20-605, *Career Management for Army Officers*, is a compilation of time-tested ideas which over many years were developed and practiced in the Army. You should turn to it occasionally as a check-up on your progress towards the top.

Career patterns (there is one for each branch of service) do not purport to guarantee a way to success. Nor do they establish stereotyped inflexible stages through which each individual must pass. But these patterns do establish broad areas in which individual ability should be tested and potential assessed. Like a runner in a footrace who checks his equipment, tests the track and finally, in running, paces himself to win, so must the Army officer determine the factors and periodically measure his advance.

What areas of individual development are significant? "Selection for Senior Military Schools", recently published in this series, gave them to you. Briefly, here they are again: command, staff, instructor, troop and combat experience. A void in one or more of these areas is not necessarily fatal, but satisfactory performance of duty in each is highly desirable.

"OK, this is all very fine," you say, "but how do I get the experience I need?" Three persons are concerned about your career and are in a position to influence its course: the Chief of your career branch, your commander and you. Let's see how each can help.

The Chiefs of the combat arms career

branches stand in the place (personnel-wise) that the Chiefs of Infantry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery and Cavalry did before WWII. Despite the fact that the career branches are handling many times more officers than the old Chiefs did, full consideration is given to the personal ambitions and needs of every officer. Your career branch controls your assignments when you are assigned from CONUS to overseas, overseas to CONUS and between major CONUS commands. Also, it selects officers for all PCS schools. By careful and fair consideration, your branch estimates your career needs, ability and potential and strikes a balance between them and the requirements of the service. Yet, the efforts of your branch may be (and often are) spoiled by your commander or yourself since Department of the Army assignment orders serve primarily as a device to move you from Point A to Point B and do not, except when a directed MOS is used, require that you perform duty in the stated MOS.

**I**N a sense, your commander has the greatest influence on your career development because he controls your actual duty assignments. Professional development through experience gained in on-the-job training is directly dependent upon his desire and capability to give you opportunity for performing varying type duties. Since professional growth is largely governed by duties performed and the experience gained, each commander has a profound responsibility in officer development.

You can help, too, by knowing what duties you need and by being alert to opportunities that will contribute to the development of your career. First, you must have a clear understanding of the factors contributing to development of individual capacity. These are: experience in varied fields or duties; performance of duty in positions of progressively greater responsibility; and, formal train-


ing in schools. Second, recognize the gaps in your development and seek opportunity to fill them. The importance of schooling has been over-emphasized by some. Formal schooling offers an opportunity to gain broader knowledge and encourages reflective and original thought, but performance of duty is what pays off in the long run—not academic learning itself.

There are some who persist in following the easy way, always seeking the most comfortable job or station. They can be sure that when responsible and important assignments (and the rewards for completing those assignments) come up, they will not be considered for them.

During the fighting in Korea, some soldiers assigned to the Far East sought staff jobs in Japan. Thus they avoided the responsibilities of command, the lessening of troop duty, and the test of combat. These individuals may well suffer because, being untried in vital aspects of their career, their potential cannot be measured.

There are also officers who, believing they alone know what is best for themselves, actively charge about, seeking a particular job or commander, or as frequently happens, a certain station or theater. They deceive themselves—as they will eventually discover. Self-attachment to one man or one type of duty breeds narrowness of view and decreases the ability to arrive at sound decisions.

**T**OP flight commanders are selected from those officers who can handle many duties. They must have demonstrated capacity for leadership, broad vision and an aptitude for performing a variety of duties. They are not to be found among those who leave their career development entirely to others or allow golden opportunities to pass by unrecognized. Nor will they be among those who indulge in personal comfort and security.



## Tough Pork Chop

IWO JIMA: Amphibious Epic  
By Lt. Col. William S. Bartley, USMC  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
243 Pages; Index; Maps: \$4.75.

Reviewed by

COLONEL A. T. McANSH

The assault and capture of Iwo Jima by the U. S. Marine Corps was a fitting climax to a drive that carried United States forces across the Central Pacific to within 660 miles of Tokyo. Tarawa, Kwajalein, Saipan and Guam lay behind along with many powerful enemy strongholds that had been by-passed and neutralized. But Iwo Jima had become too important strategically by late 1944 to be neutralized. It had to be taken and made into an operational base.

Iwo Jima looks like a pork chop from the air; in profile from the sea it has the appearance of a half-submerged whale. Dominating the entire area is Mount Suribachi, 550 feet high, an extinct volcano, forming the narrow southern tip of the Island. A dome shaped northern plateau is linked to Suribachi by a narrow stretch of land covered with coarse, black volcanic ash. This northern plateau is about one mile in diameter, and the ground sloping to either coast is rough and broken by rocky cliffs. The plateau itself is interlaced with gorges and ridges.

With the invasion of the Marshalls in February 1944, the Japanese started to strengthen Iwo Jima in earnest. By May total strength was 7,000 men. With the fall of Saipan, this strength was doubled.

The new commander, Lt. General Kuriyashina, planned and later directed an astute defense. His plan was simple and well adapted to the terrain and size of the island (7½ square miles). In a departure from traditional Japanese defensive doctrine, he abandoned the idea of all-out counterattacks against the beachhead and costly banzai charges. Instead, strong mutually supporting positions were to be occupied prior to D-Day and defended to the death. Mount Suribachi area was made a semi-independent defense sector. An elaborate system of caves, concrete block houses and pillboxes was commenced soon after the fall of Saipan and construction work continued until the island was assaulted. The defenders dug underground passages connecting different defense sectors.

The responsibility for preparing and executing the landing force plans was given

to Major General Harry Schmidt, commanding V Amphibious Corps. His major units were the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions. The 3rd and 4th were veteran units, but it was the first combat action for the 5th.

The basic plan of operations was not complicated:

(1) The 4th and 5th Divisions would land abreast on the southeastern beaches, with the 5th on the left. The 3rd Division when released from Corps reserve would land over the same beaches on or after D plus 1, prepared to assist in the attack.

(2) Colonel Harry Liversedge's 28th Marines of the 5th Division would attack on the left flank of the Corps and straight across the narrow neck of Iwo, then turn southwest to secure the Mount Suribachi area. The other RCT of the 5th was to attack to the opposite shore, then turn and attack northeast.

(3) The 4th Division on the right was to capture Airfield No. 1 in its zone, then turn and attack northeast.

(4) The entire landing force was then to drive northeast and exterminate the enemy.

Before Marines set foot on Iwo Jima that island had endured the longest and most intensive preparation given any objective in the Pacific during World War II. Carrier raids, air assaults of the Seventh Air Force from the Marianas, pre-D-Day naval gun fire bombardment and pre-H-hour bombing by sea and air units showered the island with explosives. It seemed all will to resist must surely be broken. But it was to prove otherwise.

General Schmidt, Corps commander, had other problems than with the Japanese. Naval plans called for three days of preliminary naval bombardment. Based upon experiences at Tarawa, Saipan and Peleliu, V Corps officers had asked for a 10-day bombardment. This was refused. A second request was made for nine days. This was turned down. The third time General Schmidt asked for four days. Another refusal. For the fourth time the Corps commander asked for additional time. But Navy planners still insisted that their schedule would provide adequate preparation without even one more day.

On D-Day initial resistance was light as the LVTs disgorged the Marines who hit the volcanic sand at a run that slowed to a walk as their feet sank ankle deep into soft, loose, volcanic ash. However, prearranged fires from Suribachi and the other

With a couple of exceptions, our reviewers this month are old-timers in this Department. One of the exceptions, Colonel A. T. McAnsh has made two recent appearances in the JOURNAL—in June with "The Making of a Marine" and in August with "The Pros." Jonathan Carmen is the pseudonym of a Washington journalist with more than ten years of military service. Our other reviewers have been identified in previous issues.

commanding positions soon covered the beaches. Island garrisons came pouring out of well prepared underground positions when fires lifted.

By 1030, D-Day, the island had been crossed, and Mount Suribachi isolated. But it took four days of bitter combat before the crest was captured and the well known flag-raising ceremony performed. D plus 5 the 3rd Division (less one RCT) started landing. This division took over the job of driving down the center of the island. Boundary lines and scheme of maneuver were changed. Three divisions now fought abreast.

The following fourteen days, D plus 6 to D plus 19, follow the same theme for all units. An alarming number of completely unscathed enemy positions were found. General Kuriyashina had concentrated the majority of his forces and installations in the central and northern part of the island and had used every conceivable means to make this defense impregnable. Masterful camouflage had prevented detection of many of these positions, and it took a direct hit to accomplish destruction. Few were hit before landing. It was tragically apparent to leaders that human flesh would have to succeed where heavy armament failed, and much of the fighting was uphill as well.

The critical central portion of the Motoyama Plateau was covered with rough volcanic sandstone. At places pent-up sulphur underground bubbled up through fissures and made the surface so hot foxholes were almost uninhabitable. Marines labelled this area "Dante's Inferno." This area lent itself to strong defenses, and the skilled and disciplined camouflage of the defender and the use of smokeless powder rendered detection difficult. The Japanese, as always, fought and died in place.

The battle tested 3rd Marines of the 3rd Division, held in Expeditionary Troops Reserve, was sent back to Guam on 5 March without having set foot on the island. The division and corps commander had earlier requested use of this unit to give added punch to the slowly moving attack, as casualties had been heavy. Vigorous efforts to obtain release of the unit continued, but General Holland Smith, Expeditionary Troops commander, reasoned enough troops were ashore and another regiment would aggravate already crowded conditions. He denied the requests, and the 3rd Marines sailed away.

The attack slowly but relentlessly ground forward. A Japanese night counterattack on 8-9 March was stopped, and the final drive to clear the island began on 11 March. On 16 March, the island was declared secured but mopping up continued. The 147th Infantry, USA, arrived on 20 March to take over the defense of the island. The capture and occupation phase of Iwo Jima was announced completed 26 March.

In the fighting, 25,851 casualties were sustained by U.S. forces, including 738 doctors and corpsmen. Marines suffered 22,056 of the casualties. It was estimated that 21,000 Japanese defended the island. Up to 26 March only 216 prisoners had been taken.

The first chapter in this book gives a background of events leading up to the planning. Succeeding chapters describe

planning and preparation, the landings, the isolation of Mount Suribachi, and the long, exhausting grind northward. Chapter 9 describes the final fight, and Chapter 10 describes the supporting elements. Appendices contain detailed information including twenty excellent color maps.

Colonel Bartley and the Historical Branch, G3, Marine Corps, have done a superior job on the story of this operation. Numerous photographs highlight individual unit actions. The study of the landing and sustained attack, told in restrained language, is worthy of study by military students. The 24 Medals of Honor awarded for valor reflect the high level of individual and collective heroism characteristic of that action. A fitting tribute to all who participated was voiced by Admiral Nimitz: "Among the Americans who served on Iwo

Island, uncommon valor was a common virtue."

## Optimum MPR

MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND SOCIETY  
By Stanislaw Andrzejewski  
International Library-Grove Press, 1954  
209 Pages; \$4.50

Reviewed by

COLONEL CHARLES A. H. THOMSON

This book examines the relations between military organization and social structure. In other words, it seeks to show how military affairs affect the ways in which people live with one another, and compete for wealth, power, and prestige. A former horse sergeant in the Polish army, prisoner of war, escapee from two tyrannies, beggar, smuggler, student at the London School of

## A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

*This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a current check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 56 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.*

**ARMED FORCES SPORTS ALMANAC.** By Colonel Charles O. Kates. The Military Service Publishing Co., 1954. 577 Pages; \$3.00. A complete listing of who's who and what's what in Service sports.

**CALL TO GREATNESS.** By Adlai E. Stevenson. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 110 Pages; \$2.25. The recent presidential candidate analyzes his experiences in his recent travels in thirty countries from Seoul to Berlin. He finds that democracy has a will to survive and the ability to compete with totalitarianism.

**COMMUNIST GUERRILLA WARFARE.** By Brigadier C. Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn. Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1954. 229 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.50. A British officer and an American civilian, who interrogated Hitler's generals who fought the Communist guerrillas, offer a study of Communist guerrilla warfare. Their conclusion is that guerrillas can be trained quickly and easily and that in any war against Communism or Communists their importance cannot be underestimated.

**THE COMMUNIST STRUGGLE IN MALAYA.** By Gene Z. Hanrahan. Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954. 146 Pages; \$2.00. Includes some valuable Communist documents which should be instructive to those who may meet the Communists in guerrilla-type warfare. This mimeographed booklet was not written for popular consumption but is well organized for students of this subject.

**ELECTRONICS FOR EVERYONE.** By Monroe Upton. The Devin-Adair Company, 1954. 370 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$6.00. A popular history of electronics with easily understood illustrations. Not a book for the technician but particularly valuable for the layman who wants to have a smattering of electronic knowledge without hard study.

**THE FIGHTING SUDANESE.** By H. C. Jackson. St. Martin's Press, Inc. 1954. 85 Pages; \$2.00. The World War II record of a fighting race little known in this country.

**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.** By Robert Strausz-Hupe and Stefan T. Possony. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1954. 826 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$6.50. A second edition with new material covering technology, war, international law, ethics, the economics of the nuclear age, the colonial question, and the problems of international racial tensions. Other sections have been brought up to date.

**KAGNEW: The Story of the Ethiopian Fighters in Korea.** By Kimon Skordiles. Radiopress, Tokyo, Japan, 1954. 244 Pages; Illustrated. The story of the Ethiopian battalion in Korea, written by a Greek correspondent.

**MAN AGAINST NATURE.** Edited by Charles Neider. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 483 Pages; \$5.00. Forty-five stories of daring and adventure from Boccaccio's story of "The Plague" to "The Strange Death of Louis Slotin," the atomic scientist. 479 pages of stirring stories, no two alike. Schweitzer, Hillary, Lindbergh, Costeau, Francis Parkman and Herodotus are among the others.

**THE MAN IN THE THICK LEAD SUIT.** By Daniel Lang. Oxford University Press. 207 Pages; \$3.50. A layman's tour of the world of the atom.

**MUSSOLINI: The Intimate Life of a Demagogue.** By Paolo Monelli. The Vanguard Press, 1954. 304 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.00. A translation of an Italian biography with new material added. This is in no sense a sympathetic estimate.

**REBEL ROSE: Life of Rose O'Neal Greenhow, Confederate Spy.** By Ishbel Ross.

Harper & Brothers, 1954. 274 Pages; Illustrated; \$4.00. The biography of one of America's most famous spies.

**RETURN TICKET.** By Anthony Deane-Drummond. J. B. Lippincott Company, 1954. 254 Pages; \$3.50. One more of the long series of books by British personnel detailing their escapes from enemy hands during World War II. Drummond was a parachutist and was taken prisoner twice. Here is real military adventure.

**STRATEGY.** By Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart. Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers. 420 Pages; Index; Maps; \$5.00. One of the world's foremost military writers offers his thoughts on the theory and history of military strategy.

**THE TREASON OF THE PEOPLE.** By Ferdinand Lundberg. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 370 Pages; Index; \$4.50. An indictment of the American citizen's lack of interest and sincerity in pursuing the American ideal of democratic government. One chapter, "Arms and Democratic Man," finds that weakness in our military system lies in the people and not necessarily in the services.

**WE REMAINED.** By Col. R. W. Volckmann. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1954. 244 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.75. The story of the American-Philippine guerrillas of Northern Luzon, written by their commander. A really stirring story of a too-little known incident in American history.

**WHERE LAND MEETS SEA: The Tide Line of Cape Cod.** Written and engraved by Clare Leighton. Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1954. 202 Pages; Illustrated; \$4.00. A gathering-together of personal impressions of the tide line of Cape Cod with woodcuts by the author. A beautiful book for the library and one that most New Englanders will be proud to own.

Economics, and translator, the author has been teaching sociology since 1947 at Rhodes University in South Africa. He brings wide experience to bear on his subject, as well as an impressive range of history, anthropology, and sociology. The outcome is a personal, somewhat difficult, short but enormously suggestive book, valuable for lay reader as well as for the professional student of military affairs or of sociology.

Military organization influences social structure mainly by determining the distribution of naked power. Power, naked or veiled, is inescapable in our world of struggle for wealth, power, and prestige. The ways power is seized and used affect social stratifications—the arrangement of people in society into aggregates according to their social roles. The author invents terms and symbols to carry on his analysis: *biatxy*, *polemity*, and the *MPR* (military participation ratio). *Biatxy* (Greek *bia*-violence) expresses the degree to which the distribution of power is determined by naked force. *Polemity* is the proportion of military energy to total energy used in a state. The *Military Participation Ratio* (*MPR*) expresses the degree to which people in a society are specialized for military affairs. The optimum *MPR* is that which yields maximum military strength, other factors equal. Military organizations are classified according to a combination of three factors: *MPR*, cohesion, and subordination. A cubic classification ensues of six types (two are logically impossible). Each is given a coined name: our frontiersmen are dubbed *Tallenic*, and grouped with *Tallensi* tribesmen and *Trekboers* because they all show a high *MPR* (most frontiersmen had to fight), low subordination (Indian fighting didn't call forth elaborate systems of leadership and hierarchy) and low cohesion (frontiersmen were notably independent as fighters as well as settlers).

The extent of governmental regulation is briefly correlated with military activity; not all extension of governmental control is due to military factors. Ferocity in war does not always increase with the military participation ratio. Aristocrats and professionals tend to be less fierce; they develop codes of honor and procedure. But the change-over to mass armies usually coincides with a great intensification of ferocity. Compare the courtesy of the British and French commanders at Fontenoy, each offering the other the first chance to fire, with the fierceness of the French mass armies engendered by the Revolution.

Both democratic and totalitarian forms of government are compatible with a large amount of "vertical mobility"—the rising or falling of individuals in status. Why so in totalitarian states, often thought oppressors of the masses? Two reasons at first: first, the despot finds his allies in the masses; second, and more important, is the fact that "the main pillar of a despot's power is his ability to promote and degrade." Such mobility is less in democracies, not because democracies disfavor it, but because there

is less distance between social strata, hence less range of movement.

The final chapter—a guess (1950) at the future—is least systematic, most readable, and most provocative. There can be a balance of power, leading to periodical wars. Such wars may lead to the collapse of civilization or disintegration of the globe. One state may win to world hegemony, or there may arise some kind of world federation assuring universal peace. The author deals shortly and sharply with each possible case. His comments are sure to produce argument, if not violent disagreement. Consider his prediction that the chances of survival of democracy and liberalism in the USA would be very slim, if we were to win world hegemony. Such traditions, however deeply rooted, could not, in the author's view, resist indefinitely the pressure of the actual distribution of power. Such proconsuls as MacArthur would become too independent of civil authority, too accustomed to disregard of the wishes of subordinate majorities.

Convinced of the soundness of Malthus' assertion that population must always press with increasing weight on resources, he puts hunger at the bottom of causes of wars. The solution is logical: birth control. No other population controller will suffice in the long run. Moreover, "the money spent on perfecting an infallible and comfortable contraceptive appliance would undoubtedly do more to assure peace than much greater sums spent on promoting international understanding by exchange visits, etc. . . ."

World federation is possible, if less probable than world hegemony of one power. In any case, it is wrong to think of the future solely as a contest between the USA and Russia. Other power centers may arise: a unified Western Europe, or China. Maybe even India. The task for Western diplomacy, so far crudely bungled, is to sow discord among Communist allies. Their community of faith is no guarantee of friendship. If world federation were to come about, it would be prosperous, peaceful, technologically sluggish (the control of research by bureaucrats would surely arrest it), standardized in culture, with a slow tempo of aesthetic and cultural change. Life might be much like that of a South Sea Islander, playing at work, cultivating the arts (including love-making), cooking, chatting, singing, dancing, joking. Sighs the author, "Paradise regained . . ."

## Phony

### CHINESE GORDON

By Lawrence and Elisabeth Hanson  
Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1954  
256 Pages; Index; \$4.00

Reviewed by

JONATHAN CARMEN

General Charles George "Chinese" Gordon was an Army "brat," the son of a lieutenant general of artillery, and the great-grandson of a Highland soldier who was the founder of the family. A few years after he had left Woolwich Academy as a sub-lieutenant of engineers, Charles George

became a hero to Victorian England and remained such the rest of his life. His fanatic evangelism and his reputation as a greater leader of irregular forces caught the fancy of an England that was very sure of itself and of its place in the world.

The truth is that the public picture of Chinese Gordon was as synthetic as the public picture of movie stars and gangsters of our day. He came close to being a complete phony. Barring his one solid accomplishment as the leader of the Ever-Victorious Army in China in 1863 (in eight short months he drove the Taipings from town after town and captured Soochow), his military career was an unredeemed series of failures. If the Victorians who held him in such high regard as a Christian general had understood the well-springs of his religion, they would have been appalled. Had they understood the perverted sordidness of his private life, they would have been aghast.

He was in truth a very unpleasant person who spent most of his life quarrelling with colleagues, superiors and himself—especially himself. As the Hansons write at one point: "he could not brook authority of any kind, he could bow to no judgment but his own."

His life between the victories in China in 1863 and the final disaster at Khartoum on 26 January 1885 was a mess, a squalid moral mess. And yet through those 27 years he was a hero: "Chinese Gordon," the general who sought to bring the civilizing influences of Christianity and trade to the outcasts of the earth.

The people who saw through him were maligned and criticized by the press, the pulpit and the pub. And here is a most revealing side lesson in this highly fascinating book. That lesson is that the brass-plated, plush-bottomed fat cats in the War Office (and, by reasonable extension, in the Pentagon) are not always as fat-headed and obstinate as popular fancy and fiction paint them. Sometimes (and probably oftener) they are very right in their stubborn adherence to fact, whereas the public of even a free country is at times very misguided about its heroes and therefore very wrong.

## No Sure Thing

### THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR

By Benjamin Graham  
Harper & Brothers, 1954  
272 Pages; Index; Charts; \$3.50

Reviewed by

BRIG. GEN. DONALD ARMSTRONG

The intelligent soldier wouldn't think of deciding on a course of action in war without making an estimate of the situation. But too often the intelligent soldier is a most unintelligent investor. In fact he frequently isn't an investor at all; he is a speculator looking for a sure thing. And the only sure thing about speculation is, almost inevitably, total loss.

Unfortunately, investment itself has nearly as many uncertainties as the battlefield. It, too, has its principles of strategy

and tactics. To avoid being mystified and misled in investment, a sound leader is essential, and Mr. Graham has the sanction of past success to qualify as one of the best advisers in the management of funds destined for the purchase of stocks and bonds.

Mr. Graham's book is not concerned with the entire business of investment, but is limited to the securities markets. His assumption is that his reader is a novice and that he needs guidance in the most elementary phases of the subject. No previous knowledge of the securities markets is required to understand the recommended procedures. Mr. Graham describes in clear language and without hedging the sources of economic intelligence and an appropriate program for two kinds of investors. One approach is designed for the passive individual interested primarily in safety of capital and unwilling or unable to devote much time to the study of investment. He is the so-called defensive investor. The other program is for the aggressive investor who wants a higher return and is ready to risk more and to put more time and thought into the selection of his investment media. Without regard to which class the reader may belong, he will find the book a clear, authoritative and reliable guide to the selection of stocks and bonds for investment.

### Everybody's Business

THE SEVEN MEN OF SPANDAU  
By Jack Fishman  
Rinehart & Company, 1954  
285 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.50

Reviewed by  
MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY

This is the "authentic inside story of the world's most important prisoners in the world's most carefully guarded prison." The prisoners are Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, Deputy Fuhrer Rudolf Hess, Hitler Youth Leader Baldur von Schirach, Reichsbank Minister Walther Funk, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, Minister of War Production Albert Speer, Foreign Minister Baron Constantin von Neurath.

The author, a London newspaperman, thinks that "Spandau is everybody's business," that two of the prisoners, Hess and Doenitz, have been chosen to carry on where Hitler left off, and that there are in Germany two powerful organizations "determined to assert their claims." Hess is under sentence of life imprisonment, and Doenitz, although he will be released in 1955 or 1956, is now sixty-three, a rather advanced age at which to lay the foundations of another Nazi movement when he gets out. Certainly some such development is likely in Germany as it struggles to regain its place among the nations of the world, but the argument that the seven men in Spandau are the key figures in such a possibility is hardly convincing.

Even if Spandau is "everybody's business," most of this book will appeal only to those who take a morbid interest in the details of what is admittedly a unique

prison setup, in the mental and physical abnormalities of the prisoners, and in the details of the prisoners' correspondence with their wives. Among military readers, only the specialists in German intelligence will find much to interest them.

### POW Alcatraz

MEN OF COLDITZ  
By P. R. Reid  
J. B. Lippincott Co., 1954  
287 Pages; \$3.95

Reviewed by  
RICHARD G. MCCLOSKEY

The recent war certainly produced the most ingenious lot of escapes of any war, and far and away the best written escape stories. This new one by P. R. Reid, who told of his own escape from Colditz in *The Colditz Story*, continues the drab, tragic, sometimes outrageously funny, and always exciting narrative of the escapes from Colditz from 1942 until the fortress was relieved by the American First Army in 1945.

Colditz was peculiar. It was the one German camp which housed only those who had tried to escape from some other camp. This fact concentrated the most imaginative, daring, and patient (but unlucky) prisoners of all nationalities. The guards outnumbered the inmates, and after 1942, escaping had to be highly scientific and meticulously planned to evade German countermeasures. The variations of escape methods devised at Colditz were almost infinite—including the almost incredible feat of building a glider which was to take off from the roof. The liberation, not the Germans, foiled this attempt.

The Colditz story is particularly interesting because it deals with an international grab bag of prominent and recalcitrant prisoners: English, Poles, French, Dutch, Belgians, and a small clutch of Americans. With humour and without malice, Reid contrasts national modes of behavior as they were revealed in conduct as prisoners, attitudes towards discipline (German, and that of their own CO), and escape techniques.

Apart from the excitement, Reid presents some well-thought opinions on escape technique, especially on the advantages of dribbling a few men out at a time, instead of flooding them out in mass escapes.

Put this book at the top of your list of escape reading.

### Death of a Town

THE RAID  
By Laurence Greene  
Henry Holt & Co., 1953  
246 Pages; \$3.00

Reviewed by  
ORVILLE C. SHIREY

*The Raid* is the biography of a most unusual town, and the story of the event that was at once the most dramatic thing that ever happened there and the death of the town. The place is Harper's Ferry, West Virginia; the event is John Brown's raid

on the federal arsenal there.

Harper's Ferry was apparently a place that was born for a violent end. It hangs, what's left of it, to the mountainside where the Potomac and the Shenandoah came together in violence millenia ago. Because of its water power it was an ideal place for a gun factory. The gun factory attracted Irish and Pennsylvania Dutch who apparently hated each other on sight and fought incessantly, with or without benefit of spirits. Because the route of the Potomac was a passage to the west, the B&O Railroad and the C&O Canal Company fought bitterly for a right-of-way which the mountains at Harper's Ferry cut down to a bare shelf. Because there were guns there, John Brown decided to seize them, and helped mightily to fan the spark that burst into the flame of the Civil War. And because the arsenal was indefensible and was destroyed, and the railroad was vulnerable to raiders all through the war, Harper's Ferry was, for all practical purposes, killed off.

But the site of Harper's Ferry, with its heights towering over the coming together of the rivers, is one of the great natural sights in America and has been acquired as a national monument. So it may be that Harper's Ferry has seen the end of violence.

Greene has not written a formal history. His book, like a good many histories these days, is almost in novel form, and he makes liberal use of quotes from documents of the period. The result is a well-researched, unusually dramatic biography of a town.

Military readers will be most interested in the account of John Brown's raid that makes up a large part of the book. Greene has added little to the total of our knowledge of the raid, but the material he has pulled together from many sources gives as well-rounded a picture of a fantastic operation as there is in print. Certainly it is the most readable of all the studies of Brown's raid.

Greene touches only lightly the Civil War operations around the Ferry on the grounds that these have already been covered by swarms of Civil War writers.

### Cloak and Dagger

THE SCARLET THREAD  
By Donald Downes  
The British Book Centre  
207 Pages; \$3.50

Reviewed by  
COL. R. ERNEST DUPUY

This is a farrago of counter-spy adventures, in Oppenheim style, purporting to be the author's own experiences as an agent first for Britain and later for our own OSS in World War II.

The best that can be said for it is that the author writes well. His opening chapter, a tale of high adventure on the Salerno beachhead, is the best piece of writing in the book. Perhaps that is because it contains no counter-spy folderol.

The accuracy of the author's historical perspective is shown by his gratuitous remark that Gen. William J. Donovan was the only officer to receive the Congressional Medal of Honor in World War I, an error that gallant "Wild Bill" would be the first to denounce.

## Two on History

### THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 1775-1783

By John R. Alden

Harper & Brothers, 1954

294 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00

### WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: 1910-1917

By Arthur S. Link

Harper & Brothers, 1954

331 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00

Reviewed by


LT. COL H. A. DeWEERD

John Alden's book presents the American Revolution not so much as "a reaction to repeated injuries and usurpation" as a result of clashing economic interests, administrative friction, and the "incompatibility" of English and American political concepts and practices. He devotes about one half of his space to the military aspects of the Revolution but without effecting any important change in earlier interpretations. He makes his most valuable contribution in dealing with the Loyalist problem and in emphasizing the political, social, and economic aspects of the break with the Empire. The book contains a number of well-chosen illustrations and is amply provided with maps.

Arthur Link's volume on Wilson and the Progressive Era is the product of many years of research and reflection upon the problems of this period. His work on a multi-volume biography of Wilson has already forced a revision of some opinions based on Ray S. Baker's work. The present volume covers the period from 1910, when the break-up of the Republican Party was impending, to the entrance of the United States into war in 1917. Sentimental admirers of Woodrow Wilson will find parts of the present work hard to take. For, to put it briefly, Mr. Link does not believe that Wilson was a progressive at heart and shows that he was singularly inept in the field of international affairs.

Wilson's attitude on child-labor laws, Negro rights, female suffrage and related matters caused Mr. Link to conclude that though he was intelligent and sincere, Wilson was "not a progressive of advanced persuasion." His efforts at lowering the tariff, at reorganizing banking and currency, and at anti-trust legislation were carried out "with a minimum concession to advanced progressive concepts. . . . To try to portray such a man as an ardent social reformer is to defy the plain record."

Because this volume ends with our entrance into the European War in April 1917, it does not show Wilson as the moral leader of the Allied world, a position he won by reason of his statements on the purposes of the war and the objectives of the peace in the period from January 1918 onward.



## Pass In Review

When Douglas Southall Freeman died about a year ago, he had already published five volumes of his monumental work on George Washington. He had also completed the final edit of sixteen chapters of Volume VI carrying Washington through his first term as President. This sixth volume, entitled *George Washington: President and Patriot* (\$7.50) will be published next month. All of these handsome boxed volumes are available through our book service at \$7.50 per volume.

Another new book out next month that will be of great interest is Samuel Eliot Morison's ninth volume in his *History of U. S. Navy operations in World War II*. This volume covers Sicily-Salerno and Anzio and will sell for \$6.00.

A few months back, our book service launched a sale of overstock books at greatly reduced prices. Most of the titles went fast but somewhere along the line somebody dropped a stitch and we failed to list one of the best buys of the lot. So herewith for a special offer until we run out is *The Stilwell Papers* which retails for \$4.00, on sale for \$1.00. If you recall the reviews which the book received when it came out right after World War II, you'll recognize this offer as a real bargain.

This magazine's staff is well stocked with ardent book readers. I wasn't around here very long before I discovered that one had to be reasonably agile and alert to lay hands on the good books before they disappeared from view. While my batting average is pretty good, I bobbled on one title I badly wanted to read and finally wound up borrowing a copy (from a non-staffer) in order to get it read. The book in question was Elmer Davis' *But We Were Born Free* (\$2.75) and I can say that it was well worth the effort. Davis is a fierce adherent of the basic American right of free speech and his latest book is not only highly pertinent for this day but resounds with encouragement for Americans who are concerned with the trend toward infringements on our basic rights.

We've added two new military handbooks to our list of stock books that our doughboy readers will welcome: *Rifle Squad and Platoon in the Attack* (\$2.00) and *Infantry Unit Leaders Guide* (\$1.50).

The Book-of-the-Month Club's August selection undoubtedly will find a top notch on forthcoming best-seller lists. It's *The Roosevelt Family of Sagamore Hill* (\$5.00) by Herman Hagedorn. This highly entertaining biography of Theodore Roosevelt and his family has already gathered a list of ringing indorsements from an imposing list of advance readers of note.

I read Eddie Gilmore's *Me and My Russian Wife* (\$3.75) and enjoyed it thoroughly. Gilmore spent eleven years behind the Iron Curtain working for A. P. and has written entertainingly of some of his experiences. I was a bit disappointed not to get a better "feel" of Russia out of his long experience, particularly in view of his profession, but I can't quarrel a bit with the enjoyment he provided.

Two more candidates for up-coming best-seller lists are Irving Stone's *Love Is Eternal* (\$3.95) and Thomas B. Costain's *The White and the Gold* (\$5.00). Stone's book is a fictionalized biography of Mary Todd Lincoln and if it measures up to the standard of his previous "famous wives"—Jessie Fremont and Rachel Jackson—it will be a big success. The name Thomas B. Costain on any book is like money in the bank to the publisher. This latest effort is the first in a series of books which he will write on the early days of Canada.

R.F.C.

# Selected Books For Military Readers

ALL TITLES ARE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE SHIPMENT

## World War II

Admiralties (Historical Division) . . . . .	.50
Army Air Force in World War II (Craven & Cate)	
Vol. I Plans and Early Operations . . . . .	8.50
Vol. II Europe: Torch to Point Blank . . . . .	8.50
Vol. III Europe: Argument to VE Day . . . . .	8.50
Vol. IV Guadalcanal to Saipan . . . . .	8.50
Vol. V Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki . . . . .	8.50
Bastogne (Marshall) (cloth) . . . . .	3.00
(paper) . . . . .	.25
Bradley: A Soldier's Story (Bradley) . . . . .	5.00
Calculated Risk (Clark) . . . . .	5.00
Churchill's Memoirs (Churchill)	
Vol. I The Gathering Storm . . . . .	6.00
Vol. II Their Finest Hour . . . . .	6.00
Vol. III The Grand Alliance . . . . .	6.00
Vol. IV The Hinge of Fate . . . . .	6.00
Vol. V Closing the Ring . . . . .	6.00
Vol. VI Triumph and Tragedy . . . . .	6.00
Command Missions (Truscott) . . . . .	7.50
Crusade in Europe (Eisenhower) . . . . .	2.98
Fleet Admiral King (King) . . . . .	7.50
Forrestal Diaries (Millis) . . . . .	5.00
Four Stars of Hell (Critchell) . . . . .	3.75
From Down Under to Nippon (Krueger) . . . . .	6.50
History of Marine Aviation in World War II (Sherrod) . . . . .	6.50
History of U. S. Marines in World War II (Historical Division)	
Battle for Tarawa . . . . .	1.75
Bougainville and the Northern Solomons . . . . .	2.25
The Guadalcanal Campaign . . . . .	4.25
Saipan: The Beginning of the End . . . . .	3.75
The Defense of Wake . . . . .	1.50
Assault on Peleliu . . . . .	2.75
Seizure of Tinian . . . . .	2.50
Marine Aviation in the Philippines . . . . .	2.50
Marines in the Central Solomons . . . . .	2.75
Campaign in New Britain . . . . .	4.25

Payment must accompany your order including a 25¢ handling charge for each order.

We send you bonus coupons worth 15% of your order.

Recapture of Guam . . . . .	4.25
Iwo Jima Amphibious Epic . . . . .	4.75
History of U. S. Naval Operations in World War II (Morison)	
Vol. I Battle for the Atlantic . . . . .	6.00
Vol. II Operations in North African Waters . . . . .	6.00
Vol. III Rising Sun in the Pacific . . . . .	6.00
Vol. IV Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions . . . . .	6.00
Vol. V Struggle for Guadalcanal . . . . .	6.00
Vol. VI Breaking the Bismarck Barrier . . . . .	6.00
Vol. VII Aleutians, Gilberts & Marshall Islands . . . . .	6.00
Vol. VIII New Guinea & the Marianas . . . . .	6.00
Vol. IX Sicily, Salerno, Anzio . . . . .	6.00
Island Victory (Marshall) (cloth) . . . . .	2.00
(paper) . . . . .	.25
Iwo Jima (paper) . . . . .	.25
Kesselring: A Soldier's Record (Kesselring) . . . . .	5.00
Life's Picture History of World War II . . . . .	10.00
Makin (Historical Division) . . . . .	.35
Omaha Beachhead (Historical Division) . . . . .	1.75
Patton and His Third Army (Wallace) . . . . .	3.50
Small Unit Actions (Historical Division) . . . . .	1.25
St. Lo (Historical Division) . . . . .	1.25
Strange Alliance, The (Deane) . . . . .	4.50
Struggle for Europe (Wilmot) . . . . .	5.00
To Bizerte (Historical Division) . . . . .	.50

U. S. Army in World War II (OCMH)	
Approach to the Philippines (Smith) . . . . .	5.50
Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Operations (Watson) . . . . .	3.75
Cross-Channel Attack (Harrison) . . . . .	6.75
Fall of the Philippines (Morton) . . . . .	5.25
Lorraine Campaign (Cole) . . . . .	11.00
Okinawa: The Last Battle (Appelman) . . . . .	8.50
Persian Corridor & Aid to Russia (Mottet) . . . . .	3.50
Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops (Palmer) . . . . .	4.50
QM Corps—Vol. I. Organization, Supplies, Service (Risch) . . . . .	3.25
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare—'41, '42 (Matloff) . . . . .	3.25
Stilwell's Mission to China (Romanus) . . . . .	5.50
The Supreme Command (Pogue) . . . . .	6.50
Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzo & Schmidt (MacDonald) . . . . .	4.50
Transportation Corps—Vol. I (Wardlow) . . . . .	3.25
War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas (Pictorial) . . . . .	3.25
War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas (Pictorial) . . . . .	4.00
War Against Japan (Pictorial) . . . . .	4.00
Washington Command Post (Cline) . . . . .	3.25
Logistical Support of the Armies May '41 to Sept. '44 ETO (Ruppenthal) . . . . .	4.50
U. S. Marines and Amphibious War (Isley) . . . . .	7.50
Uncommon Valor . . . . .	3.00
Utah Beach to Cherbourg (Historical Division) . . . . .	2.00
Volturmo (Historical Division) . . . . .	.40
War As I Knew It (Patton) . . . . .	4.50
War Reports (Marshall, Arnold, King) . . . . .	7.50
Winter Line, The (Historical Division) . . . . .	.35

## Civil War

A Stillness at Appomattox (Catton) . . . . .	5.00
Bull Run Remembers (Hanson) (cloth) . . . . .	2.75
(paper) . . . . .	1.90
Glory Road (Catton) . . . . .	4.50
Lee's Lieutenants (Freeman)	
(3 Vols. Boxed) . . . . .	22.50
Vol. I . . . . .	7.50
Vol. II . . . . .	7.50
Vol. III . . . . .	7.50
Lincoln Finds A General (Williams)	
Vols. I & II—Set . . . . .	15.00
Vol. III . . . . .	7.50
Mr. Lincoln's Army (Catton) . . . . .	4.00
Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant . . . . .	6.00
Sheridan (O'Connor) . . . . .	4.50
Stanton (Pratt) . . . . .	5.95

## Other U.S. Wars

Combat Actions in Korea (Gugeler) . . . . .	5.00
Decisive Battles of the U.S.A. (Fuller) . . . . .	6.50
From the Danube to the Yalu (Clark) . . . . .	5.00
General Dean's Story (Dean) . . . . .	5.00
Korea: 1950 (Department of the Army)	1.25
Short History of World War I (Edmonds) . . . . .	7.00
The River and the Gauntlet (Korea) (Marshall) . . . . .	5.00
War of 1812 (Adams) . . . . .	3.00
War of the Revolution (Ward)	
Vols. I & II—Set . . . . .	15.00

## ORDER FORM

### COMBAT FORCES BOOK SERVICE

1529 18th Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Street Address \_\_\_\_\_

Town or APO \_\_\_\_\_ Zone \_\_\_\_\_ State \_\_\_\_\_

☐ I ENCLOSE \$ \_\_\_\_\_

PLEASE ADD 25 CENTS TO THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF YOUR ORDER TO COVER HANDLING AND SHIPPING CHARGES

Please send the following books.

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

YOU SAVE 15%. Upon receipt of your remittance with your book order, we will send you Book Dividend Coupons worth 15% of the amount remitted, which can be used for purchasing additional books within the time limit stamped on the coupons. (Coupons cannot be issued with organization orders.) (OF-854)

## Handbooks and Guides

Army Officer's Guide (Harkins) . . . . .	4.75
Army Wife, The (Shea) (New ed.) . . . . .	3.50
Art of Clear Thinking, The (Flesch) . . . . .	2.75
Art of Readable Writing, The (Flesch) . . . . .	3.00
Art of Plain Talk, The (Flesch) . . . . .	2.50
Battery Duties (Cocklin) (paper) . . . . .	1.50
Company Administration & Personnel Section (Virtue) . . . . .	3.75
Company Duties (Boatner) (cloth) . . . . .	2.50
(paper) . . . . .	1.25
Food Service for the Army & Air Force (Symons) . . . . .	3.50
Frontline Intelligence (Robb & Chandler) . . . . .	2.50
Guerrilla Warfare (Levy) . . . . .	.25
Handbook and Manual for the Non- commissioned Officer (cloth) . . . . .	3.50
(paper) . . . . .	2.50
How to Survive an Atomic Bomb (Gerstell) . . . . .	1.95
How to Make Sense (Flesch) . . . . .	2.75
Infantry Unit Leader's Guide (Multop & Barrett) . . . . .	1.50
Intelligence Is for Commanders (Glass) . . . . .	3.85
Manual for Courts-Martial, 1951 . . . . .	3.25
1953 MCM Supplement . . . . .	.55
Map and Aerial Photograph Reading . . . . .	2.75
Map Reading for the Soldier . . . . .	1.00
Mathematics for the Millions (Hogben) . . . . .	5.95
Military Management for National Defense (Beishline) . . . . .	6.00
Notes For Troop Instructors:	
Automatic Pistol—Caliber .45 . . . . .	1.00
Interior Guard . . . . .	1.50
Military Courtesy and Discipline . . . . .	1.00
Officer's Guide (MSP) . . . . .	4.00
Orders and Directives (Chester) . . . . .	3.00
Platoon Record Book . . . . .	.50
Preventive Maintenance Manual . . . . .	1.00
Rifle Squad and Platoon in Attack (Rathbun) . . . . .	2.00
Squad Record Book . . . . .	.25
Survival (Infantry Journal) (cloth) . . . . .	1.50

## Biography

Abraham Lincoln (Thomas) . . . . .	5.75
Genghis Khan (Lamb) . . . . .	3.50
George Washington (Freeman)	
Vols. I & II—Set . . . . .	15.00
Vols. III & IV—Set . . . . .	15.00
Vol. V . . . . .	7.50
Vol. VI . . . . .	7.50
Robert E. Lee (Freeman)	
(Boxed set, 4 Vols.) . . . . .	25.00
Napoleon (Ludwig) . . . . .	1.45
Napoleon's Memoirs (DeChair) . . . . .	7.50
On Active Service in Peace and War	
(Stimson & Bundy) . . . . .	5.00
Panzer Leader (Guderian) . . . . .	7.50
Rommel: Desert Fox (Young) . . . . .	3.50
Rommel Papers (Hart) . . . . .	6.00
Stonewall Jackson (Henderson) . . . . .	6.00
The Head and Heart of Thomas	
Jefferson (Dos Passos) . . . . .	5.00

## Strategy and Principles of War

Airborne Warfare (Gavin) .....	3.00
Art of War (Sun Tzu) .....	2.00
Atomic Weapons in Land Combat (Reinhardt & Kintner) .....	3.95
Battle Studies (DuPiqué) .....	2.75
Caesar's War Commentaries (Warrington) .....	1.65
Defense of the West (Hart) .....	4.00
Effects of Atomic Weapons (Herschfelder) .....	3.00
Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World (Creasy) .....	1.65
Infantry In Battle .....	3.00

Mahan on Sea Power ((Livezey) . . . . .	3.50
National Security and the General Staff (Nelson) . . . . .	5.00
On War (Clausewitz) . . . . .	5.00
Reveries On the Art of War (DeSaxe) . . . . .	2.00
Soldier's Load and Mobility of a Nation (Marshall) . . . . .	1.00
Strategic Air Power (Possony) . . . . .	5.00

## General and Military History

American Campaigns (Steele) Vol. I... Beginning of the U. S. Army 1783-1812 (Jacobs) .....	6.00
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Gibbon) Vol. I .....	6.00
Vol. II .....	2.45
Vol. III .....	2.45
History of the German General Staff (Goerlitz) .....	7.50
Makers of Modern Strategy (Earle) .....	7.50
Men of West Point (Dupuy) .....	5.00
Military Staff: Its History & Development (Hittle) .....	3.75
War and Civilization (Toynbee) .....	2.50
War and Peace (Tolstoy) .....	2.45
Warfare (Spaulding) .....	5.00
War Through the Ages (Montross) .....	8.50

## Weapons

Book of The Garand (Hatcher) .....	6.00
<i>Centerfire:</i>	
Vol. I Metric Pistol and Revolver	
Cartridges .....	7.50
Vol. II American & British Pistol &	
Revolver Cartridges .....	7.50
2-Vol. Set .....	14.00
Guided Missiles (paper) .....	1.00
Gunsmithing Simplified (MacFarland) ..	6.95
How to Select and Use Your Big Game	
Rifle (Stebbins) .....	5.00

## Leadership and Psychology

Managing Men (Kraines) .....	2.00
Men Against Fire (Marshall) .....	2.75
Psychology for the Fighting Man (cloth) .	1.50
(paper)	.25

## Dictionaries, Atlases

American College Dictionary (Regular)	5.00
American Oxford Atlas (Campbell-Lewis)	10.00
Thesaurus of Words & Phrases (Roget)	1.95
Thorndike Barnhart High School Dictionary	5.50
Thorndike Barnhart Dictionary (Thumb Indexed) Special	2.25

## Communism

Capital (Marx) .....	2.45
Red China's Fighting Hordes (Riggs) ..	4.00
Soviet Arms and Soviet Power (Guillaume) .....	3.50
Soviet Military Doctrine (Garthoff) ...	7.50

## Unit Histories

Under the Southern Cross (Americal Division) (Crown) .....	6.00
Battle History of the 1st Armored Div. (Howe) .....	6.50

Old Breed (History of the First Marine Division) .....	6.50
First Cavalry Division in World War II (Wright) .....	3.00
First Special Service Force (Burhans) ..	5.00
Follow Me (Second Marine Division) (Johnson) .....	6.00
History of the Second Engineer Special Brigade .....	6.00
Third Infantry Division History (Taggart) .....	6.00
Third Marine Division .....	5.00
Fourth Marine Division in World War II (Proehl) .....	5.00
From Salerno to the Alps (Fifth Army) ..	6.00
Down Ramp (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th & 6th Eng. Special Brig.) .....	5.00
Spearhead (Fifth Marine Division) ....	6.50
History of the Sixth Marine Division (Cass) .....	5.00
6th Infantry Division in WW II .....	5.00
Ninth Marines 1942-1945 (Burrus) ....	5.00
Conquer (Story of the 9th Army) .....	4.50
Eight Stars to Victory (9th Division) ..	6.00
Night Climb (10th Mtn Div) (Harper) ..	2.50
The Angels (History of the 11th Airborne Division) .....	6.00
History of XVI Corps .....	5.00
Saga of the XX Ghost Corps .....	7.50
Children of Yesterday (24th Infantry Division) (Valtin) .....	3.00
27th Infantry Division in World War II (Love) .....	10.00
Let's Go (29th) (Ewing) .....	5.00
Work Horse of the Western Front (30th Division) (Hewitt) .....	4.00
37th Infantry Division in World War II (Frankel) .....	7.50
40th Infantry Division .....	5.00
Jungleers (History of the 41st Infantry) (McCartney) .....	10.00
56th Fighter Group in World War II ..	10.00
71st Infantry Division History .....	1.50
76th Infantry Division .....	5.00
Ours to Hold It High (77th Infantry Division) .....	6.00
Thunderbolt Across Europe (83rd Division) .....	3.50
Battle of Germany (84th Infantry Division) (Draper) .....	5.00
85th Infantry Division .....	5.00
Blue Devils in Italy (88th Division History) (Delaney) .....	5.00
89th Infantry Division .....	5.00
91st Infantry Division in World War II (Robbins) .....	5.00
History of the 94th Infantry Division (Byrnes) .....	5.00
Battle Babies (99th Division) (Lauer) ..	6.00
Rendezvous with Destiny (101st Airborne Division) (Rapport) .....	7.50
Epic of the 101st Airborne (Grout) ....	2.50
Timberwolf Tracks (104th Infantry) (Hoegh) .....	4.00
St. Vith (106th Division) (Dupuy) ....	5.00
Operation Sandstone (White) .....	3.50
History of the 120th Infantry Regiment. ....	6.50
Second to None (Story of the 305th Infantry) .....	5.00
History of the 313th Infantry in World War II (Wood) .....	5.00
History of the 363d Infantry Regiment. ....	5.00
History of the 376th Infantry Regiment 1921-1945 .....	3.50
390th Bombardment Group .....	14.00
History of the 398th Infantry Regiment. ....	5.00
409th Infantry in World War II (East) ..	5.00
Americans (Story of the 442d Combat Team) .....	5.00
501st Par. Regt. (4 Stars of Hell) .....	3.75
The 727th Ry Operating Bn in World War II .....	5.00

**Ready Now!**



POSTMASTER: If this magazine is addressed to a member of the United States Military or Naval Service, whose address has been changed by official orders, it may be forwarded without additional postage. See Par. 10, Sec. 769, P. L. & R. Entered as second class matter at the Post Office at Washington, D. C. Additional Entry at Richmond, Va.

RETURN POSTAGE GUARANTEED BY THE  
COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL  
1529 18th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

## **The Battle History of the 1st ARMORED DIVISION**

**By George F. Howe**

Today's war—and tomorrow's—has been influenced by the successes and the failures of the 1st Armored Division in World War II. The 1st, the pioneer armored division of the United States Army, was our guinea-pig armored formation. Here, at last, is the story of how Old Ironsides fought for more days than any other American armored division, and left a record that is second to none.

**ALGERIA-FRENCH MOROCCO**

**TUNISIA**

**NAPLES-FOGGIA**

**ANZIO**

**ROME-ARNO**

**NORTH APENNINES**

**PO VALLEY**

What really happened at Kasserine? Why was the 1st Armored's T/O different from that of any other armored division? Did Old Ironsides influence the battle at Anzio? Can tanks fight in mountains? You'll find the answers to these questions and many others in this stirring account of leadership, audacity and efficiency. It's the true story of what happened; not how historians wish it had happened. Order your copy now.

**\$6.50**

**Published by**

**COMBAT FORCES PRESS**

**1529 18th St., N.W.**

**Washington 6, D. C.**